5.1 Key Themes
Data analysis identified seven key themes which we have labelled: The scale of GEJET overwhelmed disaster preparation efforts, Disconnection between Central Government and Local Organisations, Self-reliance - the local community rises to the challenge, Machizukuri: Addressing Different Levels of Risk and Vulnerability, Local Knowledge of Specific Needs, Mistrust and Other barriers to Resilience, and Gaps in Assistance
Theme 1: The scale of GEJET overwhelmed disaster preparation efforts: An important theme that emerged from the data was the inadequacy of previously effective preparation efforts in the face of the GEJET. While Japan has a solid disaster response system, and its communities undergo regular preparedness drills and practice disaster scenarios and awareness workshops to ensure they are able to cope when disaster strikes, they were unprepared for the GEJET. Several participants spoke about the importance of practice drills in ensuring the community is well prepared for a disaster. The drills and practice efforts are based on the most likely scenarios and are based on hazard maps and have been effective in preparing for previous disasters including earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis. Examples of direct quotations from participants supporting this theme are presented in Table 6.1.
However, the enormous scale of GEJET meant that they were not prepared, and without enormous effort, could not adequately prepare for such an unexpectedly destructive disaster. There was a consensus among all participants that the preparation undertaken was insufficient. For example, Ms Endo Miki, an emergency worker, had to communicate tsunami warnings to the townspeople with her shouts. Unfortunately, she lost her life in Minami Sanriku’s crisis management centre, where the powerful tsunami washed away everything (McCloskey 2011). She is credited with saving seven hundred lives. This example shows how the practices in place were inadequate for a disaster of this magnitude.
An example of how the Disaster Preparedness Program worked well at the local level is when more than 3000 school children safely evacuated to higher ground and survived despite the intensity of the tsunami and how quickly entire sections of towns were destroyed. The students had prepared in community disaster preparedness programs and received training in helping the more vulnerable and using meaningful and flexible judgement in disaster scenarios. For example, in Kamaishi-city on north-eastern Honshu (one of the worst impacted cities with about 1200 residents reported as missing or killed by the tsunami), almost all the elementary and junior high school students survived when they acted according to the concept of ‘tsunami tendenko’. Tendenko is a dialectal expression that means ‘go separately’ and calls for a quick evacuation if a tsunami hits without attempting to help others, family, children and parents.
The concept was a product of several years of training in disaster education that was part of a school program established in 2005. The tendenko concept flourished on the eastern coast of Japan as a grassroots response to large-scale disasters. The word tsunami tendenko has been handed down and circulated in the Tōhoku region as an important code of action to be observed in local communities at risk of tsunamis (Kodama 2015).
Table 6.1. Examples of quotes in relation to Theme 1
During education and drill exercises, people learn about the importance of knowledge in emergencies. People are educated about worst-case scenarios, especially for tsunamis when there is only a very short time available to evacuate. [Mr Nobou, NPO]
I was here for the previous incidents … in this one … though we had drills, we were not very ready. Due to the level of waste for two days, so much debris was hard to clean, and it was difficult to reach the evacuation centres. My daughter’s school disappeared, and we had no food. Whilst government officials arrived, they didn’t ask us what we should do. They know we have experienced other events, but we wondered why they didn’t ask us in this one? They didn’t ask us what good ideas would be. [Ms Yuki, NPO]
We participated in several routine emergency drills, such as residence fires, traffic accidents and response to these emergencies. Often, we adequately participated and practised. However, we haven’t participated in unusual emergencies, such as unexpected and destructive disasters or crises. [Mr Sato, NGO]
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The GEJET was considered a novel emergency, and such events require and demand ‘adaptive leadership’ if they are to be met with effective countermeasures (Howitt & Leonard 2009, p. 617). The disaster area, particularly the Sanriku area, is considered well prepared for disasters and tsunamis based on past experiences. However, several issues emerged after the 2011 disaster. For instance, the disaster was much more widespread than anticipated, and there was damage and injury in areas considered outside the zones of highest risk. These areas were less prepared for the effects of the tsunami.
Evacuation drills aim to improve disaster evacuation skills among the population. Government organisations such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, with cooperation from the disaster risk reduction organisations in the central and local governments, along with the resident organisations (NPOs) in the community, developed a disaster risk reduction plan that includes evacuation drills and warning systems at the village level. This plan included various initiatives such as ‘self-help’, which compels residents to know what to expect in the wake of a disaster and to understand the associated risks. They should be proactive and warn others instead of waiting for official orders to evacuate or seek shelter, for instance. Other initiatives include ‘mutual help’, where they make evacuation plans as a community. Local residents understand and use disaster risk information to forge effective and accurate plans.
Several evacuation systems are used in disaster scenarios to enable all residents, including those who require special consideration, such as women, children, and people with disabilities can protect themselves from disasters and evacuate safely. However, rural Japanese culture tends to be male dominated. Men have a high degree of contact with individuals outside of their household, but women are less connected and more centred in the home and family. Each community’s norms may differ from other communities; hence, conflicts may occur regarding gender and individual roles within the community. School children and infants are also members of the population who need special support, so evacuation plans, disaster education and drills are tailored to their capabilities and safety.
. Although the Japanese government immediately responded in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami under the existing emergency response systems, which were already quite robust given Japan’s history with such natural disasters, they were forced to amend existing laws and enact several new laws and regulations to expand those systems due to the sheer magnitude of the GEJET disaster.
Theme 2: Disconnection between Central Government and Local Organisations
Interviewees frequently spoke about a lack of coordination and disconnection between the central Japanese government and local organisations which we have identified as Theme 2.
While the coastal areas of Iwate Prefecture were the focus of extensive government intervention and political manoeuvring, and as response efforts continued beyond the immediate aftermath period, the government of Japan shifted focus towards greater engagement with the local community in the affected areas.
There were, however, considerable difficulties as the government struggled to connect with post-disaster communities effectively and the reported lack of coordination and connection between the various groups hindered recovery efforts and created frustration for those concerned. Some examples of participants’ reports of some of the difficulties are presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Examples of participants’ quotes in relation to Theme 2
What a stimulating scene. That wasn’t planned work because the public sector repaired some damages successfully, others not as much. In particular situations, fishermen volunteers and other agents were able to come together to achieve collective actions. [Mr Sato, NGO]
Responses were really slow and required approval for most applications we did. The relief efforts get hung up waiting on official permission, and [it] takes [more than] a day before we can access more support. [Mr Nobuo, NPO]
Waiting a lot. They would not let us move on or progress without going back to the officials despite the need to react quickly. [Mr Nobuo, NPO]
The capacity of the existing systems could not be reinforced. We were left in the middle of the devastations with no supplies. [Ms Akira, NPO]
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Organisations struggled to support the survivors and perform essential relief; for example, relocating food and relief supplies or distributing necessary items because they lacked the resources and did not have the implementation capacity of the central government. This difficulty may have been due to their propensity to work independently of other organisations on specific issues. Some also reported a disconnect and a lack of coordination between different relief organisations in Iwate Prefecture, delaying much needed assistance. Participants expressed their frustrations regarding slow response times and a lack of response from the authorities. One participant expressed her surprise that little input was asked of local community residents as the scale of the disaster seemed to overwhelm authorities at all levels despite the planning and preparation.
Slow responses or a lack of responsiveness from the government led to delays in securing needed resources. Since Japan is a disaster-prone country, most municipalities had appropriate stocks of emergency food and supplies in their storehouses before the disaster. Yet, many of the emergency supplies in the affected area were washed away or otherwise damaged or destroyed. While there was an urgent need for replenishment that was not considered in the drills and preparations, the response at the prefectural and national levels, including the supply of services for residents and the provision of housing, was extremely slow.
A lack of coordination among different scales of operation was apparent that prevented a coherent response to risk associated with damaged infrastructure, closed roads, loss of fuel, lack of health care support and paralysis of supplies. Due to communication and information sharing problems directly caused by the disaster, integrated relief activities became complex and difficult to carry out, and there was confusion about the severity of the damage in the affected areas and regions.
Moreover, the failure of communication systems and power in many areas led to difficulties in reaching survivors. Also, the failure resulted in perceptions of the dysfunctionality of local organisations in sharing precise information among their colleagues. Regular reform in disaster practices, on the other hand, will enable the government to forecast long-term risk mitigation and take proper action.
Theme 3: Self-reliance - the local community rises to the challenge
The support and effectiveness of local organisations and the community in responding to the GEJET was a frequent theme throughout the interviews, which we have labelled ‘Self-reliance - the local community rises to the challenge’. Some examples of participants’ quotes relating to this theme are reported in Table 6.3.
Japan regularly experiences floods, landslides, and smaller earthquakes that typically cause only minor damage. Japan has habitually overcome the more severe disasters with the help of strong community linkages, social capital, leadership of local communities and a strong governance support system. The Kobe (Hanshin-Awaji) earthquake of 1995 was a definitive moment in the development of local relief cultures such as volunteering and civil society in contemporary Japan. Major lessons learned from the Kobe disaster became templates for various relief groups to prepare for and respond to future disasters.
However, the 2011 GEJET disaster inundated a far wider range of areas than those anticipated in the existing hazard maps and disaster planning. People who lived in areas that had not been specified as susceptible to hazards attempted to evacuate too late as it seemed unlikely the tsunami waves would affect them directly and many of the casualties were from those areas. While, the disaster created a greater sense of collective vulnerability among residents, it also forced them to become more self-reliant and ultimately more resilient.
Due to the catastrophic scale of the tsunami in coastal areas, people lacked food, supplies and basic services like medical attention because of the paralysis of logistics in the inland areas. Residents were left to fend for themselves in difficult situations, and the provision of essential supplies and services collapsed in the days and weeks following the tsunami most survivors lost family, friends, homes, and property. Many elderly residents were unable to obtain their daily medications.
Unprecedented levels of support were needed to help survivors meet their daily needs, clear massive debris, and re-establish destroyed areas. Judging by the residents’ accounts of the lack of coordination and scarcity in some relief supplies like food and clean water, municipal governments could not address the scale of the disaster in all its dimensions and it seems the government was deficient in mobilising existing networks. lt, Due to limited public help and support from the government, neighbours, residents, and their communities were the first responders, and community residents supported the tsunami survivors by evacuating them to safety and providing food, water and shelter. This highlights the importance of self-help and cooperative help in each community (Sakurai & Sato 2018), in which people showed solidarity and worked together, reflecting the notion of Kizuna (having a social bond or connection).
The government's recovery efforts included several slogans or sayings meant to help motivate the local population. For instance, the term ‘Kizuna,’ meaning social bond or connection, was central to the local campaign slogan ‘Ganbarō Nippon!’ (Let’s do our best, Japan!) and reflected norms around collective-reinforcing imagery. Similarly, the Tōhoku phrase ‘Ganbapesshi’, translated as ‘try hard’ or ‘keep going’, was used. Other terms, including ‘Moyai’ (coming together) and the concept of ‘Kizuna- 絆’ (enduring bonds, close relationships), became central to conveying the spirit of a community joining together. ‘Kizuna’ was chosen as Japan's kanji (ideogram or script) of 2011 because it best symbolised the resilience of the communities in disasters (Tokita 2015). It was also used as the title to a symposium held at the University of Tokyo in 2015 as it embodied the idea of community recovery. The notion of kizuna was ubiquitous in Japanese popular culture even before the 2011 GEJET disaster and, therefore, a readily incorporated social referent. It also was prominent in the broader sense after the 2011 GEJET disaster discourse. These initiatives motivated people living outside the affected regions to support the victims through financial donations and volunteering efforts.
Another factor was the cultural dimension and the use of notions like ‘Kizuna - the bonds of friendship’ to build resilience. The term evoked a sense of national and international solidarity in the face of hardship and was combined with the expressions Gaman (endurance) and Gaman-Zuyoi (resilience). The concept of Kizuna was also considered coterminous with stereotypes about the Japanese national character, which is perceived to be group-oriented with a unique ability to withstand adversity and a strong sense of community (Suter 2016, p. 305). A clear disconnection appeared in the government response to the disaster, which increased the vulnerability of residents.
Table 6.3 Examples of participant quotes in relation to Theme 3
We don’t think we’ve ever seen this situation of how vulnerability can be mitigated by our culture before. Our inherited behaviour starts appearing. [Ms Akira, NGO]
I just hated to knock on the doors and ask: “Are you okay? Are you safe?” I think they are just inappropriate questions to ask. Instead, I asked the survivor: “Is there anything we can help you with?” Even if they don’t feel good, they may feel more comfortable. [Ms Akira, NPO]
Community organisations started to accept donations of supplies regardless of the source [so when] we realised trucks were coming, [we] unload[ed] supplies in our warehouse. We sorted those supplies and stored them. We prepared the supplies according to the needs of every team to avoid disruptions and bottlenecks of relief priorities. [Ms Akira, NGO]
There were ten fishing ports around Kamaishi city and surrounding villages. First of all, I went to each village and asked them to make a list of items they need[ed]. Then, the next day I collected the list, and according to the list, we sorted and classified the supplies for each village. This is how we supported each other. [Mr Takashi, NPO]
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The responses and actions of local community members following the GEJET were critically important to the recovery effort and was referred to by several participants. Local organisations were able to help others and used community solidarity as a tool to help mitigate and provide assistance to residents in trouble. Participants observed that the self-help and community-driven practices embodied in the machizukuri resulted in various projects and efforts, including planning initiatives, neighbourhood-level actions, and urban development, that integrated local culture. These efforts helped to focus on the particularities of Japanese cities and emphasised the resilience of the communities.
Over the years prior to 2011, a collaborative, integrated community participatory approach was developed in the machizukuri as local community groups with wide-ranging expertise assisted in cities, towns, and villages in the Tōhoku region. The machizukuri also represents a long-term commitment to the community and the responsibility and involvement of all stakeholders in community development and reconstruction of the affected area. In the GEJET disaster, machizukuri organisations were important because they fostered community care and citizen participation. Community organisations were set up in situ and facilitated community care by emphasising the tangible and intangible aspects of community recovery post disasters. Members were empowered to help other members.
The people of Tōhoku were commended for their strength and resolve in the recovery. They were admired for their perseverance (known as gamanzuyoi) and the resilience they displayed following the disaster. There was a focus on community, and crimes like looting were low to absent in the recovery. Neighbours helped their fellow community members instead of taking advantage of the chaotic circumstances for personal gain.
People gained power through strengthening resilience among those affected. A total recovery would require time and strength from the area’s residents. In addition, Buddhist groups and worship centres provided community support and spiritual care after the 2011 GEJET crisis, fuelled in part by research into the role of religion in health care and care for the dying. These spiritual care approaches contributed to addressing the needs of disaster victims initially and embraced the caring nature of the Japanese culture which helped people cope with the situation and adapt, despite feeling vulnerable.
Further evidence showed a definite focus by relief organisations on meeting the needs of each survivor. There was a strong emphasis on conducting a needs assessment to assess what relief items residents needed. However, relief workers were aware of the need for sensitivity when asking people about their needs – see the example provided by Ms Akira in Table 6.3.
She reported trying to empathise with the residents she contacted and acknowledged that many residents were able to find safety. However, they still needed assistance with other dimensions of their lives due to the multidimensionality of the disaster and the extent of the devastation. One participant explained, while the earthquake struck and caused damages, a sense of solidarity was created in the aftermath, and people started donating supplies.
Her local organisation made an effort to know the needs at the community level and fomented solidarity among the disaster-affected population. When community and individual behaviours change due to the circumstances of a crisis, they seek collaboration across individual and professional groups to rebuild from their culture and cope with or adapt to shocks or crises to foster a more sustainable response.
Here, part of being resilient in the wake of such disasters is to appeal to humanitarian work in supporting the local communities and response efforts (Robertson et al. 2021). The local community organisations were trusted by residents and responded collectively to the disaster through local donations to secure what was most needed and meet the different needs of survivors, such as food, water, and healthcare support.
Moreover, participants explained it as a way of perceiving things positively in such a situation. The themes that link these examples are solidarity and helping to distribute resources in the ensuing days and weeks after the disaster, but it is not only a matter of solidarity per se. Perhaps this is important in terms of explaining resilience because it provides a concrete example of how a community can build resilience through community linkages. Aldrich (2012) showed how community ties and local civil society are decisive factors in determining a community’s resilience to disaster and coordinating recovery and rebuilding. A properly coordinated, planned, and decisive recovery policy with well-thought-out participation of different stakeholders would have been useful and efficient. This feedback regarding local responses to the disaster in Japan shows there was resilience at the local level, and community-based organisations helped to support that. Still, the scale of the loss and the scope of recovery was significantly greater than planned for.
Theme 4: Machizukuri: Addressing Different Levels of Risk and Vulnerability (‘unimaginable’ (soteigai))
The issue of vulnerability and different degrees of risk faced by various members of the community was another important theme identified through the data.
Disaster relief operates in the context of communities that have different levels of vulnerability and with populations and individuals within populations that experience different levels of risk. The general understanding was that local communities were prepared to cope with disasters like tsunamis because of machizukuri practices that exist in most Japanese cities. However, disaster relief is inherently linked to the vulnerability levels of local communities (komyunitei). As people faced the local circumstances of the earthquake, they were exposed to different degrees of risk, and they faced different challenges.
In this context, vulnerability to risk is viewed at the individual level. People were exposed to numerous risks in their localities and confronted with different challenges. There was a lack of employment opportunities in the aftermath of the disaster, for example, and core industries such as aquaculture and the processing industry in Rikuzentakata faced recruitment challenges and other problems. A great deal of land in the region became overgrown with weeds. Most importantly, the downtown area of the city was lower than other areas, which exacerbated human suffering during the evacuation. However, residents who lived near higher ground survived because they could evacuate successfully, even as they saw the tsunami unfolding.
The evacuation and rescue methodologies for disasters include special consideration of some groups including the elderly and people with disabilities (both physical & mental disability, for example, dementia, can place people at a greater risk of injury) or medical conditions who are more vulnerable and prone to injuries and are more likely to suffer harm and need more attention due to the harsher living conditions in evacuation centres, especially in unusually cold weather.
Evacuation teams, for example, from Otsuchi city and several other cities and towns, were reported missing or killed. The tsunami struck them after they evacuated from the earthquake. They felt responsible for leading survivors to higher ground rather than evacuating themselves.
Moreover, high death rates among aged people in Iwate Prefecture were flagged as a significant issue, as the elderly and people who need health care are less able to evacuate quickly. Evacuation centres were overcrowded due to the huge number of evacuees.
Table 6.4 Examples of participant quotes in relation to Theme 4
Unequal distribution of risk and unequal distribution of reconstruction efforts made residents more vulnerable. [Ms Yuki, NPO]
Due to specific particularities of Japanese cities, machizukuri [community building] community practices played a vital role in promoting community activities, including a strong emphasis on the neighbourhood in attempts at making a community space. [Ms Akira, NPO]
Cultural dependency such as the term machi as a place of a social community is deeply rooted, which relates to how people perceive their place in communities. [Mr Obha, NGO]
Expected improvements include further community-driven initiatives, further decentralised actions in the cities and more effective use of machizukuri attempts. [Mr Sato, NGO]
The elderly and sick people were susceptible as many had to suffer overcrowded temporary shelter settings and several transferred to hospitals during evacuation. [Mr Sato, NGO]
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Theme 5: Local Knowledge of Specific Needs
Understanding vulnerability played a major role in both the initial response and ongoing relief efforts, particularly through the collaborative efforts of non-profit organisations in the region. Machizukuri was viewed through a cultural lens and provided a way to understand how culture shaped vulnerabilities.
As the communities coped with the disaster, the main concern initially was assuring the safety of the survivors. Several organisations had shifted their focus and started to prioritise assistance for women and the elderly. For example, some organisations provided household items that were damaged or lost, and some focused on re-establishing healthy routines for children and helping their families.
An eclectic number of strategies were employed to help meet the different needs of residents and to address the multi-faceted problems that the community faced in the period following the disaster. Local participating organisations understood what different segments of the population needed and how local organisations could help. For example, local knowledge and awareness of the difficulties people faced allowed aid organisations to understand the specific need for bicycles to allow people to move around (see Table 6.5). They also knew how resources could be distributed and allocated to people whose own capacity to cope was strained.
Part of the process of understanding the demands was determining what types of supplies were needed and if the support was suited to the specific culture of Japan. This approach is consistent with the Japanese culture, understanding the trauma of a disaster situation and showing compassion, generosity, and effectively governing the relief operations.
Table 6.5. Examples of participant quotes in relation to Theme 5
The stories of various reporters, when viewed within the context of Japan’s collective culture, the many leaders, volunteers, and community members that contributed to the relief production, all represented opportunities for social engagement as machizukuri objectives. [Mr Ohba, NGO]
Our project aimed to provide particular materials such as bicycles so that survivors could move around. [Ms Akira, NPO]
Some Japanese aid organisations helped in providing household equipment such as fridges and washing machines and those kinds of things, and other NGOs just focused on children. They made temporary playgrounds and that way they supported the families. [Mr Ohba, NGO]
We had neighbourhood associations (known as Chonaikai), volunteers and local participants coming from everywhere to provide help. No matter what they did, they lent their knowledge and efforts to show solidarity. Kizuna. [Ms Yuki, NPO]
I believe that Japanese neighbourhood associations showed a strong emphasis on the elderly and disabled population as they could not evacuate themselves. [Mr Oba, NGO]
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Theme 6: Mistrust and Other barriers to Resilience
The issue of mistrust creating a barrier to resilience emerged as an important theme from the interviews. Despite the existence of long-standing community-level organisation and mobilisation for improvement in local infrastructure and community resources such as the machizukuri initiative [まちづくり] (Menoni et al. 2012), many of the local actors were not recognised as community leaders because their social engagement fell outside of the existing framework of community disaster response. This lack of recognition left them vulnerable in the wake of the crisis, and it made them less resilient as a community as the effects of the disaster wore on.
While the government played a vital role in the evacuation and response efforts and apologised to the victims for its slow response, survivors developed a sense of mistrust due to the lack of information regarding the damage the tsunami caused and the explosion of the nuclear reactors. They often received confusing explanations from authorities and
felt ignored and confused, completely disconnected from family and community as limited information on the scale of the damage was provided to them by the officials. Survivors wanted to perceive a sense of normality.
Moreover, participants referred to a lack of national government preparedness, a lack of organisation at prefectural levels, and an overall lack of effective decision-making. Interviewees also referred to a lack of consultation with local communities regarding restructuring and relief efforts that further contributed to a lack of trust. Several examples of participant’s quotes supporting the theme of mistrust are displayed in Table 6.6.
The structure of the community relating to norms and practices may partly explain the lack of consultation as the relief and response were not localised, and researchers have emphasised the grave impact this had on the social bonds between community members in the GEJET affected areas (Kaneko 2013). The region suffered an exodus of the population beginning in early 2013.
Participants described many inconsistencies in operations, realising the difference between government rhetoric and actual action, while it was also acknowledged that the government had many competing interests to attend to as the disaster unfolded and relief was underway. Still, they felt the government ignored their participation as a source of support.
Therefore, using a centralised approach alongside priorities in relief engagement demonstrated the politicised nature of disaster relief that has left several communities and organisations feeling excluded from participation in the relief operations.
The key factor for most people is that up until the end of 2015, much of the recovery was focused on infrastructure projects for the benefit of the community and its development. For example, temporary housing, public housing, rebuilding schools, and the hospital were larger projects that did not necessarily facilitate participation because the central government did not formulate appropriate guidelines on priorities. Despite extraordinary reconstruction efforts, people’s recovery has stagnated and
survivor’s other needs, including health issues, both physical and mental, job losses and other were neglected. While reconstruction was important, other significant disaster-related issues were not prioritised. The centralised approach to the disaster left the major budget in the central government’s hands. Localities and communities used their own budgets to plan their own priorities, but those resources were inadequate given the scale of the disaster.
Table 6.6 Examples of participants quotes in relation to Theme 6
Iwate Prefecture is so big. The affected area is quite long, from Iwate Prefecture down to Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, those prefectures. The first job they had to do was to collect all the materials and supplies they needed, which was the first thing they did. Early-stage, that’s March 15th, so four days later. This was the early stage of the activity. Only a small volume of the materials came. Supplies came to the office, including medical supplies. [Mr Sato, NGO]
Everyday life becomes extraordinarily different. This needs more support. [Mr Nobou, NPO]
The disaster forced people to change their lives. Daily disparities were greatly affected by the earthquake. Disaster, evacuation, reconstruction, living, and economic disparity. What remained until the end was a reconstruction of the mind. Mental health. [Ms Kako, NGO]
I think the attention devoted to the economic element of this disaster is not an issue. The impact of this disaster is huge on everyone in this country. However, we believe we were ignored, even deliberately left out of consultation and support. [Mr Kaito, NPO]
Perhaps, we were misled by viewing ourselves as superior. Our country’s political position in terms of strength and weakness were clearly exposed after the disaster. [Mr Sato, NGO]
Remarkably after the disaster, our country requires decentralisation of both political and economic structures. In particular, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant crisis drew significant criticism to the nuclear-power production in Japan. [Ms Yuki, NPO]
The central government did not show adequate knowledge of specific regional needs, as communities and local leaders used their own resources to finance reconstruction efforts. [Mr Nobou, NPO]
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Theme 7: Gaps in Assistance
We have labelled the seventh and final theme from the interviews as ‘Gaps in Assistance’ and some examples of participants’ comments can be seen in Table 6.7.
One of the roles of the government in disasters is to facilitate the delivery of food, which was very scarce in the immediate aftermath of the GEJET, and relief items to evacuation centres in the affected areas. Supplies like this were consolidated at Japan Self-Defence Forces JSDF sites (50 sites nationwide), and JSDF ultimately delivered these supplies to the affected areas. However, in practice, the delivery of aid was more complex, and while the government focused on providing evacuation centres and temporary housing, this was not a priority among the residents at the time. Resources were not mobilised in ways that considered the local community. Yet, the response guidelines gave the highest priority to saving human lives. With the loss of community connections (tsunagu) and close neighbourhoods, people emphasised the social linkages despite having busy lives and jobs. Survivors and their families were separated in the evacuation process, and the lack of information resources put them under stress.
Although mechanisms were in place in Japanese rural society that were intended to respond to disaster situations (such as Japan’s Emergency Management System and Risk Reduction - The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act), the government desired to take control of the relief rather than leave it in the hands of the local community (Cabinet Office 2016). Many called upon the government to pay closer attention to the needs of local residents.
The government did not amend their approach to the disaster in general nor to the specific issue of the nuclear crisis that arose. They did not allow prefectures and cities to use their own recovery and reconstruction plans.
The Japanese-planned pre- and post-disaster intervention mechanisms sought to address a variety of common problems that communities faced in an effort to learn from the current crisis and apply that knowledge in the event of disasters in the future. The emergency stakeholders worked jointly across structured approaches in the emergency response hierarchies to assess, detect and respond to the crises. This silo system emphasises the authority of leaders regardless of their education or background.
The government response across essential functions, resource allocation, communication and coordination left people under stress. Flaws were observed in the Japanese Government’s communication during the earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The lack of clarity regarding the information released led to significant confusion at national and international levels alike, which led many to question the transparency of the government (OECD 2015)
Overall, the findings show that the humanitarian relief workers felt a deep sense of discomfort because of the centralisation of and leadership style employed during disaster relief. It prevented them from dealing with local authorities who fully understood the local governance systems and the impact of the disaster on both people and infrastructure. Although the centralised disaster response system was intended to provide a resilient model for disaster management, since communities, individuals, groups, and organisations were given guidelines to follow, there were difficulties in implementation given the scale of the triple disaster across such a wide region of Japan.
Table 6.7 Examples of participant quotes in relation to Theme 7
We did not need new evacuation centres or new temporary housing. We were facing a new crisis, and our needs were more important. Neither response nor quick decisions were effective at a time when our people were at great risk. [Mr Obha, NGO]
Governments and institutions have a responsibility to listen to and engage with local communities and include local leaders and management knowledge and practices in their approach to disaster prevention and preparedness going forward. [Mr Ohba, NPO]
We noticed the central government did not appear to be flexible in terms of our recovery and reconstruction plans. [Mr Obha, NGO]
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