This study examined the CBRN preparedness of government hospitals in Riyadh. These findings are important because these unexpected events can wreak havoc if they are not handled appropriately. The study has also provided information about healthcare providers’ competence in handling such situations. The availability of supplies, equipment, and logistics in a hospital is necessary but insufficient to manage disasters; adequately trained healthcare professionals play an equally important role. Hence, the present findings can be used to improve conditions that foster the CBRN preparedness of government hospitals in Riyadh. The overall response rate of the present study (91%) was higher than what has been reported in similar studies that have been conducted in Belgium, Australia, the United States, and Mecca.(9, 10, 15, 21)
Without clearly defined objective criteria and key performance indicators of minimum requirements for staff preparedness, it is not possible to assess hospital preparedness.(22) Many measures of disaster preparedness exist (15, 24), one of which assess 3 associated competencies: general competencies, specific competencies of emergency nurses, and rapid response competencies of first-line healthcare providers (23). However, the CBRNE Plan Checklist was adapted and used in the present study because we found it to be most appropriate to the Saudi context.
All the participating hospitals had disaster committees and detailed disaster action plans. However, only a few of them had disaster units and CBRN planning committees. Similarly, very few hospitals had conducted combined drills in collaboration with local agencies. This finding underscores their lack of initiative in mitigating the effects of disasters and the need to delineate the finer details of plans that pertain to combined drills and specific disaster units and strengthen CBRN planning by constituting CBRN planning committees. This finding is similar to Shalhoub et al’s findings that all their participating private hospitals in Riyadh had a hospital disaster plan and committee but were inadequately prepared for emergency drills. (16)
In this study, the disaster plans of 7 hospitals included CBRN considerations. This figure is higher than what was reported in a Belgian study (53%). (10) Combined drills were conducted in collaboration with local agencies in very few hospitals, and this finding concurs with those of Wetter et al and Al-Shareef et al. (15, 21)
In the present study, only half of the hospitals had a designated CBRN coordinator. A CBRN coordinator oversees CBRN preparedness activities. Therefore, their presence can facilitate the planning and execution of preparedness activities. In a majority of the participating hospitals, the medical director oversaw CBRN preparedness activities. Further, hospital personnel had received inadequate CBRN preparedness training. Hospital personnel’s knowledge about the signs and symptoms of CBRN exposure was poor. Frontline healthcare workers play a crucial role in treating victims of disasters within a hospital. Poor training and a lack of knowledge can adversely affect the effectiveness of CBRN preparedness. Healthcare workers in Australia, the United States, and Mecca receive advanced training in disaster management. (9, 15, 21) The hospitals were found to have satisfactorily assigned roles and responsibilities that pertain to the management of CBRN events to different personnel. Responsibilities that pertain to issues such as triage, security, chain of custody, storage of contaminated items, and transportation of contaminated items and deceased persons had been assigned in a majority of the study hospitals. This is an important component of CBRN preparedness because it is difficult to assign such responsibilities during disasters. However, the responsibility of procuring equipment had not been assigned in a majority of the hospitals.
Mass communication systems disseminate important messages to all staff members and the general population during disasters. Therefore, it is an important component of disaster management. However, this system was present in fewer than half of the participating hospitals. Decontamination devices help prevent the spread of hazardous CBRN materials from contaminated bodies or objects to other individuals, equipment, and facilities. Encouragingly, facilities to isolate contaminated victims were available in 80% of the hospitals. However, decontamination devices were available in only half of them, and contaminated items could be contained in only 40% of them. Thus, there is an urgent need to improve the availability of decontamination devices in hospitals because they can prevent mass contamination and mitigate the health impact of incidents that involve contaminants. The availability of decontamination facilities in the participating hospitals of the present study was poorer than what has been reported for some western countries (21, 25) but better than what has been reported for Australia and Mecca. Similarly, systems that can contain contaminated fluid were found to be available in only 40% of the government facilities in Mecca. (15)
With regard to preparedness for biological incidents, most hospitals had policies and procedures to diagnose and manage Class A agents. However, only half of them had trained their staff in these policies and procedures. Similarly, fewer than half of the hospitals had trained their staff to recognize the signs and symptoms of exposure to Class A agents. The mere availability of policies and procedures is insufficient to manage the aftermath of disasters. Hence, there is a greater need to focus on the education and training of healthcare workers to improve hospital preparedness. Medications are an important component of emergency and disaster management. It is necessary to stockpile them so that they can be used whenever there is a high demand. Nevertheless, only 6 hospitals had plans to stockpile medications. Further, only 3 hospitals had a separate stockpile for staff. Half of the hospitals did not plan to procure medicines from municipal or regional stockpiles during an emergency. All these factors can seriously affect the availability of drugs during disasters and compromise the quality of services that need to be provided. The availability of antibiotics was satisfactory across hospitals, but the antitoxin for C. botulinum was available in fewer than half of the hospitals. Such organisms can be used in bioterrorist attacks. These findings are similar to those of a study that was conducted in Mecca. (15) Similarly, only 56% of the hospitals in the Unites States were found to have adequate supplies to handle chemical or biological attacks. (25)
Nine hospitals had conducted an annual vaccination program against influenza for their staff. Most hospitals had policies to identify unusual surges in the rates of particular types of illnesses and facilities to diagnose illnesses that are caused by organisms that can be used in bioterrorist attacks (anthrax, brucellosis, plague). Similarly, most hospitals had emergency preparedness plans to manage mass casualties of biological agents. All hospitals had adequate on-site PPE. The availability of vaccination programs in hospitals was similar to what was reported in a Belgian study, (10) and the availability of PPE was similar to what has been reported in studies that have been conducted in countries other than Saudi Arabia. (9, 10)
Most hospitals had policies and procedures to treat individuals who have been affected by nerve gases, pesticides, vesicants, pulmonary agents, and other substances. Similarly, in a majority of the hospitals, antidotes like atropine, diazepam, pralidoxime, and tropicamide were available. A study that was conducted among private hospitals in Riyadh also found that a stockpile of antidotes for organophosphate and cyanide poisoning was available in most hospitals. (16) However, almost half of the hospitals did not have rapid access to stockpiles of drugs and facilities to track antidote inventories. This merits attention because victims of disasters require urgent care, and delays in procuring medicines and equipment can delay effective responses. Keim et al found that hospitals in a major city in the United States were insufficiently prepared to address emergencies that involve nerve agents and cyanide poisoning.(26) Similar to the present findings, the availability of adequate amounts of antidotes like atropine, pralidoxime, and diazepam in hospitals have also been reported by studies that have been conducted in the United States and Belgium.(10, 27) However, Eliseo et al found that these compounds were unavailable in hospitals.(9) In the present study, a majority of the hospitals had facilities to monitor chemical contamination and bags and containers to discard chemical waste. Protective clothing was also available in more than half of the hospitals, but 6 hospitals had not trained their staff to use such equipment. The present findings about the availability of facilities to manage contaminated water are similar to those of a British study. (28)
A majority of the participating hospitals had a radiation safety officer and plans to manage internal radiation incidents and irradiated victims. More than half of the hospitals did not have dosimeters that staff could use. This is an important finding because radiation detection instruments can be used to estimate the risk of a nuclear incident. Further, they are essential to the safety of staff members. The inadequate availability of radiation detection measures in hospitals was also reported in another Belgian study. (10) In a study that was conducted in the United States, the availability of equipment, protection, and treatment that pertain to radiation trauma was found to be inadequate. (29) In the present study, most hospitals had a contact list of in-facility radiation experts, but only a very few of them had access to external experts. In a study that was conducted in Australia, most hospitals were found to have access to specialist advice in the event of a CBRN incident; these findings are similar to the present results. (9) This finding is significant because external experts serve as important sources of information during an emergency. Although most of the participating hospitals had adequate facilities, equipment, and logistics to handle radiation-related incidents, they varied in the extent to which these resources were available.
Strengths and limitations of the study
The present study has several strengths. First, the current study was one of the first to examine the CBRN preparedness of public hospitals in Riyadh. The present findings are likely to serve as an indispensable source of empirical evidence in future disaster planning and management in public hospitals. Second, the use of the CBRNE Plan Checklist ensured that a comprehensive and valid set of information about the CBRN preparedness of hospitals were collected and examined. Third, all the hospital heads were interviewed by a single researcher. This enhanced the reliability of the findings and eliminated the possibility of inter-observer variations. Fourth, the high response rate (> 90%) that emerged in the present study permits the results to be generalized to other similar cities within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Finally, the hospital heads who were in charge of disaster preparedness are likely to have been made aware of several lacunae in their facilities over the course of the interview, and this may have stimulated them to conduct an internal assessment and improve their preparedness.
A few limitations of the present study must be borne in mind when its findings are interpreted. The incident commanders or heads of emergency departments of the participating hospitals provided all the data. Thus, respondents’ reluctance to disclose the inadequacies of their hospitals may have biased the data that were collected. Indeed, respondents’ reports about the availability of inventories, equipment, and logistics were not crosschecked through first-hand observations. Similarly, the knowledge and skills of healthcare workers were not directly assessed; instead, they were indirectly assessed based on the reports of persons in-charge. This may have resulted in the under- or overestimation of their abilities.