The Q-Day Dilemma and the Quantum Supremacy/Advantage Conjecture

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2331935/v1

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The Q-Day Dilemma and the Quantum Supremacy/Advantage Conjecture

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2331935/v1

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When Shakespeare averred, “a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”, we precisely knew the attributes associated with this thing called “ROSE.” But do we really know what Quantum supremacy¹ or Quantum advantage² exactly entails in Quantum Computing (QC) space, except that latter appears more politically correct than the former? How do we achieve the supremacy or advantage unless we precisely know what threshold needs to be reached to qualify? Can that threshold be totally oblivious to ethics and humane interests? What good a nuclear chain reaction is, if it cannot be controlled to serve humanity? In the same breadth definition of quantum advantage cannot be just limited to achieving algorithmic superiority over legacy computing systems, particularly when a section of the experts attribute catastrophic threat³ that unrestrained QC may cause by collapsing the current cryptographic infrastructure⁴ resulting in amplified existential risk to humanity.⁵ These predictions are relevant only if QCs become commercially viable and deployable in the service of humanity. No technology can be a one-way ticket to catastrophe, and neither can the definition of superiority of that technology be. If at all there are catastrophic risks, QC can never enter public domain as a minimum viable product (MVP) unless there are safeguards in place. So obviously those safeguards should become an integral part of the definition of its superiority over the conventional computers and a standard to be met to pass the MVP threshold. NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) is pursuing the standardization of Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as that safeguard,⁶ but with 80^th of the 82 candidate PQCs recently failing⁷ and companies already offering QC as a service, there is an urgent need for an alternate strategy. Our research proposes a novel encryption agnostic approach⁸ to safeguard QC,⁹ and articulates a comprehensive definition of an MVP that can potentially set a gold standard for defining commercially viable quantum advantage over the traditional computing.

Physical sciences/Mathematics and computing/Computer science

Physical sciences/Engineering/Electrical and electronic engineering

Physical sciences/Mathematics and computing/Information technology

NIST

PQC

Quantum Computers

Quantum Advantage

In recent years, quantum computing has made great leaps in its promise to offer computational speed by using quantum phenomenon and technology to break the bounds of classical computation and reach “quantum advantage.”¹⁰ Despite these exciting new advances, quantum computing has its limitations. NISQ, or the Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum defines current era of quantum computers’ handling of intermediate executions of 50-100 qubits which can surpass classical computing abilities but still suffer from quantum gate noise rendering fault-tolerant quantum computing a prospect that for now remains beyond reach.¹¹ In any case, for real-world general-purpose tasks, quantum computers will never replace classical computers, nor are they intended to do so. At best they will become an integral part of high-performance computing (HPC) for specialized use cases for a variety of important scientific tasks.¹²

In 2012, John Preskill coined the phrase “quantum supremacy” to describe the moment when quantum computers solve tasks and problems that cannot be realistically solved by conventional computers.¹³ He later claimed that 30 years is “not an unrealistic timescale” for achieving general-purpose quantum computing supremacy.¹⁴ However, in 2019, Google claimed that their Sycamore quantum processor solved a problem in three minutes that would take a classical computer over a thousand years.¹ Not letting Google’s claim go unchallenged, IBM rushed a preprint report claiming that they solved the same problem in 2.5 days using a classical technique,¹⁵ dismissing Google’s quantum supremacy claim (the point where quantum computers can do things that classical computers can’t). When Nature published Google’s breakthrough on quantum supremacy,¹⁶ quantum researchers objected to the use of ‘supremacy’ calling it irresponsible to override the historical context of the descriptor, which risks sustaining divisions in race, gender and class. They called on the community to use ‘quantum advantage’ instead.² In response to the controversy, Preskill explained why he called it “quantum supremacy”¹⁷

According to a recent report private investors had funded at least 52 quantum-technology companies globally since 2012 and governments and large companies have poured billions into a hardware that does not yet exist.¹⁸ Apparently, quantum research is progressing at a pace faster than originally predicted,¹⁹ and the race for the supremacy is getting hot and confrontational with peers challenging Google’s claim.⁷ While it is abundantly clear that quantum supremacy or advantage is far from being achieved, it is worth taking a step back and precisely defining what quantum supremacy or advantage should entail, or rather what do we want quantum supremacy to be? Britannica dictionary defines “supremacy” as “the quality or state of having more power, authority, or status than anyone else.”²⁰ But in any civil society, “power without restraint is tyranny.”²¹ Humanity wouldn’t want quantum supremacy to be a tyranny of sorts, especially when defining supremacy is very much within human control. So here is an attempt to review the origin of the term “quantum supremacy” de novo and propose a more ethical definition of the term so that it remains within the confines of the prevailing democratic standards and eclipses the negative connotation that critics of the term suggest.¹⁸

Now that companies have already started offering commercial QC services for specialized computing needs, many questions demand urgent answers. How do you judge the performance of a QC in absence of a gold standard? Without a gold standard how would anyone know a candidate QC has succeeded? How do you define a gold standard? Researchers are predicting how QC can cause havoc resulting in global catastrophe.³ The same characteristics that make QC exponentially powerful also makes it devilishly difficult to control if it breaks every possible encryption that makes the Internet work. The possibility of QC causing the collapse of current cryptographic infrastructure is claimed by some experts as real,⁴ and the existential risk to humanity being amplified.⁵ All these predictions are relevant only if QCs become commercially viable and deployable in the service of humanity. And if they do, can they achieve supremacy without an effective control for preventing their exploitation against humanity by bad actors? In other words, just as autonomous mobility cannot reach supremacy in absence of an efficient braking system, quantum computing cannot go anywhere without culling its catastrophe causing capabilities. Technological supremacy can never trump humanity. No technology can be allowed to go rogue. Not challenging the political correctness of the term, can quantum supremacy or advantage be achieved merely by solving tasks beyond the capacity of the classical computers? Unless safeguards are not in place can a new technology become commercially deployable and deliver any value particularly when a section of experts associate catastrophic or existential risk with the technology? What good is autonomous car or a nuclear chain reaction without the safeguard of a braking mechanism? And if the risks limit its full commercial deployability, will QC be ever expected to achieve supremacy / advantage over classical computing? The answers to all the questions would come over time as QCs evolve, but what is urgently needed is defining quantum supremacy / advantage as it is the most widely used terminology in quantum research and a goal that every quantum researcher is striving to achieve. Complete clarity of the goal will keep the research focused.

The Blockchain Conundrum

Projected to be a multi-trillion industry,²² blockchain and cryptocurrencies exclusively rely on adversary facing cryptography.²³ Several research groups are exploring PQC for developing quantum-resistant blockchain.²⁴ Implementing PQC primitives is prohibitively expensive.²⁵ The cost of a typical Ethereum blockchain transaction is already very high, clocking as high as 360 times the cost of a conventional database.²⁶ Attempts at making blockchain resilient with PQC will further accentuate the already prohibitory costs of blockchain transactions.

The Q-Day Quandary

The more powerful a technology is, the more likely it will be abused. Q-day is when quantum computers will break the Internet.²⁷ Theoretically, all cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Given the ubiquity of cryptographic schemes in our everyday online activities, this could be catastrophic.³ Quantum supremacy should not just be our competence in getting closer to the Q-day, but our ability to cope with the perils of the Q-day. With over 90% of PQC (post quantum cryptography) candidates failing NIST’s standardization process, QC appears more detrimental to human interests than the benefits it delivers.²⁸

Defining Quantum Supremacy/Advantage

Any new technology must be researched, conceived, discussed, developed, and implemented within a very simple principle – its existence should be perceived as a vehicle for human advancement. To achieve those objectives, the first order of business is benchmarking the standards that define the technology. So, what exactly Quantum Supremacy/Advantage entails? Notwithstanding the controversy over the political correctness of the term, the four corners of quantum supremacy/advantage need to be clearly defined, even before any gold standard or benchmarking ideas are designed and standardized for establishing key performance indicators (KPIs).²⁹

Arriving at a precise definition of quantum supremacy/advantage largely depends on:

the evolution of the business model for delivering of QC services to the end users, and,
the safeguards that secure the Internet from the quantum threats and are relevant to that business model.

Each of these elements are discussed in detail herein:

Quantum-as-a-Service Business Model

By most estimates, a single qubit cost around $10,000³⁰,³¹,³²,³³. An encryption breaking QC is estimated to require approximately 317 million qubits.³⁴ On top of the actual cost of the qubits, a host of sophistic electronics, coaxial cabling and other materials that achieve near absolute zero operational temperatures housed in a large, controlled room costs a fortune. Even if the price of each qubit comes down 1,000 times, an encryption breaking QC will still cost in the range of $3 billion, a price far beyond the reach of ordinary mortals, and certainly not a hacker’s cup of tea. The only possible business model that can make quantum computing accessible to customers is through the cloud-based services. Quantum-as-a-Service (QaaS) is rapidly evolving as a likely business model.³⁵ At least six QCSPs (Quantum Computing Service Providers) including Amazon and IBM, have already launched their QaaS product, offering scientists, researchers, and developers cloud services for building, testing, and running quantum computing algorithms.³⁶ Some even offering there QaaS free.³⁷ Such QCSPs can be regulated by governments to restrict subscription to verified subscribers only under terms and conditions that allow target quantum algorithms only to be deployable to pre-registered domains, and mandated to deploy specific security protocols to access the QC services. The QaaS business model is easier to regulate as compared to regulating the desktop hackers. The standardizing and policy-making agencies, the NIST in the US and ENISA, its equivalent in Europe, are currently focusing exclusively on PQC (post-quantum cryptography) to withstand the decryption capabilities of powerful QCs. The recent failures of PQCs²³,⁷,³⁸ and the evolving QaaS business model compels us to rethink our QC safeguarding strategy and look beyond the state-of-the-art for safeguarding classical computers from future quantum hackers.

QC Safeguards

Not all existing security tools are vulnerable to attacks with QC.³⁹ The quantum threat to legacy computers can be broadly dealt with in following two ways⁹ (Fig.1):

Protecting each Internet-connected legacy computer individually from quantum attacks with state-of-the-art PQC.
Segregating all QC activities from mainstream Internet with encryption agnostic ZVC (Zero Vulnerability Computing).⁸

State-of-the-art Safeguards with PQC:

Cryptography is omnipresent in securing data and authenticating its access,⁴⁰,⁴¹ and is used in almost all inter-device communications whether within network or in non-network scenarios.⁴² Cryptography remains the foundation of Internet security.⁴³ The state of the art therefore takes the first approach in protecting individual computers with PQC algorithms. It is also a natural culmination of prevailing cybersecurity practices in prior art. As it is an impossible task to instantly modernize the encryption algorithms of all and sundry IT systems operating today, preparations must be commenced to handle the new situation.⁴⁴ Securing a computer in a network without cryptography is inconceivable in legacy systems. It is for this reason that quantum threats exist, and it is for the same reason that a number of standardization bodies are currently working on standardization processes of PQC. These efforts are being led by the US-based NIST, the International Standards Organization (ISO), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Each one of these initiatives is at a different stage and covering different PQC schemes. With the recent setbacks that NIST is facing, and no clear success emerging out of NIST’s PQC standardization process initiated 5 years ago, it becomes important to explore the possibilities beyond PQC. In that context a new hypothesis on quantum resilient computing is worth investigating⁹ (Fig. 1: graphical abstract)

Beyond State-of-the-art

Since the birth of the modern computer, cryptography has remained the mainstay of the computer security. If a technology can secure a connected computer without the need for encryption algorithms, it will automatically make the connected device quantum safe.

An encryption agnostic approach constituting the second strategy was recently proposed as an alternative to the Internet-wide deployment of PQC.⁹ Winning a Seal of Excellence from European Commission, Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) revolutionizes the classical architecture of computers by completely obliterating a computer’s attack surface by banning all 3^rd party permissions and as illustrated in the graphical abstract in Fig, 1 transforms the multilayered legacy computing systems to solid state software on a chip (3SoC).⁴⁵

Encryption Agnostic Cybersecurity

In legacy computing systems all hardware and software are designed to grant 3^rd party permissions so that vendors and developers can create a range of applications that make computers useful. It is impossible to build a computer without incorporating 3^rd party permissions. Almost all computer vulnerabilities, originate from those inherent permissions.⁸ As illustrated in Fig. 2, ZVC achieves zero vulnerability by

banning all 3rd party permissions, thus completely obliterating the attack surface.
creating switchable in-computer offline storage within the connected device itself.

As illustrated in Fig. 3 this encryption agnostic approach essentially segregates QC from the mainstream computing infrastructure within the Internet. In this ZVC-powered novel QaaS architecture, a typical QCSP (Quantum Computing Service Provider) provides its cloud-based quantum computing services to its subscribers in a business model that is quite similar to any cloud computing service provider of today. As we have seen in a previous section, such isolation of QC from legacy Internet is anyway supported by QC’s evolving subscription based QaaS business model that caters to the highly specialized high-power computing needs of specific industry users. As a term of service, the subscribers are provided with a 3SoC client for accessing the quantum computing services of the QCSP. The QCSP routes access to the quantum computer through a 3SoC server that only accepts authentication requests from a 3SoC client device. All other requests from non-subscribers or hackers with legacy computing devices are declined (Fig. 3).

As illustrated in Fig. 4 this novel QaaS architecture can potentially provide unbreakable end-to-end security to access QC and isolate it from the rest of the Internet (Fig. 4) This means that the genuine subscribers of QaaS platform can be mandated to deploy specific security protocols to access QC within a secure Intranet segregated from rest of the Internet. The 3SoC tunnel connecting the user to the QC is encryption agnostic and therefore immune to encryption-breaking quantum algorithms. This makes QC inaccessible to bad actors. Most importantly, this strategy neutralizes the need for Internet-wide, device/resource-focused deployment of the resource intensive PQCs that demand significant processing time and power.⁴⁶ Thus, a 3SoC intranet can potentially offer defense against misuse of quantum computing by bad actors even if the PQC algorithms fail to deliver the promise.

All the evidence suggests that QC is experiencing an inflection point.⁴⁷,⁴⁸,⁴⁹compelling us to get ready for this new computing paradigm. Moreover, as companies have already commenced offering QaaS cloud services,³⁰,³¹ the need to secure the Internet from impending quantum threats is more than ever. Recent setbacks may jeopardize the original NIST timeline for PQC standardization estimated at 15 years for full transition to Quantum-safe Internet.⁵⁰,⁵¹,⁵² Global PQC implementation is a massive undertaking impacting each computing device in the entire Internet ecosystem. It is not just time consuming but resource intensive undertaking. However, the alternate approach for quantum resilience that this paper proposes, limits its implementation to QCSPs offering discerning QaaS subscription exclusively to highly selective special need clients warranting no Internet wide implementation of QC. Thus, keeping the QC exploiting bad actors at bay. As reasons therefore, the process of validation and full transition to quantum-safe internet can be accomplished much faster than the PQC timeline projected by NIST (Fig. 5).

The astronomically high cost of QC virtually rules out universal unfettered access to quantum algorithms as the QaaS business model evolves. QaaS can be implemented not only by enforcing policies but rendering all malicious activities by bad actors technologically out of bounds. The former can be controlled by the regulatory authorities, and the later by deploying ZVC-powered 3SoC client-server network architecture proposed in this paper. The impending quantum threats to the Internet can be best dealt with by segregating all subscription-based QC activities from the mainstream Internet by regulating the QaaS access, rather than attempting to protect each Internet-connected device individually from quantum attacks. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

Astronomically high cost of QC makes it unaffordable for common man, so QC can never be as accessible as legacy computers are to all and sundry.
Because of QC’s prohibitory costs, QaaS is fast evolving as a subscription-based cloud computing business model.
QaaS business model makes it easier to regulate QC both technologically and legally as compared to securing each Internet-connected computing device individually with PQC.
A new cybersecurity paradigm can secure the Internet from any impending quantum threats by not letting QC go wild and significantly shorten the timeline for making Internet Quantum-safe.
Universal Internet-wide implementation of computationally intense and expensive PQC may not be warranted to secure the Internet from the potential quantum threats.

Finally, for the purpose of benchmarking and developing key performance indicators (KPIs) for defining quantum advantage, Quantum Supremacy/Advantage can be articulated as “deemed to have been achieved when a quantum computer measurably solves algorithmic problems that cannot be realistically solved by conventional computers in a timeframe and manner that restrains rogue elements from its misuse in disrupting a classical computer’s cybersecurity and compromising the integrity of the Internet.”

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Acknowledgement

The author is grateful to Dr Brecht Vermeulen and Professor Peter Van Daele (IMEC - Ghent University, IDLab iGent Tower - Department of Information Technology, Technologiepark-Zwijnaarde 126, B-9052 Ghent, Belgium) for support in the initial hypothesis building research, and to Mr Tejas Bhagat and Ms Saidya Khan for their help in preparing this manuscript. The author is also grateful to Dr Kotzanikolaou Panayiotis of University of Piraeus and Dr Kostas Kolomvatsos of University of Thessaly for being trusted partners in several consortia and initiatives involved in development of the Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) concept.

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The Q-Day Dilemma and the Quantum Supremacy/Advantage Conjecture

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The Inflection Point & Quantum-Safe Internet

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