In order to discuss the possible impacts of the Bridge scenario, we compare it to four other scenarios i.e. the impacts of current policies (CurPol), the conditional NDCs (NDCplus), and the models’ cost-optimal pathways towards 2 °C (starting immediately: 2Deg2020, and with a delay: 2Deg2030) (see Methods and Supplementary Information for more details). For the first two scenarios, the current policies and NDCs were extended beyond 2030 by assuming equivalent effort, i.e. by extrapolating the ‘equivalent’ carbon price in 2030, using the GDP growth rate of the different regions up to 2050 for the extrapolation (see Supplementary Information part C). For the Bridge scenario, the defined set of measures was implemented up to 2030 (Table 1) and a cost-optimal path towards 2 °C was implemented after 2030 (see Supplementary Information part C). A full description of the scenarios and additional results can be found in the Supplementary Information.
[Please see the supplementary files section to view Table 1.]
A bridge over the emissions gap
The model outcomes (Figure 1 and Supplementary Figures B 7 and B 8) show that the CurPol and NDCplus scenarios both fall considerably short of the emission reductions needed to implement the Paris Agreement (consistent with earlier work). In contrast, the good practice policies included in the Bridge scenario are able to reduce GHG emissions close to the needed levels in 2030, followed by a longer-term trajectory similar to the ambitious benchmark of 2Deg2020. The Bridge scenario has a less steep reduction than the 2Deg2030 scenario in the short term, offering a pathway that largely closes the 2030 emissions gap without adding substantial challenges in the short and medium terms. Here, the emissions gap is defined as the difference between the NDCplus scenario and the 2Deg2020 scenario. The Bridge scenario closes that global emissions gap by 71% (median, range 26%–275%) by 2030, and compensates the slower start by a slightly deeper emission reduction in 2050, 106% (85%–112%). The 2030 emissions gap is closed by 17% in the USA, 49% in India, 56% in the EU and 75% in China.
Figure 2 shows the rates of GHG emissions reductions in the Bridge scenario, compared to the CurPol, NDCplus, and cost-optimal case (immediate: 2Deg2020 and delay: 2Deg2030). In contrast to the increase in GHG emissions under current policies in some countries, emissions decline everywhere in the Bridge scenario, especially in the 2030–2050 period. In most countries, the Bridge scenario shows smaller reductions than the immediate action 2Deg2020 scenario in the short term (2030), and smaller reductions than the 2Deg2030 scenario in the longer term (2050). As such, good practice policies can constitute an alternate pathway in line with the Paris Agreement’s climate goals, without relying on carbon pricing only as in cost-optimal scenarios, while not significantly increasing the burden in the longer term.
Which measures have the largest effect on emissions?
The emissions gap between the NDCplus and 2Deg2020 scenarios amounts to approximately 12 GtCO2e in 2030 (model median). The Bridge scenario closes this gap with 71%. The energy supply sector (through higher renewable energy share, electrification, energy efficiency improvement) is the largest contributor to emissions reductions between the NDCplus and Bridge scenarios, both in 2030 and in 2050 (Figure 3). In most models, also mitigation of non-CO2 emissions, the transport sector (zero-carbon vehicles and efficiency improvements), and AFOLU (notably in 2030) play an important role. This indicates potential to enhance NDC ambition in specific areas.
Changes in energy and land-use systems
Figure 4 shows projected changes in energy and land-use systems under five scenarios: CurPol, NDCplus, Bridge, 2Deg2020, and 2Deg2030. The Bridge scenario significantly increases mitigation action compared to the CurPol and NDCplus scenarios. In fact, on several indicators, the prescribed policies (Table 1 and Supplementary Information part A) close the gap with the cost-optimal 2Deg2020 scenario almost completely. By 2050, the Bridge scenario is more ambitious than the 2Deg2020 scenario for many indicators, compensating for the delay with respect to the cost-optimal pathway. Figure 4 Panel a, for example, shows that the target to increase the renewable electricity share by 1.4% per year in the Bridge scenario (measure 9) leads to deployment far beyond the CurPol and NDCplus scenarios in 2050 (i.e. towards 75%, versus around 50%), but similar to the 2Deg2020 (in line with previous research13) and lower than the 2Deg2030. In 2030, however, the Bridge scenario is similar to 2Deg2020, so it does not increase the global trend in terms of installing renewables in the short term (it may do so regionally, however, see Baptista et al.11). As a result of the assumed penetration of non-fossil fueled vehicles (measure 20), the Bridge scenario shows a significant increase in the share of electricity in transport, even more so in Bridge than in 2Deg2020 (Panel b). This starts in 2030, but manifests especially in 2050. However, in some models, the target to increase non-fossil fueled vehicles actually leads to an increase of biofuel powered engines (Supplementary Figure B 1) rather than electrification (explaining the relatively large range), but less so than the 2Deg2030 scenario in 2050. Following CCS (measure 13), efficiency improvement (measure 14), and F-gas emission reduction (measure 10) targets in industry, industrial emissions (expressed as CO2 emissions from industrial processes as well as F-gases, panel c), are projected to decrease, in Bridge slightly more so than in 2Deg2020 (by 2050). Because the measures in the buildings sector focus on energy efficiency improvements (measures 3-6), the share of electricity in buildings (panel D) is not projected to change significantly in the short term, but Bridge makes up for that by 2050. Panel E shows that the afforestation policy (measure 16) leads to slightly more afforestation in 2030, followed by a large scale-up in 2050, but not as large as in 2Deg2030. As such, CO2 emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU) are projected to be reduced by 38% (model median) by 2030 and by 120% by 2050 in the Bridge scenario, relative to 2015 levels. Supplementary Figure B 2 shows the same indicators but for the NDCplus-convergence scenario instead of NDCplus: by 2050, the convergence scenario is closer to the Bridge scenario than NDCplus for most indicators. Figure B 3, finally, shows the projected changes in the primary energy mix. Bridge sees lower total primary energy supply mainly due to the efficiency improvement and transport electrification measures, but not as low as 2Deg2020, and a shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, especially by 2050. As a result of the scale-up of renewable energy, electrification of energy demand, and efficiency improvements, CO2 emissions from the energy sector are projected to decrease.
Costs of building the bridge
While the good practice policies may have benefits in terms of social and political acceptability, earlier work (Kriegler et al., 2018) has highlighted that a set of regulatory measures may be more costly than a comprehensive carbon pricing scheme, leading to a non-cost-optimal transition across regions and sectors. A uniform price signal ensures that mitigation happens first where costs are lowest, leading to the overall efficient outcome, in absence of other market failures. Furthermore, climate action as represented in the Bridge scenario implies a more gradual path for emission reductions in the period 2020-2030 compared to the immediate implementation of the cost-optimal policy (2Deg2020). This delay can further raise costs of the Bridge scenario, depending on the evolution of technology costs. The salience of a carbon price, however, may also raise opposition especially from low-income households facing energy poverty and food-insecurity14, carbon-intensive regions and vulnerable trade-exposed industries that may complicate or delay its implementation15. Arguably, the good practice policies included in the Bridge scenario face lower implementation barriers and could speed up climate action compared to a scenario in which cost-optimal policy measures are pursued. A fair evaluation of the costs of the Bridge scenario therefore involves two comparisons: one with the immediate and cost-optimal climate policy (2Deg2020), and one with a delayed implementation of uniform carbon pricing, starting in 2030 (2Deg2030) and therefore requiring more disruptive action to meet the 2 °C target.
Our results (Figure 5) indicate that although the Bridge scenario raises policy costs (as expressed by GDP cost per tonne CO2e abated relative to the Current Policy scenario) in 2050 by more than 20% (1%–38%) compared to an immediate implementation of a cost-optimal 2 °C scenario with globally uniform carbon prices (2Deg2020), it has lower policy costs (Figure 5a) and carbon prices (Figure 5b and Supplementary Figure B 9) in the near term (2030). The Bridge scenario also outperforms a delayed 2 °C scenario (2Deg2030, see Supplementary Information part C) with costs being more than 10% (-6%–33%) lower in 2050. As such, our analysis suggests that early but non cost optimal action is preferred over climate policy delay.
Interestingly, not all models in the ensemble agree on the size and sign of the trade-off between early and cost-optimal policy implementation. Multiple and counteracting effects are at play. Generally, good practice regulatory policies would raise costs particularly when the resulting energy system deviates strongly from the cost-optimal one. If the necessary changes are obvious, or when there are low-hanging fruits for climate policy, then a similar outcome may be achieved through regulation and carbon prices. The phase-out of coal and the scale-up of renewable power generation technologies16-18 may be an example that comes close (Supplementary Figure B 10 shows that investments in the electricity sector are projected to shift from fossil fuels to renewables). However, for other trade-offs, such as efficiency improvements versus fuel shift, or the allocation of emission reductions across sectors, a mix of regulatory measures that leads to an outcome resembling the cost-optimal one may be more difficult to achieve. Therefore, while regulatory policies can be a pragmatic entry-point for climate policy, cost-efficiency in the medium and long-term is more easily achieved via comprehensive carbon pricing schemes across all sectors and regions to avoid inter-sectoral and inter-regional leakage12. The costs of delaying climate action, on the other hand, depend on technological progress and the availability and scalability of negative emission technologies (NETs) in the future, among others19. For three out of four models that capture economic growth endogenously, the costs of delay outweigh the additional cost of regulatory good practice policies in 2050.
An advantage of the regulatory measures as implemented in the Bridge scenario is that carbon prices remain at lower levels in the near term, which may facilitate public acceptability and implementation of carbon pricing schemes with a broad sector coverage. If political consensus in favour of a comprehensive pricing scheme is not found over time, then a further intensification of the good practice policies may serve as a practical way forward to close the emissions gap. At the same time, the advantages of good practice policies in terms of acceptability may be challenged if ambitious climate targets bring cost elements to the forefront of the political debate.
Hence, our results suggest that a global roll-out of good practice policies can be a useful approach to close the emission gap in the near term, while their role in climate policy in the longer term should be reconsidered in the context of a broader policy mix20, including carbon pricing21.