2.1 Discretion
An essential conceptualisation of discretion-as-perceived is “the degree to which frontline workers perceive to possess discretion” (Thomann et al., 2018, p. 584). Furthermore, Lipsky (2010) highlights that discretion of SLBs can be illustrated in their perceived freedom to make a judgment while on the job. He also added that SLBs are individuals who see themselves as trustworthy and accountable for the decision as they are aware that such judgments have a profound influence on clients/public lives.
The theory of street-level bureaucracy by Lipsky (2010) drew attention to the public servants who work directly with the public. These personnel are called “street-level bureaucrats” or SLBs who directly interact with people. Examples of these individuals are law enforcement officers, educators (public school teachers), labour inspectors, social workers, etc. The main component of this theory is discretion, which can be understood as the perceived freedom to decide; while enforcing regulations, SLBs may employ rewards/sanctions or may behave as an advisor to clients during the enforcement phase (Hill & Møller, 2019; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014).
Lipsky (2010) also empathise that SLBs often do experience discretion by their freedom to depart from service ideas by following rules and procedures and emphasising managing their clients' expectations and demands (Hill & Varone, 2021; (Hassan et al., 2021c).
Lipsky (2010) and Hupe and Hill (2015) noted that SLBs regularly see themselves burdened by the bureaucratic system as it contains many sets of standard operating procedures that they must adhere to, which many shapes their behaviour. However, they typically have elevated levels of discretion as they strive to empower themselves by pursuing unconstrained freedom to decide.
Taylor and Kelly (2006) found that discretion is employed when SLBs focus on finding ways to assist their clients and move away from following strict guidelines on how regulation objectives can be achieved. However, to ensure that the enforcement process is active, SLBs must act freely based on the limited information to achieve successful enforcement (Hill & Varone, 2021; Thomas, 2006). Tensions may emerge between policy necessities and the SLB’s abilities to deliver services to clients (Lipsky, 2010). A bureaucrat must have the ability to manage numerous clients' demands during the policy implementation, as their performance will be measured by their ability to ensure clients comply with policies (Davidovitz & Cohen, 2021; Hupe & Hill, 2015; Meyers et al., 1998).
SLBs discretion is experienced during the enforcement phase while the dealings between these bureaucrats and their clients are used as an indicator of regulatory and policy outcomes, as the level of compliance of inspectees will shape by the success or the failure of these interactions. Similarly, discretion will shape the bureaucrat’s perception of their client's “client meaningfulness”, as their perceived freedom is interwind with whether inspectees can support or harm the enforcement process, and based on that perception, SLBs will determine how to manage clients’ expectations and interactions (Hupe & Hill, 2015; Hupe, 2019).
Therefore, SLBs' perceived ability to act freely will ultimately define policy and regulatory outcomes as it involves SLB's decisions that will influence how clients comply with regulations (Hill & Møller, 2019; Meyers et al., 1998).
2.2 Client meaningfulness
Tummers (2012, p. 9) described this construct as the perception of SLBs on the values added due to particular policy implementation to the target group/clients, “do they perceive that they are helping their patients by implementing this policy?” (Tummers et al., 2012, p. 16).
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) argued that SLBs generally emphasise achieving a regulatory objective and aid their client by considering their circumstances. These SLBs generally have positive perceptions of their client during the enforcement phase, and bureaucrats try to build a professional relationship with them.
Tummers and Bekkers (2014) highlighted that when a bureaucrat experiences unrestricted ability to decide, this will positively shape how they perceive their client, and SLBs will do their best to ensure the client experience the benefits of a policy.
Hence, this study conceptualises this construct that focuses on how SLBs perceive their clients. For example, a labour inspector tasked with ensuring firms comply with labour laws, using their discretion, may dedicate much of their time and capability to persuade and convince clients to comply with regulations and explain the benefits of a policy. Such behaviour is associated with how bureaucrats perceive their clients and SLBs' determination to guide the client on ways to comply with regulations.
Moreover, Sandfort (2000) has demonstrated that SLBs within public welfare institutions in the United States of America are bureaucrats who have a favourable view of their clients, and generally, SLBs who experience a high level of discretion.
Lipsky (2010) has also added that bureaucrats commonly have a positive perception of their clients and want to help them. SLBs are willing to accommodate the client's needs during policy implementation and provide the clients access to essential information on how they could comply with regulations (Hupe & Hill, 2015). Therefore, SLBs who perceive that they enjoy unconstrained discretion will directly influence their client's meaningfulness (Tummers, 2012).
In conclusion, client meaningfulness is a unique phenomenon discussed in recent literature that focuses on bureaucrats' behaviour at the frontlines of policy enforcement. Hence, how SLBs perceive their ability to decide will shape how they perceive clients/inspectees during the enforcement stage, as bureaucrats who perceive they have unrestricted discretion will feel that they can provide constructive assistance to their clients (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014).
This study hypothesises that bureaucrats’ discretion will ultimately shape client meaningfulness during policy and regulation enforcement when conceptualising this effect. However, a missing linking factor mediates these construct's relationship, and this study proposes that enforcement style is that missing component, as it deals directly with how bureaucrats choose to enforce regulation and ensure clients comply.
2.3 Multi-dimensions enforcement style
Enforcement style can be described as “the interaction of inspectors and regulated entities” (May & Winter, 2011, p. 223). The enforcement style was highlighted by Carter (2016) as the procedures employed to enforce rules by the bureaucrats during their interaction with the public. It is also recognised as the regular dealings of bureaucrats with the clients (Scholz, 1994).
This study conceptualises enforcement style as to how SLBs behave during their interaction with clients, whether they are kind and provide advice to clients on ways to comply and tries to accommodate the circumstance of the client, or they may act like a strict SLB who focuses on following the letter of the law and standard operating procedures.
Also, enforcement style may be experienced while sanctioning non-compliers, how SLBs plan to interact with inspectees, and how to conduct administrative tasks. Nevertheless, the performance of SLBs has a rational parameter since their main job is interacting with the public and enforcing policies.
The past literature debated if enforcement style is conceptualised to vary along with multiple or one dimension (Lo et al., 2009; May & Wood, 2003). The traditional school of thought conceptualises the enforcement style as a one-dimensional approach. A dimension that focuses on the ability of bureaucrats regarding rigidness when enforcing regulations: this was seen in the work of Kagan (1994), who argues that the enforcement style of bureaucrats varies from being punitive to more cooperative, and scholars such as Reiss (1984) emphasise that SLBs are individuals who prefer a deterrent approach and sanctions to and cooperative approach.
However, the current literature regarding enforcement styles generally agrees that it is not static, and SLBs employ various dimensions of enforcement style depending on the situations they undertake (Mascini, 2013). Street-level bureaucrats employ diverse enforcement style dimensions while encountering inspectees (Etienne, 2013).
Scholars have argued that a one-dimension approach is not enough to understand the complexity of the enforcement style phenomena (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1994; Gormley, 1998). This was documented in the work of May and Winter (1999), who had demonstrated that the enforcement style varied along with a multi-dimension approach, varying along “formalism and coercion”. May and Winter (2000, p. 147) describe formalism as “the degree of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal conversations and rule-bound instances on the part of the [street-level bureaucrats]” and coercion as “the willingness to issue threats that vary from a trusting inspector not issuing warnings, to a sceptical [street-level bureaucrat] threatening to report or to impose penalties for violations.” The scholars also argue that bureaucrats can employ both dimensions in a situation but at different degrees, which will result in distinct enforcement style.
de Boer (2019) and de Boer et al. (2018) identified three main dimensions of enforcement style. The first is legal, the second is facilitation, and the third is the accommodation dimension. A bureaucrat can combine the three-dimension when interacting with clients. This was also confirmed by the work of Lo et al. (2009), de Boer and Raaphorst (2021) and Hassan et al. (2021a), who argue that enforcement style is beyond one dimension.
Firstly, the legal dimension is an approach that stresses the rigidness of the law, and a street-level bureaucrat is legally oriented with a focus on enforcing the law without considering the circumstances of the inspectees. This approach is commonly used in developing countries as the bureaucrats deal with inspectees when enforcing the regulation in a legally rigid manner or focus on explaining the consequence of noncompliance to clients (de Boer, 2019; May & Winter, 2000). This is in line with the deterrence school of thought regarding enforcement, which emphasises that the best method for a bureaucrat to enforce regulation is to be legally minded and use their discretion to punish or reward clients by issuing penalties. The literature agrees that such behaviour will have a negative impact on clients as it will promote noncomplying behaviour (Cohen, 2000; Rechtschaffen, 1997).
The second dimension is facilitation which deals mainly with the ability of bureaucrats to communicate the ways to follow the law; this is toward the cooperative school of thought, which argues that the best method to enforce regulation is by persuading clients to follow the law, providing them with advice and educating them on regulation that they need to comply with and essential considering the circumstances of clients when enforcing regulations. This is also seen in the responsive regulation theory as an optimum method to enforce the regulation. The bureaucrats will act as advisers to clients, where clients will be more willing to listen and follow the rules enforced by bureaucrats (de Boer, 2019).
Lastly, accommodation is an enforcement dimension that focuses on the idea that when enforcing the regulation, street-level bureaucrats take to account the views and the advice of key stakeholders, such as the advice of colleagues or supervisors of the bureaucrats. This dimension is different from the previous two. The perspective pointed out that stakeholders' advice and opinion are essential in shaping bureaucrats' behaviour at the frontlines. This dimension is essential as it shows that bureaucrats do consider advice from others as they view that advice is paramount and coming from people with knowledge in the field; for example, bureaucrats can be polite when interacting with clients because he or she is driven by the idea that their supervisor or team leader is polite when interacting with clients (de Boer & Raaphorst, 2021).
In conclusion, this study theorises that SLB's discretion as perceived will shape their interaction with the public during policy enforcement and will determine how they combine different dimensions of enforcement style, which in turn will influence their perception of their clients (see Fig. 1).
Centred on the literature above, this study hypothesis that:
H-1
SLBs who demonstrate significant discretion when interacting personally with clients are bureaucrats who experience more client meaningfulness.
H-2
SLBs who demonstrate a high level of discretion when interacting personally with clients will experience positive client meaningfulness, as this relationship is mediated by the significant influence of the legal dimension of enforcement style.
H-3
SLBs who experience a high level of discretion when interacting personally with clients will experience positive client meaningfulness, as this relationship is mediated by the significant influence of the facilitation dimension of enforcement style.
H-4
SLBs who demonstrate a high level of discretion when interacting personally with clients will experience positive client meaningfulness, as this relationship is mediated by the significant influence of the accommodation dimension of enforcement style.