Research Article
Coalitional Manipulation of Voting Rules: Simulations on Empirical Data
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2032633/v1
This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License
published 03 Feb, 2023
Read the published version in Constitutional Political Economy →
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Using computer simulations based on empirical data, we show that seven voting rules that we call the IRV family (Instant-Runoff Voting, exhaustive ballot, Condorcet-IRV, Benham, Smith-IRV, Tideman and Woodall) are less sensitive to coalitional manipulation than a large selection of prominent voting rules. While the relative performances of these seven rules still deserve further investigation, we show that the differences are at most marginal.
Computational social choice
Coalitional manipulation
Strategic voting
Instant-Runoff Voting
No competing interests reported.
published 03 Feb, 2023
Read the published version in Constitutional Political Economy →
Editorial decision: Accepted
03 Dec, 2022
Reviews received at journal
09 Sep, 2022
Reviewers agreed at journal
09 Sep, 2022
Reviewers invited by journal
09 Sep, 2022
Editor assigned by journal
08 Sep, 2022
Submission checks completed at journal
05 Sep, 2022
First submitted to journal
05 Sep, 2022
You are reading this latest preprint version