Uranium weapons have been increasingly employed in battle action since their first use by the US and UK forces in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then, they have been used in the Balkans in the late 1990s, then Kosovo in 2000, probably in Afghanistan in 2002 and then also in the 2nd Gulf War (GW2) in March and April 2003. On impact, uranium penetrators burn fiercely to give an aerosol of sub micron diameter oxide particles which are largely insoluble and remain in the environment for many years [1].
There is considerable public and scientific concern that these radioactive particles may remain suspended for long periods, or may become resuspended and are therefore available for inhalation by non-combatants at some distance from the point of impact. Little research seems to have been carried out on the distance travelled by the uranium aerosols. The military maintain that the uranium remains near the point of impact, and the Royal Society report also states that the material does not travel more than some tens of metres. On the other hand, measurements of uranium in local populations in Kosovo some nine months after the use of uranium weapons tested positive for depleted uranium in urine and the United Nations (UNEP) found uranium particles in air filters in Bosnia and Kosovo some years after its use. The author visited both Kosovo in 2001 (with Nippon TV) and South Iraq in 2000 (with Al Jazeera), and measured DU residues in the environment using scintillation counting for beta and alpha radiation. Samples were taken in Kosovo and analysed in Wales to show the presence of DU particles precipitated from snow and present in puddles far from the impact points. Later, information on Uranium in air samplers deployed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment showed the presence of Uranium from the 2nd Gulf War in 2003 [2] in a study similar to the present one.
The question of the dispersion of uranium aerosols from battlefields is of significant legal interest, since if a radioactive weapon resulted in the general contamination of the public in the country of deployment or elsewhere, the weapon would be classifiable as one of indiscriminate effect.
AWE have been routinely monitoring uranium in air since the early 1990s but since 2000 have carried out filter determinations from high volume air samplers (HVAS) roughly every two weeks. They were required to set up these monitors in the late 1980s following the discovery of a child leukaemia cluster near the plant [3]. There are monitors onsite but they also deploy them at various other sites some 15km distance from the plant. We previously, in 2006, obtained results using the Freedom of Information Act. Analysis carried out and published in 2006 showed that Uranium levels in air filters near AWE increased significantly at the time of the 2003 Gulf War [2]. The issue was widely reported in the media [4].
This report examines the trend in uranium shown by the measurements made on high volume air sampler filter systems (HVAS) deployed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston Berkshire UK from 2018 to the end of 2022 and compares the period of the Ukraine war with the period before the war from 2018 to January 2022.
Modern Tank warfare has increasingly become dependent on the use of DU weapons since 1991. It is the key munition in tank warfare. It would therefore be unsurprising if Uranium is being employed in the Ukraine theatre. Furthermore, the fact that after Chernobyl, radioactivity arrived in the UK from the Ukraine, some 1800 miles away should make it clear that Uranium particles from the use of the various anti-tank weapons used by either the Russian armed forces or those supplied to Ukraine by the US and other Western States could contaminate the air in the UK. It has been reported that Bradley fighting vehicles being supplied to the Ukraine by the USA use DU penetrating munitions, and so levels of DU are likely to increase in the UK and Europe. This may have serious public health implications.