Aiming at the problem that the government regulates the carbon emission of enterprises, this paper introduces the prospect theory to correct the revenue function of government and enterprise, considering the risk of air quality deterioration, built an evolutionary game model of government and enterprise based on prospect theory. According to the weight of the two sides on the probability of air quality deterioration under the equilibrium state, the risk of air quality deterioration is divided into three levels: low, medium and high. Analyzed the evolution strategy of government and enterprise under different levels. The results show that when the risk of air quality deterioration is low, the government tends to negative regulation and enterprises adopt traditional production. When the risk of air quality deterioration is high, government tend to be positive in regulation and enterprises are inclined to low-carbon production at the beginning. However, with the implementation of enterprises low-carbon production, government departments will turn to negative regulation. At the same time, there will be incentive paradox phenomenon in the process of government regulation of carbon emissions.In the long run, it is more effective to strengthen the punishment of government departments' ineffective supervision than to punish enterprises.