Turkey's history of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China spans more than half a century. These relations were established in August 1971 and developed parallel to the opening up of both countries in the 1980s (Kabakci, 2021). Underlined by a joint military exercise, bilateral relations were elevated to the status of strategic partnership in 2010 as part of the Turkey's more general foreign policy shift towards Asia (Alagoz, 2021b). Ankara later engaged in the Xi Jinping administration's flagship foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Chaziza, 2021a), and the commercial ties between the two countries strengthened. The net worth of Turkish trade with China increased from US$1,4 billion in 2000 to US$24,1 billion in 2011, and then to US$35,9 billion in 2021 (Türkiye–People's Republic of China Economic and Trade Relations, 2022).
The development of relations with China on the state level is usually accompanied by an increased number of contacts with Chinese counterparts on the sub-state level (Kamiński, 2021). Local and regional authorities try to promote business, academic or cultural cooperation, attracting Chinese investors, students and tourists. These kinds of sub-state activities attracted considerable scholarly attention in the 1980s (Duchacek, 1984; Hocking, 1993), and they usually fall under the heading "paradiplomacy" or "city diplomacy" in discussions of municipalities' international engagement. Paradiplomacy belongs to the much broader process of diplomatic pluralisation, whereby diplomatic practices, institutions and discourses are freed from the limitations of traditional international diplomacy (Cornago, 2013).
The academic literature on Sino-Turkish relations has mainly been reticent on the sub-state dimension of cooperation. Even very recent publications (Eliküçük Yıldırım, 2021; Güneylioğlu, 2022; Isik & Zou, 2019; Öniş & Yalikun, 2021) ignore this phenomenon in the context of the BRI, economic relations or public diplomacy. The few existing studies on Turkish paradiplomacy either concentrate on contacts with Balkan states (Muhasi̇lovi̇c, 2020) or present a general overview of Turkish town-twinning practices (Akman, 2016).
This paper explains sub-state cooperation between Turkey and China, attempting to answer four categories of questions:
1. What is the scope and what are the patterns of cooperation between Turkish and Chinese cities?
2. What are the decisive factors for successful collaboration with the Chinese? What is the role of institutionalisation (agreements, offices abroad etc.), the city's size, the mayor's attitude, local/regional partners (business, academia) and the national government?
3. What are Turkish cities' goals, benefits and obstacles in their relations with Chinese counterparts?
4. How can the Turkish government use city-to-city relations to reach its policy goals towards China?
The paper argues that city diplomacy is a hidden capacity in Turkish foreign policy. Links with Chinese cities are already established, and they can be developed. The cooperation is now far below its potential, particularly in business. The development of subnational links with China might be of instrumental use to Turkey in reaching its foreign policy goals.
This research is based on an in-depth literature review and data gleaned from a survey of the capital cities of all 81 Turkish provinces conducted from November 2021 to March 2022. Paper and electronic versions of the survey questionnaire were distributed to representatives of city authorities (the units responsible for international cooperation). Almost half of them (n=40) completed this study, a very good response rate (>49%) considering that the average response rate for surveys is 5–30% (Keeter et al., 2017).
This paper contributes to the literature on Sino-Turkish relations as the first study examining the development of subnational cooperation between these partners. The study's findings suggest that the multi-level governance (MLG) approach (Ciesielska-Klikowska & Kamiński, 2022; Hooghe & Marks, 2001) might also be applied to analysing Turkish foreign policy. The sub-state level matters in foreign relations, even in highly centralised models of policy-making such as the Turkish one.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the phenomenon of city diplomacy and its links with foreign policy. Section 3 presents an overview of Sino-Turkish relations, sketching the political and economic context for developing sub-state contacts. Section 4 describes Turkey and China’s city-to-city relations based on survey results. The final section presents the ways in which Turkish foreign policy might benefit from further developing sub-state contacts with China.
City diplomacy as a part of foreign policy
One of the most important trends of recent decades has been the increasing prominence of cities on the global stage. Cities are no longer passive "venues" for international relations; rather, many have become influential actors in shaping their dynamics (Curtis & Acuto, 2018). Thanks to globalised political, economic and technological forces, cities have become international players able to engage meaningfully in different forms of diplomatic activity.
City diplomacy can be defined as "the institutions and processes by which cities engage in relations with actors on an international political scene with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another" (van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007, p. 11). Mayors or municipal civil servants represent cities in their diplomatic activities.
City diplomacy manifests as agreements, institution-building and bilateral or multilateral cooperation with foreign partners. Traditionally, cities engaged in twinning, through which they build relations with partner cities (Zelinsky, 1991). Currently, they also organise themselves into transnational cities networks (TCNs), where municipal representatives (mayors, officials) cooperate, share knowledge and try to influence global governance in areas such as global climate policy (Acuto & Leffel, 2021; Lee & Jung, 2018). Cities offer interesting new possibilities for tackling contemporary global challenges.
Cities conventionally focus on low-politics issues such as waste management, public transport, internal security and education. However, the boundary between high and low politics has been blurred in today's world. "Low politics" acquire international significance and move to the sphere of "high politics", with environmental protection as a primary example (Kuznetsov, 2015). Cities responsible for implementing environmental policies are indispensable partners to governments and international organisations engaged in global governance. It is no surprise that the global role of cities has been formalised in the United Nations system (Acuto et al., 2021; Kosovac et al., 2020).
The growing number of international connections between cities, and the political activities thereof, create overlaps between states' domestic policies and foreign policies, or between subnational competencies and central government diplomacy. Central governments can have positive or negative attitudes towards city diplomacy, perceiving it as an opportunity or as a challenge. In the former approach, the government may see cities as potential instruments of state foreign policy and contributors to state diplomacy. In the latter, it may see cities as troublemakers capable of undermining state foreign policy goals (Kuznetsov, 2015).
Considering city diplomacy as a form of paradiplomacy, the relationship between cities' foreign activities and state government foreign policy can be conceptualised through a modification of the classical Soldatos (1990) model. Four relational patterns emerge:
- Cooperative-coordinated, whereby cities' involvement in international relations are under formal or informal coordination with the central government;
- Cooperative-joint, whereby city diplomacy is formally or informally included in national foreign policy;
- Parallel-harmony, whereby municipal governments act independently in the international arena according to their competencies. Their actions, however, are harmonised with and do not contradict national foreign affairs;
- Parallel-disharmony, whereby local authorities' external actions oppose national government policy.
This model does not explain conditions (e.g. the political system) that must be met to build a specific pattern of relations. Since the development of the theory of paradiplomacy in the 1980s, researchers have strongly agreed that the "democratic system is some kind of key precondition for the existence of constituent diplomacy" (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 41). Later, case studies from China or Russia (Pietrasiak et al., 2018; Stremoukhov, 2021) changed this traditional way of thinking, providing evidence that paradiplomacy (including city diplomacy) exists even in non-democratic political systems.
On the basis of existing literature, one can assume that centralised states in which the government holds a significant amount of power will tend to build cooperative relationships with subnational units, control them or even use them instrumentally in foreign policy actions. For instance, Shanghai officials confronted their counterparts from Osaka, its Japanese sister city, amidst Sino-Japanese tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute (Liu & Song, 2020).
This example is characteristic of how the realist school of international relations, one of the most prominent in China (Qin, 2011), looks at paradiplomacy. In this view, subnational units participate in international relations with formal or informal state government approval and thereby promote the state's interests. Engagement of local authorities leads to "the rationalisation of the foreign policy" (Soldatos, 1990) of central national governments due to the subnational delegation of all foreign policy tasks that can be more effectively performed by cities.
Realists, contrary to liberals, do not link the external activities of subnational units with political pluralism within a state (Kuznetsov, 2015). Therefore, the realist approach is fitting to analysing Turkish paradiplomacy and foreign policy, particularly after 2016 (Yilmaz, 2021).
The next section introduces Sino-Turkish intergovernmental relations. This lays the foundation for demonstrating the place of subnational contacts between cities in the countries' bilateral relations. Hocking’s (1993) concept of multi-layered diplomacy is central, here.
An overview of Sino-Turkish relations: Economically oriented Chinese policy
During the Cold War, Turkey officially recognised Beijing rather than Taipei as a member of the United Nations Security Council, in parallel with the normalisation of US–China relations. On August 5, 1971, in Paris, Turkey and China signed an agreement to develop mutual political relations; they signed a commercial treaty in 1974 (Atli, 2016, p. 6). In the post-Cold War period, both countries tried to develop bilateral relations and establish mutual trust. In 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's official visit to Turkey was both the first high-level visit from China post-Cold War and the symbol of a new era in bilateral diplomatic relations; the Chinese president was honoured with the Order of Merit (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2000).
On the 40th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic ties, the nations upgraded their bilateral relations to the status of strategic cooperative partnership, stressing Turkey's role in the Chinese plan to rebuild the ancient Silk Road—even before the official announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Visiting Turkey as Vice President in 2012, Xi Jinping stated at the China–Turkey Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum that "Istanbul was the gateway to Europe for the ancient Silk Road and now plays an important bridging and linking role for China–Turkey friendship… Since ancient times, the world-famous Silk Road has linked our two peoples together" (Jinping, 2012). Turkey obtained dialogue partner status the same year at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Beijing Summit. The idea that the key to being an active player in the global economic and political forum is through cooperation with Asian countries, especially the SCO member countries, pushed Turkey to announce the Asian Anew Initiative in August 2019 (Deveci & Gullu, 2021, p. 774). Aware of the global shift of power from West to East, Turkey has adopted a foreign policy that prioritises economic opportunities coming from China, using its own geographical location between Europe and Asia to its strategic advantage (Alagoz, 2021a, p. 291). The Turkish and Chinese country leaders met frequently; between 2015 and 2020, alone, they met eight times in high-level, face-to-face meetings.
The nations' economic links grew alongside their political relations. Whereas their trade volume was worth US$1 billion in 2000, its value increased to US$19,5 billion in 2010 (TUIK, 2022). Considering that the total trade volume between the two countries is worth approximately US$3,5 billion per month, it had the potential to reach nearly US$45 billion by the end of 2022 at the time of writing.
Table 1: Turkey-China trade statics (2013–2021, USD Billions)
Year
|
Export
|
Import
|
Trade Volume
|
Trade Balance
|
2013
|
3.75
|
25.26
|
29,01
|
-21,51
|
2014
|
2.97
|
25.73
|
28,7
|
-22,76
|
2015
|
2.50
|
25.28
|
27,78
|
-22,78
|
2016
|
2.37
|
24.85
|
27,22
|
-22,48
|
2017
|
3.03
|
23.75
|
26,78
|
-20,72
|
2018
|
3.07
|
21.50
|
24,57
|
-18.43
|
2019
|
2.72
|
19.12
|
21,84
|
-16,40
|
2020
|
2.86
|
23.04
|
25.09
|
-20.18
|
2021
|
2.87
|
31.56
|
34.43
|
-28.69
|
2022 (Jan-Sep)
|
2.42
|
31.74
|
34.16
|
-29.32
|
Source: (TUIK, 2022)
Turkey's trade deficit remains its biggest problem in bilateral trade. China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) enabled the country to better integrate into the world market. Turkey was adversely affected by China’s accession to the WTO, due to the rising competition and decrease in textile production, which is an important sector of its economy (Dilek et al., 2019, p. 36). Turkey is trying to balance its economic relations with China by inviting Chinese tourists, investments and loans.
Ankara systematically tries to increase the number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey. For instance, 2018 was announced as "Turkey Tourism Year" in China, and various events and activities were organised in different Chinese cities to promote Turkish cuisine, culture and tourism destinations. Moreover, Turkish Airlines, which started flying to Beijing in 1999, later developed a flight network opening direct connections to Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Xi'an. These efforts succeeded, and the number of Chinese tourists, only 21,5 thousand in 2000, reached 394.1 thousand in 2018 (Dilek et al., 2019, p. 58). A survey of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey in 2017 shows that almost all of them were attracted by Turkish historical and cultural heritage, and that the vast majority (88.5%) viewed the country positively after their visits (İbiş & Batman, 2018, p. 466).
China's strategic BRI initiative echoes Turkey's Silk Road initiative, called the Middle Corridor, which aims to connect to and develop trade with Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 2015, Turkey and China signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Aligning the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor Initiative (MoU), thereby combining the BRI and the Middle Corridor (Türkiye's Multilateral Transportation Policy, 2022). Both states aimed to increase their trade capacity by developing railway networks (Chaziza, 2021b, p. 36). The fact that the Middle Corridor vision aligned with BRI made Turkey one of China's key partners in the Middle East region (Durdular, 2016, p. 90). Furthermore, some Chinese scholars confirmed that the "Turkish dream" of economic development through connectivity in Eurasia harmonised with "China's dream" of the BRI (Zan, 2016, p. 50). Sharing a dream might encourage its actualisation.
Turkey's strategic location amidst Asia, Europe and Africa, as well as its customs union with the EU, makes it an attractive destination for Chinese investment projects (Yu, 2021, p. 255). According to the American Enterprise Institute's China Global Investment Tracker, there were 28 Chinese contracts and investments in Turkey between January 2005 and March 2022, valued at US$15.78 billion; Seventeen of these, worth US$9,96 billion, have been implemented since the announcement of the BRI in 2013 (AEI, 2022). Table 2 shows China's top 10 investments in Turkey between 2005 and 2022. It is worth noting that six of these are in the energy sector.
Table 2: Top 10 Chinese Investments and Construction Projects in Turkey (2005–2022)
Year
|
Month
|
Investor or Builder
|
Amount (USD)
|
Type & Sector
|
2013
|
May
|
Harbin Electric
|
2400 M
|
Construction/ Energy
|
2019
|
September
|
AVIC
|
1320 M
|
Investment/ Energy
|
2005
|
June
|
China Railway Construction, China General Technology (Genertec)
|
1270 M
|
Construction/ Transport
|
2013
|
January
|
China National Chemical Engineering
|
1100 M
|
Construction/ Chemicals
|
2017
|
November
|
PowerChina
|
1090 M
|
Construction/ Energy
|
2015
|
September
|
China Merchants Group, CIC and COSCO
|
920 M
|
Investment/ Logistics
|
2010
|
April
|
Sinoma
|
780 M
|
Construction/ Real Estate
|
2008
|
October
|
Datong
|
760 M
|
Investment/ Energy
|
2016
|
January
|
Dongfang Electric Corporation
|
660 M
|
Construction/ Energy
|
2011
|
September
|
China National Chemical Engineering
|
640 M
|
Construction/ Energy
|
Source: (AEI, 2022)
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that three quarters of China's total investment in Turkey are in sustainable energy supply for industrial production, which plays an important role in Turkey's development, and transportation and logistics, which will increase its trade potential. The predominance of energy-related investments is understandable given that Turkey lies at the intersection of Russia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, where approximately three quarters of the world's oil and natural gas reserves are located. This heightens Turkey's role as a critical energy partner to China (Zou, 2016, p. 19).
Table 3: Distribution of China's Investments in Turkey by Sector (2005–2022 March)
Sector
|
Sub-Sector
|
Amount
(USD Billions)
|
Sector Ratio in China's Investments (%)
|
Energy
|
Coal, natural gas, hydro and renewable
|
9,74
|
61,72
|
Transport
|
Railway
|
1,39
|
8,80
|
Chemicals
|
Chemical Engineering
|
1.26
|
7,98
|
Real Estate
|
Building
|
1.15
|
7,28
|
Logistics
|
Ports and shipping
|
0,92
|
5,83
|
Metals
|
Steel
|
0,44
|
2,78
|
Finance
|
Banking
|
0,43
|
2,72
|
Consumer
|
Online Sales
|
0,35
|
2,21
|
Technology
|
Telecommunication
|
0,10
|
0,63
|
Total Investment
|
|
15,78
|
100
|
Source: (AEI, 2022).
China invested US$1.39 billion in the construction and modernisation of railways in Turkey. In this regard, China supported the construction of the Third Bosphorus Bridge (Yavuz Sultan Selim), the Marmaray rail tunnel linking Europe to Asia under the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul, and the modernisation of the high-speed railway between Istanbul and Ankara (Schindler et al., 2021). All these projects, together with the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line (also known as the Iron Silk Road), which became operational in 2017, shortened the traditional trade route between China and Europe by two weeks, and its route distance by approximately 7000 km (Chaziza, 2016, p. 273).
However, the perception that China is practicing "debt trap diplomacy", especially with its investments and loans within the scope of BRI, is spreading rapidly. According to this view, China uses economic tools by which it tries to maximise its national interests through generous loans and investments that other states will have difficulty repaying (Brautigam, 2019, p. 2). The sale of 51% of the strategic Yavuz Sultan Bridge and 65% of Kumport, Turkey's third-largest container terminal, to Chinese consortiums can be can, indeed, be viewed as a consequence of economic diplomacy (Alemdaroglu & Tepe, 2021).
Turkey's unique geopolitical position between Asia and Europe, and the logistical opportunities it provides, have led to the development of political economy-based relations between China and Turkey (Gürel & Kozluca, 2022, p. 8). In particular, Turkey's voluntary participation in the BRI and sustainability of China’s investments in Turkey require the development of cultural relations between the two geographically distant countries. In this direction, municipalities, which are intertwined with the public at the local level, can play a role in supporting cultural activities and thus developing economic and political relations between the two states.
City-to-city relations between Turkey and China
The cooperation of Turkish cities with China is not as widespread as that of European Union member states, wherein most regions and half of cities have partnered with Chinese subnational units (Kamiński, 2022). Only 11 of the 40 Turkish cities participating in our survey stated that they have bilateral relations with China (Table 4). Of the 29 cities that do not have relations with China, three had bilateral contacts in the past, and eight plan to establish contacts in the future. Most of the participating cities established their contacts with Chinese partners more than 30 years ago, in the 1980s or 1990s. However, almost half of the partnerships are relatively new, i.e. were established in the last decade.
In total, we identified 20 partnerships between Turkish and Chinese cities, a slightly higher number than the 19 partnerships reported by the Chinese in 2015 (List of China International Friendship Cities 中国国际友好城市总表 1973~2015, 2020). However, half of the surveyed Turkish municipalities admitted that their partnerships with the Chinese are inactive, meaning that nothing has come of them over the last two years. Five of the surveyed cities reported no formal agreement with Chinese partners. This indicates that some of the partnerships are relatively insubstantial, i.e. inactive and weakly institutionalised.
Table 4: Turkish Cities with Chinese Partners
Turkish City
|
Chinese partners
|
Year of Establishment
|
Afyonkarahisar
|
Yunfu
|
2011
|
Ankara
|
Beijing
Shanghai
Shenzhen
|
1993
2008
2013
|
Antalya
|
Haikou
|
2011
|
Balıkesir
|
Tongxiang
|
2002
|
Bursa
|
Anshan
|
1991
|
Edirne
|
Xining
Qinghai
|
2012
2012
|
Gaziantep
|
Urumçi
|
2016
|
İstanbul
|
Shanghai
Xi’an
Guangzhou
Hangzhou
|
1989
1997
2012
2016
|
İzmir
|
Xiamen
Chengdu
Wuhan
Tianjin
|
2018
2019
2013
1991
|
Kocaeli
|
Zhengyan
|
1994
|
Trabzon
|
Rizhao
|
1991
|
The main obstacles for the cities without Chinese partners are language or cultural barriers, a lack of human resources, and a lack of engagement of local partners such as companies, universities or cultural institutions (Table 5). Some cities also cited a lack of interest, either among local authorities or on the Chinese side. Only two cities blamed a lack of support from the national or regional government, which may indicate that this is not a significant problem.
Table 5: Reasons for Turkish cities' lack of cooperation Chinese partners (n=29)
What are the reasons why your city does not cooperate with Chinese partners?
|
Answers
|
Language/cultural barriers
|
9
|
Lack of human resources
|
6
|
Lack of interest of local partners (businesses, universities, cultural institutions, etc.)
|
6
|
Distance
|
5
|
Chinese local authorities are not interested in cooperation
|
5
|
Authorities of our city are not interested/see no need
|
4
|
Political tensions with China on the national level
|
4
|
Differences in political systems
|
3
|
High costs of cooperation
|
3
|
Lack of support from the regional government
|
2
|
Lack of support from the national government
|
2
|
Lack of social, cultural or commercial relations with China
|
1
|
Lack of communication in official contact
|
1
|
Lack of interest in the past
|
1
|
Low commitment of Chinese partner
|
1
|
Interestingly, tensions over the fact that the Chinese government violates the rights of Turks living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region do not factor much into the lack of cooperation. Only four cities lacking cooperation cited this as a reason thereof, and only one city engaged in cooperation cited national-level tensions as an obstacle. This strengthens the general impression from the survey that Turkey's city-to-city contacts with China are loosely connected with national politics.
Some cities highlighted the national government's supportive role. For instance, Istanbul is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Antalya, pointed out the governor, an official representant of the central government in individual provinces, as the most important local actor in establishing international relations. Some cities also reported that their relations with China are fully coordinated with the central government’s (Antalya, Bursa and Kocaeli), and the average level of coordination is 3,6 (on a scale of 1 to 5). On the other hand, cities reported very low impact on national policy towards China; eight cities reported that they have no impact at all, and the average score is only 1,7.
Interestingly, the municipalities do not coordinate their actions towards China with other Turkish cities. The national government does not promote such cooperation, although such horizontal cooperation may bring many benefits, thanks to peer learning or promoting best practices. This is the case in the Netherlands, where the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) network tries to foster inter-municipal collaboration within the Netherlands (Interview with VNG Official, personal communication, 3 December 2020).
Eight Turkish cities identified local authorities as the initiators of contact with potential partner cities; in four cases, initiating contact was a joint action of Chinese and Turkish officials. The city of Antalya received direct support from the state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and in two other cities, local businesses were engaged. None of the cities identified academic partners as initiators, which, in the EU, are very often engaged in initiating subnational cooperation with China (Kamiński, 2021).
Culture is Turkey's most common form of bilateral cooperation with China, followed by sports and tourism (Chart 1). Surprisingly, only Kocaeli indicated academic exchange as an area of cooperation, but only Trabzon mentioned the university's engagement in collaboration with China. This shows that the academic dimension of city diplomacy towards China is less important in Turkey than it is, for example, in the EU countries (Skorupska et al., 2019).
Chart 1. Areas of Cooperation with Chinese Partners (n=11)
Kocaeli is also the only city with relations in all eight areas specified in Chart 1. It is remarkable that, with a population of 2,033,441 and a total trade volume of only US$17,2 million, this city has developed more cooperation areas as Istanbul, which has a population of over 15 million and a trade volume of US$24,5 billion.
Our analysis of local partners' engagement in developing relations with China shows that Turkish municipalities often act almost alone, usually cooperating with only one or two local institutions. Four cities identified local cultural institutions as partners, and two identified local NGOs. While ten municipalities have economic relations with China, only Istanbul identified local business partners in these relations. The success stories of some European cities’ cooperation with China (Kamiński, 2019) show that the engagement of local partners is fundamental to developing subnational links to the country.
Typically, official visits are Turkish cities' most common form of cooperation with China (Chart 2). These are followed by participation in fairs and economic forums, and collaboration in the framework of international city networks such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). Only Istanbul indicated participation in central government delegations to China, which, again, confirms the weak link between city diplomacy and Turkish foreign policy.
Chart 2. Forms of cooperation with Chinese partners (n=11)
According to surveyed officials, the most important factor in successful collaboration with Chinese partners (Chart 3) is the mayor's attitude (average score 4,7 on a scale of 1 to 5). This confirms earlier findings from the literature on city diplomacy (Lee, 2016). The next most important factor is the Chinese partners' commitment (4,3 points). Interestingly, officials highly praise collaboration with the national government, even though the survey shows that such collaboration barely exists. Consistent with earlier findings, the engagement of academic institutions, local businesses or other subnational authorities is seen as less important for the success of mutual relations; it seems that city officials do not perceive local partners as crucial to developing mutual relations with the Chinese, which begs the question as to how tangible partnership results can be obtained without involving local companies, schools or universities.
Chart 3. What is important for successful collaboration with Chinese partners? (n=11)
As seen in Chart 4, the main benefits of cooperation with Chinese partners are promoting culture (8 municipalities), exchanging experience (7) and promoting tourism (5). The benefits are rare in areas directly related to the economy. Only three cities indicated attracting Chinese investment, and one mentioned developing trade links, including export promotion. These results are not surprising given that, as seen earlier, local authorities hardly ever cooperate with their local business partners. Although benefits related to educational exchange are crucial, for instance, in the case of German cities' contacts with China (Ciesielska-Klikowska, 2021), they are, in the Turkish context, non-existent. Not a single city indicated benefiting from working with universities or schools.
Chart 4. The main benefits of cooperation with Chinese partners
The distribution of benefits stresses the character of Turkish subnational cooperation with China on the local level. It suggests that many partnerships might be superficial, with some benefits in culture and tourism but very limited ones in other areas, including economic cooperation. This is consistent with earlier findings that Turkish cities rarely work with local actors, so they cannot benefit in the areas in which the success of cooperation depends on the engagement of companies or universities.