The terrestrial carbon sink is critical to mitigate climate change by removing more than 13 billion tons of CO2 from the atmosphere yearly, equivalent to a third of all anthropogenic emissions26,27. Any conceived climate stabilization target relies on the continuity of this vast carbon removal service. Forests accumulate most of the carbon sequestered this way, constituting two-thirds or 8.8 billion tons of CO2 per year1. This carbon sink in forests acts unassisted in the sense that human actions only indirectly modify it. E.g., by unintentional tree regrowth on abandoned land or by the fertilizing effect of the added CO2 emitted to the atmosphere28,29. However, additional carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is needed on top of these natural, unassisted sinks to keep warming well below 2°C 30,31 despite hard-to-mitigate or even perpetual emissions sources like concrete manufacturing, aviation, and food production5–9. Establishing new forests is the foremost method to provide low-cost and large-scale CDR with present-day technology2–4.
However, forests are vulnerable to changes in environmental conditions and land-use, rendering the permanence of the carbon stored in them uncertain32–34. Our exposure to potential forest carbon release is threefold. We rely on 1) the permanence of existing forest carbon stocks, 2) the continued removal of a major fraction of anthropogenic emissions from the atmosphere, and 3) on vastly increasing the global forest carbon stock by large-scale afforestation/reforestation (A/R) to provide us with the much-needed CDR services. Thus, our plan to stay below critical warming thresholds becomes a bet on the world’s forests to stay healthy, undisturbed, and productive. Despite that, a growing body of evidence puts the safety of this bet into question.
Recent research reveals that the models on which today’s mitigation pathways are based might be too optimistic about the future forest carbon storage in three key aspects. 1) Models neglect disturbances such as windfall, pests, and disease35 that make up the bulk of current forest damage and show the most pronounced increasing trends in many regions22,25,36. Already modelled disturbances, such as fire, fail to approximate historic trends37. 2) Models might overestimate the positive influence of warmer temperatures and CO2 fertilization38. Findings of Dow et al. in 2022 revealed that warmer spring temperatures do not lead to more carbon being accumulated in temperate forests as projected by models15. Further, models project the Amazon rainforest to act as a major carbon sink continually39. However, more recent studies provide direct evidence of phosphorous limitation potentially cutting biomass carbon growth in half16,17. 3) Deforestation and degradation are likely underestimated in scenario-building models that currently assume perfect efficiency in replacing forest land with agriculture. A study in 2022 by Pendrill et al. found that only 45% to 65% of deforested land for agriculture was used within years after clearance due to mismanagement, land speculation, and uncontrolled fire clearings20.
Future disturbance levels are still highly uncertain, especially given the wide variety of biotic and abiotic sources modified by climate change accompanying degradation and clearing. Nevertheless, historic disturbance rates and their progression can provide insight, albeit limited to current climatic conditions. Historic disturbance rates in Europe and Canada are estimated between 0.26 %/yr and 0.57 %/yr36,45–47. However, only the highest (0.57%/yr) assessment included direct human interventions46. Rates in the Amazon could already be much higher as untracked degradation alone was found to surpass even deforestation by now affecting an average of 0.46% of forest area per year over the 22-year study period48. Finding a marked increase in historic disturbance rates over the last decades24,25,36,45,49–52, a future increase under accelerating climate change and resource demand-induced pressure is deemed likely21,23,24,45,53–56. Increases in disturbance rates were found globally except for the Congo basin, where no significant increase was observed24. Moreover, recently observed spikes in single-agent disturbances could indicate non-linear behaviour in response to direct and indirect human-induced stress23,25,36,51,53. Bark beetle disturbance rates doubled in Europe over the last 20 years36. Further, bark beetle damage in the Czech Republic surged from a long-term range of 0.2%/yr - 1.4%/yr to up to 5.4%/yr in most recent years25. Similarly, disturbance related to declining forest health overtook all other types of disturbances in the US since the late 1990s, increasing dramatically from 0.07%/yr in 1985 to 2.82%/yr in 200151.
We assess mitigation policy reaching climate targets despite looming impermanent forest carbon storage. In a set of 42 scenarios, we explore modified mitigation pathways along three dimensions (i) the degree of annual forest disturbance (n = 4 & control), (ii) different long-term climate targets (n = 2), and (iii) varying policy regulations (n = 5) within the integrated assessment model REMIND-MAgPIE43,44(Figure 1b). In the following, we contrast the foresighted policy taking immediate action with the myopic response, both aiming at the 1.5°C-consistent budget under the annual disturbance rate of four per thousand trees per year (Figure 1a/c). However, results from all 42 scenarios are made available in the extended data figures.
Reaching the 1.5°C target despite an annual disturbance rate of four in a thousand trees is achieved by measures that further lower emissions over all CO2-emitting sectors (Figures 2 & 3), expanding renewable energy supply (Figure 3), ramping up CDR deployment (Figures 2, 4 & 5), and boosting the price on carbon (Figures 2 & 6). The adjustment to the forest carbon loss (FCL) can be less abrupt and sweeping if the response is foresighted and preemptive (SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Foresight). As the time window for mitigation narrows, the regulation needs to become more severe. Thus, a myopic policy response to the same forest disturbance rate (SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Myopic) comes at a much greater cost in terms of CO2 prices required to achieve the carbon budget (Figure 2).
Implications for the energy sector
In the SSP2-1.5°C scenario without FCL, renewable energy supply is expanded by 122 EJ/yr between 2030 and 2050 to limit cumulated emissions to 500 GtCO2 (Figure 3a). Consequently, emissions from the energy, industry, transport, and buildings sector are reduced by 69% (Figure 3c). To achieve a further 40% reduction in emission by the end of the century, an even higher renewable energy share is required (Figure 3a/c).
Both the foresighted and myopic FCL scenarios project a higher renewables and bioenergy share in the first half of the century (Figure 3b). Preemptive action minimizes the adjustments needed later in the century. In the SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Foresight scenario, fossil-fuelled energy sources are further reduced by -5.8% (-17 EJ/yr) by 2030 compared to the scenario without FCL, and yearly emissions decrease by an extra -1.5 GtCO2/yr, mainly from the energy supply and industry sectors (Figure 3d).
In the myopic policy response scenario (SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Myopic), the additional renewables capacity in 2050 is tripled, increasing from +2.2EJ/yr to +7.3EJ/yr, and fossil-fuelled energy sources are phased out 1.6 times faster (-37.5EJ/yr) than in the foresighted adjustments (-23.3EJ/yr) (Figure 3b). As a result, the emission rate in the myopic scenario is 734MtCO2/yr lower than in the foresighted scenario. Two-thirds (492MtCO2/yr) of these further emission reductions come from the industry and transport sectors. Additionally, emission reductions in the buildings sector double between the foresighted and myopic scenario (Figure 3d).
Negative emissions
Energy-side mitigation measures are accompanied by negative emissions to reach the 1.5°C target. Technical CDR capacity (BECCS and Direct Air Capture with Carbon Capture and storage (DACCS)) in the SSP2-1.5°C scenario without FCL doubles every 2.6 years from 202257 to 2030, adding on average 40 MtCO2/yr of additional capacity per year (Figure 4a).
The SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Foresight scenario has a 40% higher yearly growth rate in the first half of the century, with +132 GtCO2 more cumulative negative emissions by 2100 (Extended Data Fig. 4).
Delayed implementation of negative emission infrastructure in the SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Myopic scenario leads to a steeper growth rate in the second half of the century, almost doubling the rate of the foresighted scenario from +100MtCO2/yr to +198MtCO2/yr (Figure 4a). The myopic scenario also relies on more DACCS reaching a capacity of 8.6MtCO2/yr compared to 3.7MtCO2/yr in FCL-Foresight and 1.0MtCO2/yr in the SSP2-1.5°C scenario without FCL. As a result, the cumulative negative emissions in 2100 are +242 GtCO2 higher in SSP2-1.5°C-FCL-Myopic compared to the SSP2-1.5°C scenario, resulting in almost twice the additional cumulative carbon removal than the foresighted policy in response to the same forest disturbance rate (Extended Data Fig. 4).
Land-use demand
Using land-based methods to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, such as BECCS and A/R, requires vast areas of land. In the SSP2-1.5°C scenario, 224Mha of land is reserved for mitigation until 2030 (Figure 4b). However, this expansion is accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of 247Mha of crop- and pastureland despite a growing population creating the need for more efficient agricultural practices. By the time cumulated emissions peak in 2050, land-use for CDR efforts and reduction in crop- and pastureland will almost double. Under the foresighted FCL response, an additional 69Mha of land is allocated for CDR by 2050. However, the myopic scenario uses +149Mha more land for mitigation, effectively doubling the additional land-use for CDR compared to the foresighted response (Figures 2 & 4b).
Economic cost and drivers
Carbon pricing is central to incentivizing the growth of renewables and CDR. However, such climate mitigation policies may also slow economic growth measured by GDP. The SSP2-1.5°C scenario requires a carbon price of 115 $/tCO2 in 2030, rising to 327 $/tCO2 in 2050 (Figure 6). The peak GDP loss due to the climate policy is projected to be -2.1% by mid-century compared to a world without strengthened climate policies (Extended Data Fig. 7).
Taking immediate foresighted action on FCL results in a 22% increase in carbon price in 2030 and 2050 and a peak GDP loss of -2.4%. Myopic policy adjustments lead to a 48% increase in the carbon price, with a peak GDP loss of -2.7%. Thus, the additional carbon price and GDP cost incurred by the FCL response more than doubles between the foresighted and myopic scenarios facing the same forest disturbance rate (Figures 2 & 6, Extended Data Fig. 7).