Switzerland submitted its formal climate plan months before the Paris Agreement1 and was among the first countries that met the “midnight survival deadline” 2,3. While the Swiss long-term climate strategy4 aims at net-zero emissions in 2050, the Swiss voters rejected key measures included in the amended CO2 Act in June 2021. The Swiss direct democracy revealed major societal concerns on energy transition’s feasibility and costs, which are also concealed in many countries worldwide5.
The rejection of the amended CO2 Act has roots in the many challenges Switzerland faces in achieving its pledges. First, the Swiss energy strategy6 aims at gradually phasing-out existing nuclear power (safety is the sole criterion for the phase-out time) that supplies 36% of the electricity. This entails an energy security challenge7, also confronted by many countries aiming at decommissioning strategic energy supply assets8.
Second, Switzerland starts from a low-carbon baseline – the country is at the Top-5 of the energy transition index9. It needs to maintain its carbon-free electricity supply and make progress in decarbonising industry, buildings and transport4 that have less clear emissions reduction trajectories than the energy transformation sector10.
Third, Switzerland has limited domestic renewable resources11 and depends on imported energy carriers that risk the security of supply. Solar photovoltaics have the largest potential for further development, albeit at low irradiation levels. Hydropower has little room for expansion. Low wind speeds, natural landscape preservation, and population density challenge wind power. Wood, which is important in the global decarbonisation pathways12,13, is confronted by forest management and preservation14. Biogas faces high costs and complex logistics due to the many small farms15.
Fourth, domestic CO2 capture and storage are surrounded by large geological uncertainties16. Switzerland should connect to international CO2 transport networks and storage sites17, competing for access with other European countries.
Fifth, the population increase in Switzerland for the next 30 years is projected to be 20% – one of the highest in Europe18. Without strong efficiency measures, energy security and emissions mitigation goals are at risk.
Switzerland needs robust, feasible and affordable solutions for its energy transition, which are also relevant for other countries. Identifying these solutions requires frameworks that reflect societal, political and technical realities and not overly abstract models19. Such a framework is the Swiss TIMES Energy systems Model (STEM)20, with rich techno-economic details and sectoral interdependencies supported by state-of-the-art technology assessment. While TIMES-based frameworks are widely used for assessing decarbonisation pathways21–23, STEM includes unique features identified as important in literature when assessing the energy transition19: long-time horizon, high temporal resolution, consumer segmentation, grids topology, unit commitment, energy and ancillary services markets, demand shifts, variability of renewables representation, age structures of assets, endogenous load and demand curves.
The work was performed within the joint activity of eight large collaborative energy research programmes of major Swiss universities, the Swiss Competence Centres for Energy Research (SCCERs), during 2013–2020. In this work, STEM was coupled with several sector-specific models, e.g., for buildings, grids and industry. The present study fills the research gap in scenarios assessing net-zero emissions for Switzerland. So far, only the pledges made in 2015 of reducing emissions by 70–85% in 2050 from 1990 levels24 were assessed, including energy system transformation25, economic implications26,27, social perceptions28, the needs for system flexibility29, and the role of transport30, domestic biomass resources31 and efficiency32. A few studies have assessed a net-zero Swiss energy system by 2050, but they focused on the electricity sector33 or neglected transition effects34,35. These studies overestimate technology deployment rates and underestimate costs. The Swiss Federal Office of Energy produced the “Energy Perspectives 2050+”36 to assess net-zero pathways for Switzerland. Still, the employed framework is commercial with little transparency and weak in representing sector coupling and interdependencies. In contrast, we consider alternative pathways reflecting different contextual factors and transition lock-ins to transparently evaluate the impact on the energy system and costs of achieving net-zero emissions in 2050.
A suite of contrasted net-zero scenarios
We define several net-zero scenarios to address the role of resource availability, technological progress, energy market integration and social acceptance (Table 1). They benchmarked against a business-as-usual trajectory. All consider 60 years lifetime for nuclear power plants and share the same macroeconomic and demographic assumptions37 – GDP grows by 1.2% p.a. from 2020 to 2050, the population from 8.7 million today to 10.4 million in 2050. Resource potentials37,38 and technical progress assumptions11,37,38 vary consistently across the scenarios.
Table 1
Suite of the net-zero CO2 emissions and the business-as-usual scenario for Switzerland. The net-zero scenarios (CLI, ANTI, SECUR, MARKETS, INNON and LC) reduce by 45% the CO2 emissions from the energy system and industrial processes, excluding international aviation, in 2030 from 1990 levels; they achieve 0 Mt CO2 emissions in 2050. The business-as-usual scenario does not include energy and climate targets. An additional sensitivity analysis of CLI, which assumes 50 years lifetime for the existing Swiss nuclear power plants, is discussed in the Supplementary Material.
Scenario
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Sectoral policies
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Social acceptance for new renewables
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Swiss-EU energy market integration
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Progress in low-carbon and clean technologies
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CLI
(similar to the amended CO2 Act 2021)
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Strengthening of emissions standards in buildings and vehicles;
Strengthening of the Emissions Trading Scheme
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Solar PV is highly accepted, while wind turbines are accepted if “not visible from the “balconies”
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Assuming full implementation of the bilateral energy agreements with the EU
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Baseline (median progress)
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ANTI
(low mobilisation of population towards climate change mitigation policies)
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Continuation of current emissions standards in buildings and vehicles;
No strengthening of the Emissions Trading Scheme after 2025
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Lower than today, reflecting lower tolerance for landscape changes and failure to accelerate licensing and permitting procedures
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Lower than today due to the failure of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU (also with other world regions)
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Lower than today, reflecting fragmented worldwide climate policies that hamper R&D expenditures
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SECUR
(energy security by
minimising total annual net imports across all energy carriers)
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As in CLI
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The population is willing to pay for increased security and exploit all domestic renewable resources at their fullest potential aiming at self-sufficiency
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Switzerland is to be as close as possible to self-sufficiency on annual net imports by 2050, while for 2030, net imports are halved from today.
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Baseline (median progress)
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MARKETS
(high integration of Switzerland in international markets and good availability of zero-carbon fuels)
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As in CLI
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Higher than today for wind turbines and new development of bioenergy projects (wood, manure)
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Increased integration, reinforcement of grids, cross-border capacities and corridors
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Baseline (median progress)
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INNOV
(derives from MARKETS and assumes accelerated innovation in clean energy technologies)
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As in CLI
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Higher than today for wind and bioenergy projects (wood, manure)
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Increased integration, reinforcement of grids, cross-border capacities and corridors
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Higher than baseline, reflecting coordinated worldwide climate policies that foster R&D expenditures
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LC
(least-cost trajectory variant of CLI)
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None – let the optimiser decide the sectoral mitigation efforts
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Solar PV is highly accepted, while wind turbines are accepted if not visible from the “balconies”
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Assuming full implementation of the bilateral energy agreements with the EU
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Baseline (median progress)
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BAU
(business-as-usual)
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Continuation of energy policies and carbon taxes of 2020, but no explicit CO2 or other targets
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Solar PV is highly accepted, while wind turbines are accepted if not visible from the “balconies”
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Assuming full implementation of the bilateral energy agreements with the EU
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Baseline (median progress)
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Per capita final energy consumption in 2050 is similar to today’s world average
In realising its net-zero emissions target, Switzerland moves towards a “2000 Watt” society39. This implies a per capita final energy consumption of 50 GJ/yr. in 2050 from 109 GJ/yr. in 2000 – exceeding the − 54% target in the Swiss energy strategy. Buildings and transport bear most of the efficiency effort (Fig. 1). On average, the space heating energy consumption across all buildings reduces from 87 kWh/sqm (2010–2020 average) to 45 kWh/sqm in 2050. Renovation rates of existing residential buildings accelerate from 0.9% p.a. in 2020 to 1.7% p.a. on average for 2020–2050, and the adoption of the MINERGIE® efficiency standards40 amplifies.
As electrification is impossible for all buildings41, wood/biogas and district heating warrant further consideration and double their share in 2050 from today. Transport calls for a portfolio of drivetrains. Its transition is characterised by: a) the period until 2030 with many options competing; b) the period 2030–2040 with rapid penetration of electric vehicles; and c) the period 2040–2050 with the dawn of fuel cell drivetrains for large vehicles and long-distance transport.
Achieving net-zero and being import-independent (SECUR scenario) requires bringing forward energy efficiency by a decade compared to CLI. In SECUR, the per capita final energy consumption drops to 45 GJ in 2050. As low electricity imports in winter challenge electromobility, fuel cell vehicles uptake is the highest in SECUR – powered via domestic green hydrogen.
Failing to accelerate renewable deployment (ANTI scenario) increases the energy efficiency effort at the levels of SECUR. Heating and mobility are not decarbonised, and reliance on bioenergy with CCS increases by shifting wood from end-use to energy conversion (by 2050, 49% of bioenergy in ANTI is used in electricity and hydrogen production vs 44% in CLI, and only 35% today – see Fig. 2).
Electricity consumption exceeds oil and gas for the first time in history by 2040, but zero-carbon molecules are needed
Invariably across all scenarios, electrification of final energy reaches 50% in 2050 compared to 28% today. Efficiency gains in stationary sectors maintain electricity consumption at today’s levels. However, transport alone increases electricity demand by 10 TWh/yr. in 2050 from today (Fig. 2).
Domestically produced hydrogen is of growing importance. While hydrogen first enters into industry by 2030, the automotive applications lead to improvements in fuel cells that spill over to other applications and carry forward infrastructure development. Next to transport, new uses of hydrogen in district heating supply occur by 2040, driven by fuel cell CHP micro-grids that help avoid high upfront costs of cogeneration in buildings (Fig. 2). Hydrogen also becomes important when targeting energy security and reduction of import dependency. Domestic e-fuel synthesis from green hydrogen via high-temperature electrolysis compensates for the curtailed imports (SECUR scenario). However, limited deployment of renewables delays hydrogen penetration by a decade (ANTI scenario), jeopardising decarbonisation of sectors requiring zero-carbon molecules and necessitating increased energy efficiency measures and imports.
Domestic bioenergy use doubles in 2050 from today, requiring full mobilisation of waste, manure and forest wood potential. There is a shift from end-uses to energy conversion sectors from 2030 (Fig. 2) as biogenic CHPs penetrate district heating, wood with CCS for electricity and hydrogen production delivers negative emissions, and load-following biogenic CHPs Swarms provide flexibility in integrating solar PV and wind31. In heating, pellets replace wood chips and firewood due to their higher energy density, efficiency, and easier distribution.
However, the decarbonisation of transport demands imported biogenic and synthetic liquids. These are also unavoidable in the SECUR scenario (Fig. 3), signalling that import independency across the entire energy system is a formidable task.
A carbon-free electricity supply requires doubling wind and solar production in each decade from today to 2050
A carbon-free electricity supply after a nuclear phase-out requires an unprecedented deployment of solar and wind power (Fig. 3). At a minimum, non-hydro renewable electricity would need to compensate for today’s nuclear electricity (ANTI scenario), entailing increased costs for additional energy conservation. By 2050, the electricity sector delivers 2 Mt CO2/yr. negative emissions via CCS deployment at 50% of the waste incineration plants and additional investment in 300 MW of large-scale wood-based electricity generation with CCS.
Regarding domestic hydrogen production, electrolysis is the main option until 2040. While electrolysis could cover all hydrogen needs, it is costly to integrate it into the energy system at a large scale. Thus, a cost-effective mix to supply high hydrogen demands beyond 2040 includes green and blue hydrogen. Wood gasification with CCS occurs in all scenarios as it delivers1.6 Mt CO2/yr. negative emissions in 2050, but it is challenged by limited wood resources.
In the SECUR scenario, electrolysis becomes a major option to meet high domestic needs for hydrogen and fuel synthesis that compensate for oil and gas imports curtailment. As wood gasification cannot be further scaled up due to resource limits and competition from other sectors, solar PV-based high-temperature electrolysis is deployed. In 2050, 31 TWh/yr. of electricity are used to produce 26 TWh of hydrogen – of which more than 50% is directed to fuel synthesis (see Supplementary Material).
Still, domestic production of e-liquids (hydrogen or synthetic ones) is insufficient to cover transport demand. Imports occur in all scenarios, with a maximum of 58 PJ/yr. in ANTI and a minimum of 11 PJ/yr. in SECUR (which is close to today’s levels). Failing to deploy domestic renewables puts energy security at risk.
A reliable low-carbon energy system requires coordinated flexibility from all its actors
In achieving the net-zero target, a suite of flexible options needs to be deployed: energy storage, Power-to-X (PtX), demand-side response (DSR) in heating and electric loads, grid-to-vehicle (G2V) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services in transport (Fig. 4).
Pump hydrostorage of 4.5 GW power and around 520 GWh storage capacity balances the high-voltage grid. It is complemented with 2.1 GW batteries providing 11.5 GWh energy storage at the medium- and low-voltage grid. Smart G2V absorbs excess electricity, with a maximum charging requirement of 6 GW on a summer Sunday at noon – on average, 75% of the EVs are charged at this time. V2G schemes could provide 2 GWp in spring and summer evenings if EVs have been charged with low-cost electricity. In 2050, the contribution of V2G is around 1 TWh/yr., with 13% of the EVs participating in this scheme. DSR enables intra-day shifts of electricity loads of 620 MWp in buildings and 110 MWp in industry, in line with estimated Swiss potentials42.
Thermal storage gains interest due to the increased coupling of electricity and heat systems. About 35 TWh of storage (of which 70% low temperature) at weekly and daily time scales are needed in 2050 in CLI. Embedded thermal storage in heat pumps and water heaters enable intra-day shifts of 3 TWh/yr. of electricity for heating purposes in buildings in 2050, decoupling the time of heat provision from electricity consumption.
The seasonal balancing of the energy system is achieved via electricity imports, Power-to-X, and thermal storage. Electricity imports emerge in all scenarios in winter in 2050, ranging from 3 TWh/yr. (in SECUR) to 8 TWh/yr. (in MARKETS/INNOV), which are similar to BAU (7 TWh/yr. in 2050) and in-line with the winter imports observed in the last decade43. P2X contributes to seasonal balancing via hydrogen or synthetic fuels storage of up to 2 TWh/yr. in 2050. About 1.4 TWh/yr. seasonal thermal storage is also deployed as local or virtual community grid storage.
The need for secondary operating reserve (aFRR+) increase by 44% in 2050 from today's levels. On average, hydropower provides 75% of the aFRR + demand, aggregated distributed units (CHPs, batteries, heat pumps) 20%, and electric vehicles 5%.
Without CO2 capture and negative emissions, the net-zero target cannot be achieved
The net-zero scenarios require 370 Mt additional cumulative CO2 reductions from 2020 relative to BAU. The remaining emissions in the energy system by 2050 are from industry. These are offset via CO2 capture in electricity and hydrogen production (Fig. 5).
CO2 capture emerges from 2040 and amounts to about 9 Mt CO2/yr. in 2050. SECUR has the lowest amount of captured CO2 as the goal for zero import dependency also implies the elimination of imported fossil fuels. In contrast, LC has the highest amounts of captured CO2 because hard-to-abate emissions from buildings that have limited mitigation options are offset via CCS. On average, across all scenarios, about half of the captured CO2 in 2050 is from negative emissions via BECCS and DACCS (Fig. 5).
About 75% of the total captured emissions in 2050 must be transferred outside Switzerland as there is limited domestic sequestration potential44. Thus, regulations and policy agreements are necessary to access European infrastructures for transferring and storing CO2 outside Switzerland.
Four pillars for affordable deep decarbonisation in Switzerland
The analysis highlights four pillars for affordable deep decarbonisation in Switzerland. First, to unlock domestic renewable potentials for solar PV and bioenergy whilst maintaining at least the current levels of hydropower. Second, to foster energy and emissions markets integration by fortifying the availability of imported zero-carbon fuels and securing access to international CO2 storage sites, e.g., at the Northern Sea. Third, to scale up technology innovation and improve emerging technologies. Finally, the fourth pillar is lifting socio-economic barriers related to the storage of captured CO2 and creating population awareness to accept the domestic deployment of negative emissions technologies.
Today, the average energy system cost per capita, as the model calculates, is around 3,200 CHF2019 per year. The BAU scenario, which reduces the CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and industrial processes by 42% in 2050 from 1990 levels and implements the nuclear phase-out by 2044, entails an increase of the per capita cost to around 5,700 CHF2019 in 2030 and close to 7,000 CHF2019 in 2050. In CLI, the core scenario achieving net-zero CO2 emissions in this study, the annual per capita cost in 2050 rises to around 5,900 CHF2019 in 2030 and 8,500 CHF2019 in 2050. The SECUR scenario that achieves import independence and the net-zero targets entails an annual per capita cost of around 6,500 CHF2019 in 2030 and 9,600 CHF2019 in 2050. In ANTI, the limited deployment of domestic renewables costs every Swiss person on average 6,200 CHF2019 in 2030 and 10,700 CHF2019 in 2050 (Fig. 6).
The policy cost, i.e. the difference in the energy system cost between the net-zero scenarios and BAU, shows a shift from low CAPEX and high OPEX in BAU to high CAPEX and low OPEX. Transport and residential sectors bear the highest policy costs. However, there are cost savings from reduced imports of fossil fuels (Fig. 6). The policy costs range between 5 and 20% of the BAU costs. ANTI and SECUR display the highest costs, while MARKETS and INNOV the lowest. This shows that citizen mobilisation and national and international policy co-design are important for the energy transition. Across all scenarios, the cumulative discounted per capita policy cost to achieve net-zero emissions from 2020 to 2050 varies between 5,800 and 25,400 CHF2019 discounted at 2.5% (or, on average, 320–1390 CHF2019/yr. and per capita, undiscounted).
Milestones and essential policies towards net-zero CO2 emissions
Despite the limited domestic resources and the population growth of at least 20% projected for the next 30 years, it is technically feasible for Switzerland to achieve the energy system’s CO2 neutrality, even within the context of increased energy security and import independence. Table 2 summarises key energy transition enablers for which societal, market, or technical barriers need to be removed to avoid financial burdens.
The energy system transformation requires decisive actions in each sector to reduce uncertainty in investors and society. Energy transition policies must account for systemic interdependencies. For example, imposing emissions standards in buildings and vehicles could create cost-inefficiencies if the potential of other sectors to mitigate at a lower cost is neglected. Or, implementing technology bans too early could increase energy bills for consumers. Even the most well-designed policies become expensive if citizens do not accept them or if inefficiencies from non-energy sectors persist (e.g., long licensing procedures). The analysis finds a “sweet-point” in policy implementation between the CLI and LC scenarios. Moreover, fostering technology innovation and integration into international energy markets reduce costs to 60% of those in CLI.
Decarbonisation of residential heat entails Herculean efforts45,46. Carbon and energy performance requirements, mandates for solar energy in buildings and incentives for renewable and district heating need to be complemented with cost- and benefit-sharing between energy companies, tenants and landlords to improve the attractiveness of renovations, accelerate smart technologies, and lift the “split of incentives” barrier. To avoid jeopardising industry’s competitiveness, market designs for low-carbon intensity products, industrial symbiosis47, technology standards, voluntary agreements, and timely replacement of ageing infrastructure with low-carbon alternatives can form a portfolio of policy options. In transport, supports to clean vehicles, new infrastructure incentives, and demand management via digitalisation, connected mobility, and efficient multi-modality enable decarbonisation. Biofuels and e-fuels are part of the solution only when considering land-use and carbon sources needed for their production48. The shift of electricity production to lower grid levels requires closer cooperation between System Operators and participation for storage and flexible consumers in energy and ancillary services markets. Energy security calls for support to technologies that can contribute to winter electricity supply, such as alpine PV, wind, geothermal, storage and demand-side response. Strengthening and expanding the emissions trading scheme to new sectors, coordinating energy and climate legislation, and simplifying permitting procedures for new renewable projects are essential for accelerating the transition. Moreover, it is necessary to lift financial and logistic obstacles in biogas production from manure and pursue balanced forest wood management by considering non-energetic uses and eco-services14. Hydrogen deployment requires strong climate policy signals to mitigate investment risks. Pilot projects for negative emissions technologies can confirm their potential and gradually expand their deployment. In overall, energy transition is costly without closer integration to the EU energy and carbon markets and infrastructure.
However, the solutions found at the national level need to become robust and aligned with the Cantonal or city levels. The energy transition implications to all sustainability dimensions must be further assessed and emphasised. Quantifying external costs for carrying out cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, including environmental and social aspects of the energy transition, while accounting for different stakeholder preferences, are currently pursued within an integrated framework including STEM.
Table 2
Main enablers of the Swiss energy transition (see also supplementary material)
Energy transition enabler
|
|
Increase electricity share in final demand by accelerating electrification of heating and mobility
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• Electricity share in final energy to 50% by 2050, compared to 28% in 2020
• Heat pumps to supply 35% of the space and water heating demand in buildings in 2030 and at least 75% by 2050, from 12% in 2020
• Electric cars to account for 38% of sales by 2030 and 83% of car stock by 2050
|
Achieve efficiency gains in end-use sectors, also in electricity consumption
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• Final energy consumption per capita (excluding international aviation) to be reduced by 17% in 2030 and 55% in 2050 compared to 2000 levels
• Increase the renovation rate from 0.9% in 2020 to 1.9% in 2050 for existing houses
• Electricity consumption per capita to reduce to 6500 kWh in 2050 from 6670 kWh in 2019, or at least − 10% from 2000 levels
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Maintain carbon-free electricity supply also after the nuclear phase-out
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• Electricity supply increases by at least 20 TWh/yr. in 2050 from 2020
• Solar PV to be doubled every decade: increasing from 3 GW in 2020 to 27 GW in 2050
• Hydropower to be maintained at least to 37.4 TWh/yr. from 2030 onwards
|
Deploy coordinated flexibility options across all energy sectors and across different time scales for integrating high shares of renewables
|
For example, in the CLI scenario:
• Pump hydro storage of 4.5 GW by 2050, with a storage capacity of at least 520 GWh
• Battery storage at 2.1 GW by 2050, with an energy storage capacity of 11.5 GWh
• Thermal storage additions of 5.8 GW by 2050, with 35 GWh energy storage capacity
• Seasonal thermal storage output at 1.4 TWh by 2050
• Seasonal PtX storage output reaching 1.6 TWh by 2050
• 620 MW intraday load shifts from electric appliances in buildings by 2050
• Secondary positive reserve demand + 45% in 2050 from 2020
• 6 GW peak charging power for electric cars by 2050 (grid-to-vehicle)
• 2 GW peak electricity power from electric cars by 2050 (vehicle-to-grid)
|
Lift socio-economic barriers to exploit domestic new renewables potential, especially wind, manure and wood
|
• Biogas production from manure at 2.5 TWh in 2050 with less than 1 TWh in 2020
• Wind electricity with 2 TWh in 2040 and 4.3 TWh in 2050, from 146 GWh in 2020
|
Deploy domestic green hydrogen production for decarbonisation and seasonal balancing of the energy system
|
• Domestic hydrogen production increase to 11–14 TWh/yr. in 2050
• If self-sufficiency is a priority, at least 30 TWh/yr. of hydrogen are needed to feed domestic e-fuel synthesis in 2050 (SECUR scenario)
• Green hydrogen accounts for more than three-quarters of the production; the rest is blue hydrogen from gas steam reforming operating in the seasons with low solar irradiation
|
Foster integration of Swiss and international energy markets, particularly for electricity, biofuels/e-fuels imports
|
• When self-sufficiency is not a priority:
o Electricity imports in winter increase to 5.8–7.9 TWh in 2050 from the historical average of 3.5 TWh in 2010–2020
o Biofuels/e-fuels imports increase to 38–58 PJ/yr. in 2050 from 7 PJ/yr. in 2020
• When self-sufficiency is a priority, electricity imports in winter are still inevitable at 3 TWh in 2050, and biofuel/e-fuels imports are necessary to at least 11 PJ/yr in 2050.
|
Deploy carbon capture and negative emissions technologies
|
• 7.4–8.7 Mt CO2/yr. need to be captured and sequestrated to ensure carbon neutrality in the energy system by 2050
• 3–5 Mt CO2/yr. negative emissions by 2050 are required via bioenergy with CCS in electricity and hydrogen production, and Direct Air Capture with CCS
|
Secure access to European (or international) CO2 storage sites
|
• Domestic sequestration of CO2 is 2.1 Mt/yr. in 2050, due to geological uncertainties
• At least 5–8 Mt CO2 need to be sequestrated in sites outside Switzerland, if not offset with other measures, e.g., international emissions credits, and only from the energy system
|
Net-zero and avoidance of energy imports as far as possible
|
• 25% of the solar PV potential would have to be tapped by 2030
• 90% of the solar PV potential to be tapped by 2050, 100% of the wind potential
• Promote domestic hydrogen production to cover 90% of the otherwise imported fossil gas fuels for industry by 2050
• Compared to the CLI scenario that achieves net-zero with imports:
o Heat saving measures in buildings need to be further improved by 13 to 26% by 2050
o Accelerate deployment of heat pumps in buildings by 10 years
o Accelerate deployment of district heating based on large-scale heat pumps by + 50%
|