The Influence of Social Reward on Cooperative Behaviour in Teams: An Experimental Research

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2829795/v1

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The Influence of Social Reward on Cooperative Behaviour in Teams: An Experimental Research

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2829795/v1

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This study explores the process of the influence of social reward on cooperation at the individual level. Firstly, according to self- and reward-processing theories of neuropsychology, we follow the idea of ‘stimuli-psychological process-behavioural response’ to clarify the stimuli of social reward on individuals. In addition, we analyse the psychological process of individual self-processing and reward processing triggered by external stimuli. We also deduce the theoretical framework of the impact of social reward on individual cooperative behaviour under this psychological process. Secondly, we infer the influence mode and effect of social reward from individuals’ possible reactions under this psychological process. Finally, we design a team cooperation environment using the public goods game experiment, where members can observe and impose rewards on each other. We also restore the occurrence process of social reward in the laboratory by obtaining real and dynamic interactive data of subjects to test the theoretical framework and research hypotheses proposed in this study.

Biological sciences/Psychology

Biological sciences/Psychology/Human behaviour

Social reward refers to the social stimulus or social relationships that enable individuals to obtain motivational or recreational experiences in social interactions¹^,². Human sensitivity and concern for social reward are important instincts that have survived through natural selection in the course of evolution³. In ancient times, members of tribes with greater acceptance and recognition had a greater chance of survival⁴. Social reward and economic interest are equally important to people’s social life. In organisational management, more and more enterprises have realised this notion. They actively build employee interaction networks within the organisation to create immediate incentives and recognition opportunities for employees to enhance their work experiences, such as the ‘like system’ within the enterprise and the reward or integral mechanism on the employee welfare platform⁵. Empirical studies found that social reward has a significant effect on promoting cooperation and improving team incentives (i.e. alleviating the free-riding problem). At present, studies on the impact of social reward on team cooperation mainly include three categories: the first category empirically measures the peer control climate (including social reward and social punishment climate) of the team in the workplace and examines its impact on cooperation⁶^,⁷^,⁸^,⁹. The second category mainly uses the laboratory experiment method to compare the difference in the cooperation level between the two conditions with and without social reward to test its effect¹⁰^,¹¹^,¹². The third category compares the effects of social and monetary reward, or social reward and social punishment on cooperation¹³^,¹⁴^,¹⁵. To sum up, previous studies neglected the influencing process of social reward on individuals, that is, through what factors do social reward affect individuals? How do different factors influence their cooperative behaviour independently or interactively? How effective is the impact? The raising of such questions directly [i]relates to how to carry out specific organisational design and team building to accurately use the social interaction amongst members to improve the team incentive effect.

Based on self- and reward-processing theories of neuropsychology, this study analyses the process of the influence of social reward on individual cooperative behaviour from the perspective of stimuli that individuals may receive. This study also deduces the theoretical framework of this process. How social reward affects individual cooperation and their effects are inferred from the possible responses of individuals in reaction to three stimuli. We use the classical public goods game experiment to restore the process of social reward in the laboratory by obtaining real and dynamic interactive data from subjects. We test the theoretical framework and related assumptions based on the data analysis results, uncovering the ‘black box’ between social reward and cooperative behaviour at the individual level.

Team cooperation is a process of interpersonal interaction, and the cooperative decision of an individual is the result of repeated games played by many parties¹⁶. Repeated games mean that the actions of interacting parties are mutual cause and effect¹⁷. For any individual, the change of cooperative behaviour is brought not only by a reward from a peer but also by the individual’s response to all the behaviours of peers in the whole process of interaction. According to neuropsychology, the process of social reward acting on individuals is a process of self-processing and reward processing¹⁸. Self-processing refers to that when information is related to self-concept, individuals will process it faster and remember it better. In the social environment, individuals will prioritise dealing with self-related stimuli to maintain self-concept. Individuals must evaluate the importance of the current environmental stimuli to respond appropriately to the environment. Environmental stimuli can be automatically involved in the evaluation system of self-processing. Moreover, environmental stimuli may be encoded by the reward system, that is, the reward value brought by the purposeful pursuit of stimuli¹⁹. That is, the processing of stimuli involves two aspects, the degree of self-involvement of stimuli and the reward value of stimuli. In the context of teamwork, the cooperative behaviour of peers constitutes a self-related stimulus source for any individual, which stimulates individuals to self-process through social comparison. Moreover, similar to monetary reward, social reward can also stimulate the response of the corresponding brain areas of individuals, that is, to cause individuals’ reward processing. Berridge and Robinson found that reward processing includes two parts: reward anticipation and reward outcome²⁰. Reward anticipation, also known as ‘wanting’, is a motivational process that promotes reward-related stimuli and anticipated behaviour. Meanwhile, reward outcome, also known as ‘liking’, reflects the happy experience of reward acquisition. The reward opportunity in the team will affect individuals by stimulating their reward anticipation, and the real reward of the team members will affect individuals by stimulating their reward outcome.

To sum up, the process in which social reward affects individual cooperative behaviour includes stimulating individual self-processing because of social comparison, stimulating individual reward anticipation because of reward opportunities and stimulating individual reward outcome because of reward acquisition. Social comparison, reward opportunity and reward acquisition are three stimulus factors that social reward affects individuals. Individuals’ psychological processing and response to these factors reflect the process that social reward affects individual cooperative behaviour in specific cooperative interactions and games. Specifically, the process includes the following aspects:

1.1 The influence of social comparison

Teams involving multi-party interactions provide a typical social comparison situation²¹. In team cooperation, the fundamental premise that social reward can affect individual behaviour is the social comparison based on peer information. Social comparison is the process of individual self-processing. Without comparison, the occurrence of reward is not justified and has no impact on the focus individual. People in a team make social comparisons first and then decide whether to reward others. The result of social comparison is the decision-making basis of reward behaviour and behaviour choice after being rewarded. Therefore, we speculate that the effect of social reward on cooperation includes the influence of social comparison.

1.2 The effect of reward opportunities

Brain science research on social reward found that the brain regions related to the reward system are the basis of various complex social activities of human beings. The brain’s reward processing includes reward anticipation and reward outcome (i.e. outcome evaluation). Reward anticipation refers to the expectation and waiting for the reward to be received, and the neuron activation involved continues until the reward is received²⁰. In teamwork, not every cooperator will be truly rewarded at any time. However, the existence of reward opportunities will make individuals establish reward anticipation, so everyone will inevitably be affected. Compared with no reward opportunity, reward opportunity affects individual psychology and changes individual cooperation levels by establishing reward anticipation. Therefore, we speculate that the effect of social reward on individual cooperation includes the effect of reward opportunity.

1.3 Reward acquisition

As a motivational tool, reward allows individuals to allocate more effort and resources to complete the task. Evidence from cognitive neuroscience and psychology shows that social reward processing and monetary reward processing in the brain have the same neural basis. Social reward processing also activates other social brain areas. Social reward processing not only causes the relevant brain regions of the reward system to predict, encode and evaluate the reward value but also involves specific brain regions that are very important for social cognitive processing²². Therefore, we speculate that the effect of social reward on individual cooperation includes the effect of reward acquisition.

1.4 Interaction between social comparison and reward acquisition

Neuropsychological studies showed an interaction between self-processing and reward processing in some cognitive processing stages²³. Social comparison is an important motivation for individuals’ spontaneous and instinctive driving efforts during social interactions and is essentially a type of intrinsic motivation. Social reward is extrinsic stimuli from peers and is essentially a form of extrinsic motivation. According to motivation theory, individuals’ intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation not only independently affect but also interact with each other. Therefore, one of the important ways that social reward affects individual cooperation is the interaction between social comparison and reward acquisition.

Figure 1 shows the theoretical framework of the effect of social reward on cooperation at the individual level based on the above analysis.

2.1 Effect of social comparison on cooperation

The effect of social comparison has different directions, which can be divided into the contrast effect and assimilation effect according to the direction of the result. Jiao Yuanyuan and Li Zhihui²⁴ showed that the peer effect caused by mutual observation and influence would lead to the convergence of individual behaviour. Examining the effort contagion effect of the risk management team, Breugst et al.²⁵ found that the average level of peer effort is positively correlated with the effort level of the focus individual who lags behind for one period. That is, the social comparison within the team leads individuals to adjust their subsequent effort investment according to the average level of peer effort. Falk and Ichino¹⁷ found that the social comparison brought by mutual observation led to a smaller difference in effort between subjects and a more neutral effort. According to the assimilation effect of social comparison, high cooperators in the team will make a downward comparison and reduce their cooperation level. Low cooperators will make an upward comparison to improve their cooperation level. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1: Social comparison encourages high cooperators in the team to reduce subsequent cooperation.

H2: Social comparison will encourage low cooperators in the team to improve subsequent cooperation.

2.2 Impact of reward opportunities on cooperation

In previous studies on the impact of social reward on cooperation, the data results include the behavioural changes caused by reward acquisition and the impact of reward opportunities. Existing studies have not made a clear distinction between the two. Nevertheless, evidence shows that reward opportunity alone can positively affect individual cooperation. Xiao and Houser²⁶ and López-Pérez and Vorsatz²⁷ demonstrated that the expectation of possible rewarding and punishing feedback will lead to a higher level of cooperation. In their studies, participants can choose not to read the feedback even if the experiment is not repeated in the context of knowing the existence of ex post feedback. Therefore, compared with no reward opportunity, the present study assumes that reward opportunity will promote individual cooperation in the team. The following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: Compared with no reward opportunities, reward opportunities in teams will encourage individuals to improve their subsequent cooperation level.

2.3 Impact of reward acquisition on cooperation

Reward acquisition leads to the reward-outcome stage in individuals’ internal reward processing. Reward outcome is related to ‘liking’, which reflects the happy experience of reward acquisition and is related to the consumptive happiness generated by biological consumption²⁰. Previous studies showed that social reward and monetary reward have similar effects. That is, increasing the process of perception and executive control can promote individual behaviour and achieve more effective goal-oriented behaviour. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H4: Reward acquisition will promote the improvement of individual cooperation level, and the higher the reward acquisition, the more the individual cooperation level will improve.

In addition, according to ‘crowding-out effect’ theory of motivation, excessive extrinsic motivation will make employees attribute their efforts to extrinsic interests, thereby reducing their intrinsic motivation. In other words, extrinsic incentives have a ‘crowding-out effect’ on intrinsic motivation²⁸. Extending this rule to the relationship between social comparison and reward acquisition, a reasonable logic is that peer reward will inhibit the behaviour tendency of intrinsic motivation brought about by social comparison. That is, reward acquisition can squeeze out the effect of social comparison on cooperation. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis about the interaction between social comparison and reward acquisition:

H5: Reward acquisition weakens the impact of social comparison on individual cooperation, and the more the reward received, the greater the weakening effect.

3.1 Experimental task design

The experimental task of this study is based on the classic public goods game experiment of Fehr and G Gächter²⁹. We conduct a finitely repeated public good game for 10 periods to better explore the behavioural dynamics, and the group composition does not change across periods. No subject is ever informed about the identity of the other group members. In all treatment conditions, the endowment is given by 20, groups are of size n = 4 and the marginal payoff of the public good is fixed at 0.4.

3.2 Design of experimental treatments

Our overall design consists of a public good experiment with two treatment conditions. There is an experimental treatment (with social reward) and a control treatment (without social reward). In the control treatment, after the end of each period investment task, the investment information of all group members will be randomly and anonymously arranged on the subjects’ screen. Compared with the control treatment, the experimental treatment added social reward. In the experimental treatment, after the presentation of information, the subjects are given the opportunity to send the reward message to the other three members (the cost of sending the message is 0.5 experimental tokens¹²), and the reward message has no effect on the receiver’s income. Based on Dugar¹¹ and Peeters and Vorsatz¹², we design the social reward message to be ‘Well done! Thank you very much for your input!’ followed by a smiley. The reward message received by the subjects is displayed after the reward stage, but its source is not shown.

3.3 Experimental sessions

The experiment was conducted in November 2020, December 2020 and January 2021 in the behavioural decision-making laboratory of the author’s university. The subjects were recruited anonymously through the online registration link of the online questionnaire survey platform named questionnaire star. In sum, 112 undergraduates participated in the experiment, 56 in the control treatment and 56 in the experimental treatment. They were aged 17–22 years old. We conducted the experiment, which was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox developed by the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and the subjects completed the experimental task online.

The payoff for participating in the experiment was measured by the experimental tokens. At the end of the experiment, the subjects can get the final payoff, which is converted from experimental tokens displayed on the screen into RMB at a ratio of 10:1. The experimental session lasted approximately 35 minutes, and average payoffs equalled 30–40 RMB.

The ethics review board of the Northeastern University Institute of Science and Technology approved the study.

3.4 Measurement of variables

In the public goods game experiment, the amount of investment in the public account reflects the level of cooperation of individuals in the team. Since the second period, the change in cooperation level is represented by the difference in investment in the public account between the current and the previous period. In the experiment, the subjects can compare their cooperation level with other members of the group. That is, the cooperation level of other members constitutes the basis of individual social comparison¹³. Therefore, we use the investment difference between the subject and the average of the other three members—positive or negative deviations—to measure the social comparison. The experimental treatment is a categorical variable indicating whether subjects have the opportunity to reward their partner. In the experiment, the number of reward messages received by an individual is used to measure reward acquisition. Table 1 shows the definition of specific variables.

Table 1

Variable definition
Variable name	Variable symbol	Variable measurement
Level of cooperation	Contribution	The amount of endowment invested by a subject in the public account in the current period
Changes in the level of cooperation	Change	The difference between the investment amount of the current and the previous period
Social comparison	Mean+	Positive investment deviation between the subject and the average of the other three members of the group
Social comparison	Mean-	Negative investment deviation between the subject and the average of the other three members of the group
Reward acquisition	Reward Acq	The number of reward messages received by a subject from other members of the group in a given period
Reward opportunity	Rew Opp	Categorical variable, in the experimental treatment = 1, in the control treatment = 0
Age	Age	The age of the subject
Gender	Sex	Categorical variable, male = 1, female = 0

4.1 Descriptive statistics and overall effect analysis

We use the STATA 15.0 to analyse the experimental data. Table 2 illustrates the results of the descriptive statistics. The average investment of public accounts in the control treatment is 8.747, whereas that in the experimental treatment is 11.307. It is preliminary verified that social reward can improve team cooperation.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics of the control treatment
Variables	Sample size	Mean value	Standard deviation	Maximum value
Contribution	560	8.747	6.793	20
Mean+	560	2.337	3.950	19.667
Mean-	560	2.337	3.816	20

Table 3

Descriptive statistics of the experimental treatment
Variables	Sample size	Mean value	Standard deviation	Maximum value
Contribution	560	11.307	6.060	20
Receive Pun	560	1.066	0.980	3
Mean+	560	2.011	2.978	13.667
Mean-	560	2.011	3.065	14.667

Figure 2 shows the time trend of the average investment in the public account of the control and experimental treatment in each period. The overall trend of investment in the two treatments is similar. However, the average investment of the experimental treatment is always higher than that of the control treatment. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test the difference between the average investment of the two treatments in each period. The results show that the average investment of the experimental treatment is significantly higher than that of the control treatment (z = − 5.895, p < 0.001). The results verify that social reward can promote team cooperation significantly at the group level.

4.2 Hypothesis testing

4.2.1 Effect of social comparison on cooperation

Based on the data of the control treatment, we explore the longitudinal effect of social comparison on the cooperative behaviour of different individuals: in the regression analysis, the difference between the investment amount of subject i in two adjacent periods is the dependent variable, and the deviation from the average investment amount of other three members is the explanatory variable. The experimental data are panel data with two dimensions of time and cross section. Thus, we control the fixed effects of the group and period and carry out OLS regression analysis on group clustering to address the missing variables that change with time and individuals. In addition, gender and age are controlled in the regression. Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the relationship model between social comparison and individual cooperation level changes in the control and experimental treatment, respectively.

As shown in models 1 and 2, owing to the existence of social comparison, a significant negative correlation exists between the positive deviation of the average level of cooperation between subject i and other members in the previous period and the change in the level of cooperation in the two adjacent periods (b = − 0.570, p < 0.01 in the control treatment and b = − 0.590, p < 0.05 in the experimental treatment). Moreover, a significant positive correlation exists between the negative deviation and the change in cooperation level (b = 0.182, p < 0.01 in the control treatment, b = 0.393, p < 0.05 in the experimental treatment). This result shows that when knowing that their cooperation level is in a higher relative position in the group, high cooperators tend to reduce cooperation in the next period. On the contrary, when knowing that their cooperation level is in a lower relative position in the group, low cooperators tend to improve their cooperation in the next period. Moreover, the regression coefficient shows that the reduction of the cooperation level of high cooperators is more significant than that of low cooperators (0.570 high cooperators in the control treatment > 0.182 low cooperators in the control treatment > 0.590 high cooperators in the experimental treatment > 0.393 low cooperators in the experimental treatment). In models 1 and 2, the decrease in the cooperation level of high cooperators and the increase in the cooperation level of low cooperators verify the assimilation effect of social comparison. When facing social comparison information, subjects tend to be close to the comparison target, thereby verifying H1 and H2.

4.2.2 Effect of reward opportunities on cooperation

Previous studies showed that social stimuli have ex-ante and ex-post effects on individuals³⁰. The ex-ante effect refers to the individual’s response to the expected social stimulus, and the ex-post effect refers to the individual’s response to the actual social stimulus. The effect of reward opportunity on cooperation is the ex-ante effect of social reward, and that of reward acquisition on cooperation is the ex-post effect of social reward. According to our research design, the data of the first period of the experimental treatment are the individual response data when there is no social comparison and social reward but with reward opportunities. The difference between these data and the data of the first period of the control treatment reflects the pure effect of reward opportunities.

Similarly, the experimental treatment data of the second to the tenth periods reflect the combined effects of social comparison, reward opportunities and reward acquisition. Based on Gjedrem and Kvaløy³⁰, the effect of reward opportunity on cooperation is tested by examining whether a difference exists between the experimental and control treatment in the first period of data. Table 5 shows a significant difference in the first-period data between the experimental and control treatment (z = 3.158, p < 0.01). That is, reward opportunity has a positive effect on individual cooperation.

In addition, we further explore the effect of reward opportunities on cooperation. Model 1 of Table 4 analyses the effect of social comparison on cooperation change in the control treatment. Model 2 analyses the influence of social comparison and reward acquisition on the change of individual cooperation in the experimental treatment. After controlling the effect of reward acquisition, the difference in the social comparison effect between the control treatment and the experimental treatment is brought by reward opportunity. A t-test of the two sets of regression coefficients of social comparison in models 1 and 2 shows that the coefficient of negative deviation in model 2 is significantly larger than that in model 1 (χ² = 2.93, p < 0.1). By contrast, the coefficient of positive deviation is not significantly different. That is, compared with social comparison only, reward opportunity led to a significant increase in the level of cooperation of low cooperators in the next period, but no significant difference exists in the behaviour of high cooperators. Therefore, it is confirmed that reward opportunity has the effect of promoting cooperation for low cooperators but has no effect on high cooperators, partially verifying H3.

4.2.3 Impact of reward acquisition on cooperation

In model 2 of Table 4, the regression coefficient of reward acquisition after controlling social comparison is insignificant, indicating that reward acquisition has no direct effect on the change of individual cooperation, and H4 is not supported.

Model 3 adds the interaction between reward acquisition and social comparison to confirm further whether the interaction between social comparison and reward acquisition exists. The results show that the coefficient of reward acquisition is still insignificant, again indicating that peer reward does not directly impact individual cooperation. The interaction coefficient of ‘Mean +’ and ‘Reward Acq’ is positive and significant (b = 0.279, p < 0.05), indicating that reward acquisition will weaken the decline in the level of cooperation of high cooperators caused by social comparison. This result can be interpreted comprehensively; the more significant the gap between the average cooperation level of high cooperators and other members, the more the future cooperation level will be reduced. However, if a high cooperator receives a social reward, then the degree of cooperation reduction will slow down, and the more reward he/she receives, the greater the degree of reduction will be. The results suggest that the reward for high cooperators does crowd out the inherent inhibitory effect of social comparison on their cooperation.

The interaction coefficient of ‘Mean –’ and ‘Reward Acq’ in Model 2 is positive but not significant (b = 0.001, p > 0.1). This result indicates that reward acquisition will not weaken the promotion effect of social comparison on the cooperation of low cooperators. Therefore, H5 is valid for high cooperators but not for low cooperators, and this assumption is partially verified.

Table 4

Regression analysis results of individual cooperation level changes
	Control treatment	Experimental treatment
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Mean+	−0.570*** (0.162)	−0.590*** (0.108)	−0.729*** (0.081)
Mean−	0.182** (0.070)	0.393** (0.132)	0.321* (0.166)
Reward Acq		−0.099 (0.306)	−0.236 (0.315)
Mean+ Reward Acq*			0.279** (0.113)
Mean− Reward Acq*			0.001 (0.164)
Constant	2.075** (0.772)	3.571*** (0.637)	3.726*** (0.702)
Observations	504	504	504
R²	0.243	0.336	0.354
R²_a	0.207	0.303	0.319
Notes: 1. The standard error is in parentheses.

2. ***, ** And * Indicate Statistical Significance At 1%, 5% And 10%, Respectively.

3. As the data are multi-period dynamic panel data with group as the unit, the data are processed by fixed group, fixed period and clustering group during regression.

Table 5

Test of the effect of reward opportunity on individual cooperative behaviour
	Period 1 data
Control treatment	1.349
Experimental treatment	1.360
Statistical test	z = 3.158 (0.0016***)
Note: p values are in parentheses; *** indicates significance at the 1% statistical level.

4.3 Summary of empirical results

This study examined the influencing process and mode of social comparison, reward opportunity and reward acquisition on individual cooperative behaviour in teams. Amongst the five hypotheses proposed, H1 and H2 are verified, H3 and H5 are partially verified and H4 is not verified. To sum up, firstly, social comparison converges the level of cooperation within the team. After knowing the contribution information of other members, the subjects show a kind of ‘conformity’ behaviour, and the change of high cooperators is more intense. Secondly, reward opportunities can significantly improve the cooperation level of low cooperators in the team but do not affect high cooperators. Thirdly, reward acquisition does not directly affect individual cooperation but has an interactive effect on social comparison. Data analysis results show that reward acquisition slows down the tendency of high cooperators to reduce their level of cooperation because of social comparison. The results of this study show that the effect of social reward on individuals is not directly caused by reward acquisition but by reward opportunity, a social comparison amongst members and the interaction between reward acquisition and social comparison.

Firstly, social comparison is the basis of social reward, which directly affects cooperation and makes individuals approach the average level of the team. As social comparison has a negative effect on high cooperators, management can consider recognising high cooperators through vertical reward and recognition (social reward is horizontal and between employees) to eliminate its negative effect. Secondly, reward opportunities are essential channels to motivate teamwork and should be exploited and utilised. The internal communities of many large Internet enterprises provide employees with modules of mutual praise and points reward. To some extent, this approach plays a role in creating an internal reward atmosphere and creating reward opportunities, which is an important way for other enterprises to learn from. Thirdly, enterprises should guide team members to give social rewards to other members objectively and impartially and develop team members’ appreciation of positive, work-based feedback from others.

Data availability

Anonymized data will be made available to researchers upon reasonable request.

Acknowledgements

We appreciate all the participants who took part in our experimental at Northeastern University. In addition, we would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their warm work and all constructive advice to improve the quality of our article.

Author contributions

Yanmei Wang and Chang Cheng designed the research; Xinyu Liu and Aixian Ding performed the research; Yanmei Wang and MiaoTian wrote the paper.

Competing interests

The author(s) declare no competing interests.

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No competing interests reported.

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The Influence of Social Reward on Cooperative Behaviour in Teams: An Experimental Research

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Abstract

Figures

Introduction

1 Theoretical Framework

1.1 The influence of social comparison

1.2 The effect of reward opportunities

1.3 Reward acquisition

1.4 Interaction between social comparison and reward acquisition

2 Research Hypothesis

2.1 Effect of social comparison on cooperation

2.2 Impact of reward opportunities on cooperation

2.3 Impact of reward acquisition on cooperation

3 Study Design

3.1 Experimental task design

3.2 Design of experimental treatments

3.3 Experimental sessions

3.4 Measurement of variables

4 Data Analysis And Results

4.1 Descriptive statistics and overall effect analysis

4.2 Hypothesis testing

4.2.1 Effect of social comparison on cooperation

4.2.2 Effect of reward opportunities on cooperation

4.2.3 Impact of reward acquisition on cooperation

4.3 Summary of empirical results

5 Conclusion

Declarations

References

Additional Declarations

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