The Viral Warfare – Uncovering  the Connection between Conspiracy Theories on COVID and the War in Ukraine

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3359277/v1

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The Viral Warfare – Uncovering the Connection between Conspiracy Theories on COVID and the War in Ukraine

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3359277/v1

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During times of crisis, conspiracy theories tend to proliferate – especially in polarized political environments. Existing research has shown that both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have spawned a surge in conspiracy theories. However, there is a notable gap in academic research concerning the interconnection between these two sets of conspiracy theories. Our preregistered representative survey study conducted in Hungary (N = 1000) investigates the interconnections between conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and the moderating role of trust, conspiracy mentality, political preference, and socio-demographic variables in this relationship. Hungary, a nation marked by exceptionally high levels of tribal polarization, and plagued by pervasive disinformation presents an ideal case for examining the polarizing nature of conspiracy theories. Contrary to the prevailing notion that a generalized mistrust links unrelated conspiracy theories, the research finds that specific, logically unrelated conspiracy theories can be horizontally connected to each other. We found that conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and vaccines were strongly related to conspiracy theories about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This relationship persists independently of party preference, and neither mistrust in media nor Conspiracy Mentality can explain this relationship. Surprisingly, trust in domestic media positively predicted war-related conspiracy beliefs. These results, even if correlational, raise the possibility that conspiracy theories about COVID-19 (which preceded the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022) could serve as a "gateway theory," leading to the acceptance of war-related conspiracies. Our findings, in line with some previous research on “gateway theories” and the monological nature of conspiracy theories, suggest that communication interventions should address specific narratives rather than solely focusing on the “root cause” such as mistrust in institutions – which not always go hand in hand with conspiracy theorizing. Furthermore, building trust in official sources may worsen the problem in contexts where mainstream media spreads conspiracy theories. Thus, a nuanced, context-sensitive communication approach is essential in combating conspiracy theories effectively.

Social science/Psychology/Human behaviour

Humanities/Cultural and media studies

polarization

conspiracy theories

monological thinking

trust

pandemic

war

communication

According to an optimistic interpretation of world history, one of humanity's most significant accomplishments - particularly within the Western democratic world - was the apparent triumph over three paramount threats to human existence: famine, warfare, and infectious diseases (Harari, 2016). However, within the last four years, it becomes evident that two out of these three perils have resurfaced. Between late 2019 and March 2023, the COVID-19 pandemic, a lethal viral outbreak, claimed the lives of nearly 7 million individuals worldwide (JHU Resource Center). Simultaneously, in February 2019, Russia's invasion of Ukraine led to a protracted conflict resulting in an estimated death toll of over one hundred thousand lives by May 2023, as per U.S. assessments. This military engagement has also exerted a substantial adverse impact on the global economy, affecting crucial sectors like food and energy provisions (United Nations, 2023). Consequently, the resurgence of these challenges indirectly reintroduces the third threat to human existence mentioned earlier. Notably, these tragic occurrences have intersected and influenced each other: the Ukrainian invasion aggravated the proliferation of misinformation concerning COVID-19 and vaccines in Ukraine, culminating in reduced vaccination rates and elevated pandemic-related mortality (Habib et al., 2022).

Both the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine were followed (and, in the latter case, even preceded) by conspiracy theories that provided alternative explanations for the causes of the problems as well as for who is responsible for them. COVID-19 conspiracy theories, claiming for example that the virus is a hoax, or, on the opposite, a deadly dangerous bioweapon (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2022) could undermine healthcare responses and increase mortality by reducing both vaccination intentions and compliance to social distancing regulations, and pushing people towards alternative medicines (see also: van Mulokom et al., 2022; on the impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories in general: Jolley and Douglas, 2017). Conspiracy theories about Ukraine - such as that Ukraine is preparing a nuclear attack against Russia, or that Ukrainian authorities committed genocide against the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine - played a key role in both starting the invasion (see for example: Yablokov, 2022/a), and justifying the massacre of Russian soldiers against Ukrainian civilians (see for example: Habel-Sela et al., 2022; Moskalenko & Romanova, 2022). All the conspiracy theories mentioned above have been found totally fabricated and factually incorrect by fact-checkers (see for example: Reuters, 2020; Deutsche Welle, 2022).

Conspiracy theories are often symptoms of a strongly polarized, tribal political landscape, as they are used as information weapons in political information warfare (Forgas & Baumeister, 2019; Krekó, 2021). But at the same time, conspiracy theories can fuel political polarization further, resulting in a vicious circle of disinformation and pernicious polarization – that is followed by a high level of democratic hypocrisy – a double standard in the application of legal and ethical rules of the political game that is strongly destructive of democratic norms and institutions (Simonovits, McCoy, & Littvay, 2022). Furthermore, generic beliefs about the existence of conspiracies seem to be correlated with higher levels of support toward violence (Vegetti and Littvay, 2022).

Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine obviously have no logical connection. Still, websites, opinion leaders, and politicians who spread COVID-related conspiracy theories often become the primary source of war-related disinformation and conspiracy theories later, as it has been widely reported (for a collection, see for example EDMO, 2022). On the other hand, we know much less about how these sequential dramatic life-threatening crisis experiences had an impact on each other in people’s attitude systems. To what extent do these beliefs become interconnected in individuals? If they are interconnected - that earlier studies on conspiracy studies (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Enders et al., 2023 would suggest, what drives the psychological connection between them - a general mentality that supports conspiracy thinking, trust in the media, political orientation, or socio-demographic variables such as level of education, or type of settlement? In the present study, we would like to take the first steps to address these questions using a representative sample in Hungary. Conducting this research in Hungary is important for four reasons: 1) it is a neighboring country of Ukraine and a member of Western democratic alliances such as EU and NATO, which 2) operates as an “informational autocracy” (Guriyev and Treisman, 2022) in the sense that the information ecosystem including the traditional media is strongly controlled and manipulated directly and indirectly by the state and the governing party - which often includes the deliberate spreading of conspiracy theories, but 3) this connection did not really exist in the public: while the mainstream pro-governmental media has been spreading war-related disinformation massively for political gains, it rather tried to suppress COVID-and vaccine-related disinformation and conspiracy theorizing as the latter was rather seen as dangerous for the regime (see for example: Molnár et al., 2023). At the same time, 4) Hungary, a nation marked by exceptionally high levels of tribal polarization (Vegetti, 2019), and plagued by pervasive disinformation presents an ideal case for examining the polarizing nature of conspiracy theories.

COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine: triggers for conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories, in a psychological sense, are beliefs in conspiracies – events or processes in which „a number of actors joining together in a secret agreement to achieve a hidden goal which is perceived to be unlawful or malevolent”. (Zonis and Joseph, 1999, p. 17.). Conspiracy theories are social constructs that typically attribute agency to individuals and groups rather than to systemic and abstract forces, and are epistemically “risky” in the sense that while they are not necessarily and always false, these theories provide less likely explanations of world events than non-conspiratory explanations (Douglas and Sutton, 2023).

Conspiracy theories typically emerge in times of crisis, giving group-based collective explanations for these unexpected and negate – often traumatic events (van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017; Bilewicz, 2022In these cases, people experience existential threats and, as a result, stronger anxiety and uncertainty (van Prooijen, 2019). As mentioned above, in the past few years, we experienced two large-scale crises of global relevance – that have both led to a cascade of disinformation and conspiracy theorizing. As observed during two consecutive waves of globally significant events in the last few years, conspiracy theories can have several malevolent behavioral effects on individuals, groups and societies.

First, conspiracy theories on the COVID-19 pandemic undermined rational healthcare behavior such as compliance to lockdown measures, mask-wearing, or vaccine uptake (Farhart et al., 2022, van Mulukom et al., 2022). The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army was inspired, and legitimized by official conspiracy theories of the Putin regime such as the Ukrainians have committed genocide in Donbas, preparing for a nuclear strike against Russia, or that there are secret biolabs in Ukraine operated by the United States (Yablokov, 2022). Conspiracy theories could also play a role in justifying the aggressive behavior of Russian soldiers against Ukrainian civilians, such as it happened in earlier conflicts as well (see for example Habel-Sela et al., 2022; Moskalenko & Romanova, 2022). However, Kremlin disinformation and conspiracy theories also had an impact on public opinion in Europe. The Kremlin and its proxies have been spreading conspiracy theories with a direct aim to undermine the trust in international institutions such as NATO, EU, and the United States (Yablokov, 2015; Globsec, 2022, Political Capital Institute, 2023); also, they could be instrumental in undermining the support for sanctions and support towards the Ukrainian society not only in Europe but in the overall World, including the Global South (See for example, EU vs. Disinfo 2022, EUvs.Disinfo 2023; Garton Ash, Leonard, Krastev, 2023).

Conspiracy theories on the Pandemic and the War quickly started to merge in the public space. Public promoters of COVID-related conspiracy theories become primary sources of war-related conspiracy theories and disinformation right after the beginning of the invasion (European Digital Media Observatory, 2022; Brandt et al., 2022). It is unclear though at the moment how much these logically unconnected topics are also connected in people’s attitudes. Some public opinion surveys have already suggested that such connections exist. Misperceptions about COVID-19, for example, were found to be the strongest overall predictor of holding misperceptions about Ukraine in the United States (The Covid States Project, 2022). Some other public opinion polls suggest that the people who refused the vaccines have stronger war-related conspiracy theories, and are more sympathetic to Russia and its narratives (YouGov, 2022, The Star, 2022). system, Furthermore, Covid-19 conspiracy theories conspiracy theories could serve as a gateway theory towards other theories, such as that the 2022 US election was stolen (Granados Samayoa, 2022). But no systemic academic research has proven in particular that War and Covid-related conspiracy theories are connected to each other in the attitudes of citizens. We also do not know what role does other factors such as Conspiracy mentality, trust in the media, party preference, and socioeconomic variables such as education play in this relationship, and how much is it caused by some kind of horizontal justification- monological thinking. We fill this research gap through representative survey research in Hungary- a country where conspiracy theories are often spread by the government and mainstream media (Turza, 2023; Faragó, Krekó, Orosz, 2023).

Monological Thinking Behind Interconnected Conspiracy Theories

While systemic empirical research on conspiracy theories (CTs) has a relatively short history of about two decades, even the first important empirical research on the topic found that conspiracy theories form a seemingly logical (but not formal-logical) system in which one theory becomes the explanation of another one. Goertzel (1994) found that logically unrelated conspiracy theories strongly interlink with each other. For example, the ones who believed in the conspiratorial explanation of the Kennedy assassination tended to believe more that the US Air Force was hiding evidence on flying saucers. Goertzel argued that the reason is conspiracy theories forming a “monological belief system „that speak only for themselves, ignoring the context (…). Each of the beliefs serves as evidence for each of the other belief”, and where the more conspiracies a monological thinker believes in, the more likely he or she is to believe in any new conspiracy theory which may be proposed.” (p. 40.).

After this crucially important work, several studies demonstrated that logically unrelated conspiracy theories are strongly intertwined. For example, Swami et al. (2011, 2012) found, that the preference for conspiracy explanations about the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, 7/7 terrorist attacks in the UK, or the disappearance of Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan in 1937 were all predicted by stronger beliefs in other, unrelated real-world conspiracy theories and greater exposure to them. Goldberg and Richey (2020) discovered in a more recent study that anti-vaccination was significantly associated with unconnected and ideologically opposing conspiracy beliefs, such as the notion that Obama is a Muslim and the 9/11 Truther movement. Studies also found that believers in conspiracies tend to accept theories that are in logical contradiction with each other. For example, Wood, Sutton and Douglas (2014) found that people who were more inclined to believe that Princess Diana staged her own death were also more likely to believe that she was actually murdered, and proponents of the idea that Osama Bin Laden had already died prior to the U.S. special forces raid in Pakistan were also more likely to believe that he is still alive. Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) found similar tolerance of logical contradictions in the case of COVID-related conspiracy theories, with its proponents tending to believe that it was a hoax and it was a human-made bioweapon at the same time.

While some authors argue that the concept of “monological belief systems” is not particularly helpful in understanding the interlinkages between conspiracy theories (Sutton and, 2014, Douglas et al., 2019; Franks, Bangerter, Bauer, Hall, & Noort, 2017), we think that the concept should not be entirely dismissed. Recent research on COVID-related conspiracy theories also suggested that COVID-19 CTs form a monological belief system and that logically unrelated and even contradictory conspiracy theories were also strongly connected to each other, even when controlling for other standard predictors such as education, trust, and others (for example, Miller (2020).

While we think some criticism about the concept of “monological system”- such as conspiracy theories do not form a logically closed system and can be strongly reflective of events in the outside World - are valid, this term can be still relevant if not used in an absolute sense, assuming that conspiracy theories form a system that is entirely immune to information coming from the Outside World. In the following, we use this term mostly to refer to the horizontal interconnections between the conspiracy beliefs - a widely reported phenomenon that practically every author agrees upon - and the psycho-logical (but not formal logical) connections that glue these beliefs together.

Based on the massive body of research so far on the interconnections between logically unrelated conspiracy theories, it is highly logical to assume that conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine are also associated with each other despite the lack of any formal logical connection between them. This phenomenon has been observed repeatedly on the level of the messengers of disinformation. Proponents of COVID-related conspiracy theories (politicians, journalists, fringe sites) typically started to spread conspiracy theories fitting to the Kremlin’s narrative when the invasion began throughout the World (for a European overview, see EDMO, 2022). But no academic study revealed this connection on the level of the attitudes of recipients to date.

Conspiracy Theories: products of Conspiracy Theory and Mistrust?

We have a good reason to assume that these theories interlink but also, that other attitudinal factors are responsible for this connection and that the association will be stronger in some groups than others. Most studies emphasize the following underlying reasons behind the interlinkages of conspiracy theories: the lack of trust in the authorities, media, government, and official explanations, and belief in deceptive authorities (e.g., Goldberg and Richey 2020; Wood Douglas and Sutton, 2012), and also, populist attitudes that reflect this mistrust (Silva, Vegetti, & Littvay, 2017); a general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (Swami et al, 2010, 2011, 2012), or even Conspiracy Mentality (Bruder et al., 2013; Dordevic et al., 2022; Imhoff, Bruder, 2012; Williams et al., 2022) that serves as a supertheory that is derived into particular theories. This logic is strongly deductive and vertical (in line with Barkun, 2003’s argument that conspiracy theories are “pornographies of deduction”), assuming that belief in conspiracy theories is mostly the consequence of some superordinate and abstract attitudinal sets such as endemic mistrust or Conspiracy Mentality. Douglas et al. (2019, p7.) claim that “conspiracy beliefs are only related to each other to the extent that they cohere with a higher-order belief system”.

In contrary to this approach - but in no contradiction with empirical studies that can statistically explain part of the relationship between unrelated or contradictory conspiracy beliefs with mistrust or Conspiracy Mentality (e.g. Goertzel, 1994, Imhoff and Bruder, 2012; but even Wood, Douglas and Sutton, 2014) we also emphasize the role of “horizontal” interconnections between conspiracy theories: e.g. that embracing COVID-related conspiracy theories could also make people directly receptive to war-related conspiracy theories, besides mistrust and conspiracy theories.

Demographic Variables and Ideological Preferences Behind Conspiracy Theories

Several studies proved that lower levels of education (for a summary, see van Prooijen, 2017), and ideological preference of right-wing political parties (see for example Imhoff et al., 2022) are important background factors behind belief in conspiracy theories, and can also serve as a glue between the different specific theories. Douglas et al. (2016), for example found that people with lower levels of education were more likely to endorse conspiratorial explanations for well-known events, because they can have a tendency they had a higher tendency to ascribe agency and intentionality to non-living objects. The overview of studies (e.g. Van Prooijen, J.W., 2017) also reveals that the association between education or party preference and conspiracy beliefs is highly uneven and different across studies, depending on the content of the specific theories and the social-political context at the same time. As political parties and candidates can overwrite, change or even eliminate the structural, socio-demographic correlates of certain political-ideological beliefs including conservatism or authoritarianism (e.g. Enyedi, 2014) through political rhetoric, we can generally assume that socio-demographic factors might be more important in predicting conspiracy beliefs about issues that are less politicized and polarized by mainstream parties. When the conspiracy theory “explains” a highly polarizing and divisive subject role of party preference can become more important than sociological correlates such as education.

In Hungary, education was consistently found to be an important predictor behind non-vaccination, and non-vaccination attitudes are strongly related to conspiracy theories (see for example, Bauer and Koltai, 2022). Covid-and vaccine-related conspiracy theories were also found to be in negative association with education, as well as the type of settlement (Stefkovics, Krekó, Koltai, in press). At the same time, there was no spectacular difference in the position of the mainstream political parties on the necessity of COVID-related lockdown measures or vaccines, and no parliamentary party dared to openly oppose lockdowns or vaccines until the April 2022 elections when the Our Homeland Movement that advocated against vaccines and promoted conspiracy theories got into the Parliament, but with only 5.9 percent of the votes (see for example Farkas et al., 2022; Turza, 2022).

War-related conspiracy theories, on the contrary, were more divisive in the political discourse. The Hungarian right-wing governmental side (especially the press) and the pseudo-opposition extreme right Mi Hazánk Mozgalom were openly advocating for pro-Kremlin conspiracy theories, while the opposition was taking a stronger pro-Ukrainian stance and pushed back conspiracy narratives around the war that were mostly reflecting a Kremlin-close perspective. As a result, in the political center there is a strong divide evolved regarding the invasion, as shown by multiple research (e.g. Political Capital, 2022; Rényi Pál Dániel, 2022).

More specifically, in Hungary, the governmental mainstream media covering 79% of all media channels (see Mérték, 2019) was the most important source of war-related disinformation. For example, Origo, the third most popular website in Hungary, has been openly promoting conspiracy theories circulated by the Kremlin- for example, that US biolabs are preparing biological weapons against the Russians or that the United States has a secret plan to escalate the conflict to WWIII (Hanula, 2023,). Origo promoted these views with high intensity: 83 percent of the “leading news” section of this website was dealing with the war in the year after the invasion (Molnár and Krekó, 2023). At the same time, neither the government nor the pro-governmental media were openly promoting COVID-related conspiracy theories.

Given that there has been no systemic research to date on war-related conspiracy beliefs in Hungary, and their interrelations between COVID- and war-related conspiracy theories – especially in the Eastern European context - we conducted a preregistered representative survey (OSF, 2023) research to test the following hypotheses.

First, we expected a positive association between COVID-related and Ukrainian war-related conspiracy theories (H1) - even after controlling for other background variables such as trust in media and conspiracy mentality.

Second, we expected that the positive association between COVID-related and Ukrainian war-related conspiracy theories would be moderated by party preference in terms of voting for Fidesz; Mi Hazánk; Centrist-opposition coalition (H2).

Third, we expected that conspiracy mentality and trust would be associated with both COVID-related and war-related conspiracy theories: the higher the conspiracy mentality, the higher the belief in different conspiracy theories is (H3).

Fourth, in the case of COVID-related conspiracy theories, due to the relative political consensus around Covid-related measures and vaccination, we expected that COVID-related conspiracy theories are more strongly associated with education and place of residence than with party preference (governmental vs. opposition parties vs. Mi Hazánk, H4a).

Finally, in the case of more politically divisive Ukrainian war-related conspiracy theories, we expected an inverse pattern: weaker association with socio-demographic variables than with party preference (H4b.)

Finally, we aimed to construct a comprehensive path model to predict war-related conspiracy beliefs, incorporating all the socio-demographic and attitudinal variables used for testing the hypotheses above as mediating variables to see the whole pattern and more nuanced picture of our results and to check the importance (predictive value) of the variable set we chose.

Sample

The collection of the sample was administered by a Hungarian polling company (Medián). The poll was conducted by Medián between 27 May and 2 June 2022, by telephone, interviewing a sample of 1,000 people aged 18 and over, representative of the population of the country in terms of age, gender, education, and region. The survey research received preliminary ethical approval from the Ethical Board of the University of the first author (2020/226-2).We did not conduct an a priori power analysis to determine the sample size but aimed at N = 1,000 which is generally used in pollster surveys relying on representative samples of Hungarian society. Our final sample consisted of 1000 respondents with a diverse age distribution: 16% between 18–29 years, 16% between 30–39 years, 20% between 40–49 years, 23% between 50–64 years, and 24% above the age of 65. 52% of the respondents were female. Regarding the highest level of education, 35% had a high-school degree, and 26% received a post-secondary degree.

Measures

Conspiracy mentality. To measure individuals' general receptiveness towards conspiracy theories, we employed the five-item Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013). Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with each statement using a percentage scale that ranged from 0% (certainly not true) to 100% (certainly true) with increments of 10% on items such as “I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities.” The scale demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .77).

COVID-related conspiracy theories were assessed with 10 items such as “Coronavirus was purposefully created in, and released from, a biochemistry lab in Wuhan, China”. We adapted 5 items that seemed relevant in the Hungarian context from the scale that Biddlestone et al. (2020) used to measure conspiracy theories in the Anglo-Saxon context. The rest of the five items were created for the purpose of the study to measure the most relevant COVID-related conspiracy theories that were circulating in the social media and media space as we found in a previous study (Falyuna et al., 2022). Participants could indicate their responses on 5-point scales from 1 (I don’t agree at all) to 5 (I fully agree). The reliability of the scale was excellent (α = .90).

War-related conspiracy theories were measured originally by 12 items that were created for the purpose of this study (e.g., “Most of the pictures and videos of the Ukrainian victims of the war are fake”). We finally selected 9 of those items that created a coherent and psychometrically sound scale and fit well to a single factor. The items were the most typical conspiracy narratives of the Kremlin that appeared in the Hungarian political and social media discourses before and after the beginning of the invasion, according to the monitoring reports of the analysts of Political Capital Institute (see e.g., Berkes, 2022). It is important to note that while not all the items we used contain an explicit conspiracy narrative at first sight- as we wanted to avoid using too long and double-barreled questions (e.g., „Ukraine committed a genocide against the Russian minority in its territory”), all these statements that are reflecting alternative interpretations of the war and are embedded in a broader set of conspiratory beliefs about that the „real truth” about the war is kept in secret by the West, shadow powers and the mainstream media. The high internal reliability of the scale (α = .81) seems to confirm the assumption that all the statements belong to the same set of conspiratory explanations. Agreement with the conspiracy theories ranged from 1 (I don’t agree at all) to 5 (I fully agree).

Trust in the domestic and foreign media was assessed with two items: “I am now reading up on different organizations and institutions. How much do you trust them? (1) Domestic media, press products; (2) Foreign media, press products.” Respondents could indicate their level of trust with scales ranging from 0 (I do not trust at all) to 10 (I fully trust).

Party preference was measured with the following question: “If there were a new parliamentary election in the near future, which party would you vote for in a list election?” 44.5% of respondents selected Fidesz (the governing populist right-wing political party), 33.3% would vote for any of the opposition parties in and outside the parliament, 15% did not know which party to vote for, 5,1% did not wish to answer the question, and 2.1% wouldn’t vote for any of the listed parties.

Statistical analysis

Statistical analyses and visualization were performed with R 4.3.0 (R Core Team, 2023) and Mplus 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017). To test the hypotheses, we used correlation analyses (H1-H3) and OLS regressions (H4). A path model was constructed to explore the associations between trust in media, conspiracy mentality, and beliefs in COVID- and war-related conspiracy theories. Party preference and education were added as control variables. Mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares estimation (WLSMV) was applied. The following model fit indices were considered (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999): the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; ≥ 0.95 for excellent, ≥ 0.90 for good), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; ≥ 0.95 for excellent, ≥ 0.90 for good), and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA; ≤ 0.06 for excellent, ≤ 0.08 for good) and its 90% confidence interval (90% CI).

First we tested our hypothesis (H1) in which we expected a positive association between COVID-related conspiracy theories and conspiracy theories about the war in Ukraine. In line with our expectations, the association between COVID--related and war-related conspiracy theories on Ukraine was positive (r=0.55, p<0.001). The association is on a medium level, the two variables explain 30,2% of the variance of each other (R2). The association remained strong even when we controlled for the “deductive” variables often explaining the relationship: trust and conspiracy mentality (see below for the Path model).

Our second hypothesis (H2) has not been confirmed. We expected that a positive association between COVID-related and Ukrainian war-related conspiracy theories would be moderated by party preference (voting for the governmental populist right Fidesz; the extreme right Mi Hazánk; Centrist-opposition coalition). However, we found that the link between COVID-related and war-related association was not significantly moderated by party preferences if the baseline is the most popular governing party (Fidesz, all ps>0.054).

We also tested if Conspiracy Mentality will correlate with both COVID-related and war-related conspiracy theories: We expected, based on previous research (e.g. Bruder et al., 2012) that the higher the Conspiracy Mentality will be, the higher the belief in the two different sets of conspiracy theories is going to be.

In line with our expectations, the associations between conspiracy mentality as well as both COVID- (r=0.41, p<0.001) and war-related (r=0.26, p<0.001) conspiracy theories were positive. However, Conspiracy Mentality was more strongly correlated with COVID-related than with war-related conspiracy theories, and this difference between the two correlation values was statistically significant (z= -3.78, p=0,000) Furthermore, the association between the two facets of specific conspiracy theories (COVID- and war-related) was found to be higher (r=0.55) than the correlation between conspiracy mentality and any of the two facets of specific theories.

We also hypothesized (H4a) that COVID-related conspiracy theories will be in stronger association with socio-demographic variables (e.g., education - dummy: 1: with and 0: without a college degree, type of settlement - categorical: 1: capital city, 2: city, 3: countryside) than with party preference (dummy: Mi Hazánk & Fidesz vs. Centrist-opposition coalition). This hypothesis was confirmed: COVID-related conspiracy beliefs were stronger among Mi Hazánk and Fidesz voters than among supporters of the Centrist-opposition coalition (b=0.81, SE=0.23, t(686)=3.54, p<0.001, d=0.28); however, level of education had an even greater impact. Respondents without a higher education degree had weaker COVID-related conspiracy beliefs than people with a higher education degree (b=-1.55, SE=0.23, t(686)=--6.83, p<0.001, d=0.54). As the confidence intervals do not overlap regarding the two predictors (party preferences and level of education), it appears that the level of education had a greater impact on COVID conspiracy beliefs. Based on the effect sizes, education has almost twice the effect on COVID conspiracy beliefs than party preferences (see Figure 2 left panel for descriptives).

In line with our expectation (H4b), we also found that Ukrainian war-related conspiracy theories have a stronger association with party preference than with socio-demographic variables. In the case of war-related conspiracy theories, we found a stronger belief among Mi Hazánk and Fidesz voters vs. Centrist-opposition coalition (b=3.93, SE=0.20, t(640)=19.97, p<0.001, d=1.34). Party preference had an even greater impact. Respondents who had lower levels of education (without vs. with higher education degree) had stronger war-related conspiracy beliefs (b=0.51, SE=0.20, t(640)=-2.60, p<0.001, d=0.17). The confidence intervals do not overlap regarding the two predictors (party preferences and level of education). Therefore, party preference appears to have an eight times larger effect on war-related CTs in comparison with the level of education (see Figure 2 right panel for descriptives).

Finally, we constructed a path model that yielded an adequate fit to the data (chi-square = 1613.11, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.932, TLI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.053 [90% CI: 0.051; 0.056])). In this model, the strongest associations were found between Conspiracy Mentality and belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = 0.45, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001), which in turn were associated with belief in war-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = 0.42, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001). The direct association between conspiracy mentality and belief in war-related conspiracy theories was nonsignificant (𝛽 = 0.06, SE = 0.04, p = 0.09). The total effect (𝛽 = 0.25, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.18; 0.32) and the total indirect effect (𝛽 = 0.19, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001; 95% CI: 0.14; 0.24) were significant and positive, indicating that COVID-related conspiracy theories fully mediated the association between conspiracy mentality and belief in war-related conspiracy theories.

Trust in foreign media was negatively associated with beliefs in COVID-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = -0.18, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001), which, as mentioned above, were associated with higher beliefs in war-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = 0.42, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001). A modest negative direct association was also found between trust in foreign media and belief in war-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = -0.23, SE = 0.07, p = 0.001). The total effect (𝛽 = -0.31, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001; 95% CI: -0.47; -0.15) and the total indirect effect (𝛽 = -0.08, SE = 0.02, p = 0.001; 95% CI: -0.12; -0.03) were significant, indicating that COVID-related conspiracy theories partially mediated the association between lower trust in foreign media and belief in war-related conspiracy theories.

Trust in the Hungarian media was found to be positively associated with beliefs in war-related conspiracy theories, even if this relationship was modest (𝛽 = 0.16, SE = 0.06, p = 0.01). At the same time, Trust in the Hungarian media was not associated with COVID-related conspiracy theories (𝛽 = -0.02, SE = 0.04, p = 0.65).

The overall model, including mediator variables such as, party preference and education explained almost two-thirds ( 63%) of the total variance of belief in war-related conspiracy theories. Stepping one level back, mediator variables, trust in the Hungarian and foreign media and conspiracy mentality explained a notable proportion of the total variance of belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories as well (41%), See Figure 1.

Our pre-registered representative survey research supported most of our hypotheses. In line with previous research that found that logically non-connected or even contradictory conspiracy theories are coming together on an attitudinal level (Goertzel, 1994; Miller, 2020, Swami, 2011, 2012; Lamberty and Imhoff, 2021), we found in our research that conspiracy theories about COVID and war were strongly connected to each other- even after controlling for trust and conspiracy mentality (H1). Also, contradicting the vertical approach of the organization of conspiracy beliefs, we found that the impact of Conspiracy Mentality is not homogeneous on different types of conspiracy theories: while Conspiracy Mentality had a strong direct impact on Covid-related conspiracy theories, it was only weakly associated with war-related beliefs. Furthermore, the direct impact of Conspiracy Mentality on war-related conspiracy theories entirely disappeared in our path model. Certainly, the nature of our cross-sectional correlational data precludes us from making assertions about a clear and direct causal relationship between Covid-and war-related conspiracy theories, even if Covid preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But these finding opens the door for a possible, hypothetical interpretation that COVID-related conspiracy theories might serve as a “gateway theory” to the Rabbit Hole- in the sense that it can increase the appeal of other types of conspiracy theorie sincluding on the war in Ukraine. (see Fig. 1 above; and on the “Rabbit Hole Syndrome”, see Sutton and Douglas, 2022). Previous studies found already that COVID-related conspiracy theories serve as a gateway to other, logically unrelated conspiracy beliefs such as that the 2022 US election were fraudulent (Granados Samayoa et al., 2022).

Given that the Hungarian governmental media did promote war-related conspiracy theories while remaining reserved about Ukraine-related conspiracy theories (Molnár, Surányi, Krekó, 2023), we can exclude the possible explanation as well: that the association of conspiracy attitudes in the Hungarian context is caused by the media that promoted COVID-and War-related conspiracy theories simultaniously. Given that the mainstream pro-governmental media treated differently the two types of conspiracy theories, the correlation we found in the level of attitudes cannot be attributed to the impact of mainstream media promoting these theories in one package. The lack of moderation of party preference on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs towards COVID and the war (H2) suggest that the data cannot be explained only on the basis of party preference: that they go hand in hand in the ideology and political communication of certain political parties.

Our results, in line with many research on the monological nature of conspiracy theories a suggest that the association between logically unrelated conspiracy theories is not the sole product of a generalized conspiracy mentality or mistrust, and conspiracy beliefs can also have a horizontal impact on each other. The connection between logically unrelated conspiracy theories should not be solely explained by their connection to some higher-level constructs such as trust or Conspiracy Mentality.. The horizontal association between conspiracy attitudes can be explained by a universal psycho-logic (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958, see also Hunyady, 1998; 2002). s. At the same time, our results also show that vertical constructs such as trust, conspiracy mentality, and the country-specific media context should be taken into consideration as an important factor gluing conspiracy beliefs together- but not as the absolute and only reason for conspiracy beliefs going hand in hand.

We found that while party preference did not moderate the relationship between the two logically unrelated conspiracy theories (H2), it had a stronger effect on the more “politicized” conspiracy theories on the Russo-Ukraine War (H4b), while socio-demographic variables (especially education) exerted a stronger effect on the less politicized and divisive COVID-related conspiracy theories (H4a). This result underlines the importance of the specific Hungarian political context in shaping the sociological correlates of attitudes, and also reflects, on a more general level the voluntarism of political parties -especially the success of governing Fidesz - in shaping the social-political reality according to their interests. (Enyedi, 2014).

Our results also show the importance of the specific political and media context in shaping the relationship between mistrust and conspiracy theories. Also, they show that the role of the local media context and regime characteristics can overwrite some seemingly universal relationships - for example, between trust and conspiracy theories. The most surprising and novel finding in our research is that trust in the domestic Hungarian media positively (!) predicted belief in war-related conspiracy theories, while having no impact on COVID-related conspiracy theories. At the same time, trust in the international media had a negative impact on the belief in both kinds of conspiracy theories. In the meantime, in line with the typical finding that vertical trust towards different institutions usually correlate positively, (see for example: Quaranta, 2018), trust in domestic and international media correlated positively. The surprisingly unique result that trust in domestic media might have a positive impact on war-related conspiracy beliefs can be interpreted in the context of the Hungarian informational autocracy (see for example: Guriyev and Treisman, 2022; Orosz, Krekó, Faragó and Paskuj, 2022), where conspiracy theories, especially about the war in Ukraine, have been flooding from the mainstream channels of domestic media (see for example Molnár et al., 2023). In this environment, more trust in domestic sources that are spreading conspiracy theories could result in more trust in the conspiracy theories that they promote-especially among governmental voters. In contrast, mainstreaming of pro-Russian conspiracy theories was not visible in the (dominantly Western) international media. Our findings show that it is crucially important to psychologically differentiate between different facets of trust both theoretically and in research, as it can be highly misleading to assume that generalized “trust” always serves as a shield against conspiracy theories in every political context.

Our findings have important practical implications for practitioners and policy-makers,. First, on debunking and fact-checking. The traditional vertical approach of conspiracy theories suggest that debunking simply makes no sense „To the extent that COVID-19 CTs—even contradictory ones—form a monological belief system, attempts at debunking them individually will likely fail. A more effective approach may be to tackle the higher-order needs/beliefs that give rise to the belief system in the first place.” (Miller, 2002). But, as our results suggest, if conspiracy theories are positively connected and spread horizontally, and some theories might serve as “gateways” to the Rabbit Hole, (see also: Granados Samayoa ezt al., 2022) debunking specific conspiracy narratives in a targeted manner (e.g., through fact-checking of conspiracy statements) can be similarly important than only targeting the general “root causes”, the abstract background factors of disinformation and conspiracy theories such as mistrust, disillusionment, or feeling of lack of control - variables that are usually assumed to be caused by systemic factors such as inequalities (see for example Hornsey, Fielding, 2017). Therefore, targeted interventions debunking specific conspiracy theories should be taken seriously as an important tool against dangerous conspiracy theories, and their role should not be downplayed with the reference to “targeting the root causes” (typically by fundamental changes in the social-political system can be the only fruitful way to reduce conspiracy theories on a societal level. Also, our findings- especially that trust in domestic media can even amplify certain conspiracy beliefs - also raise questions about the universality of “root causes” such as mistrust. As the impact of vertical explanatory variables such as trust and conspiracy mentality is not total and exclusive, not homogeneous and highly uneven on conspiracy theories and forging connections between them, we have to abandon the illusion to find one universal cure against all the conspiracy theories in the World, and a more nuanced, context-specific and sophisticated approach is needed, including interventions for specific forms of conspiracy theories.

This study, however, is not exempt from limitations. It constitutes a survey conducted within a single country, which precludes us from establishing direct causal relationships. Instead, we can form hypotheses regarding potential causal directions, awaiting elucidation through more comprehensive experimental investigations and longitudinal research. Notably, Hungary diverges from the conventional WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) archetype, attributed to its escalating authoritarian political inclinations. Consequently, to ensure broader applicability, it is imperative to extend this study to encompass diverse nations. The evaluation of conspiracy theory adherence was reliant on self-reported data, thereby introducing potential issues like agreement bias or the inadvertent suppression of certain viewpoints.

Still, we think our research is an important contribution to the field. Specifically, in the context of a Central and Eastern European informational autocracy where war-related conspiracy theories - that usually appearing only on the fringe of the media system in the West - are distributed by the mainstream domestic media channels, building more trust in domestic media and authorities are not expected to be a winning strategy for reducing the demand for such theories. It is not only true for Hungary, but for other countries where conspiracy theories were coming from the mainstream- in Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey, or Trump’s America (Guriyev & Treisman, 2022). When the government and its media are the major source of disinformation, building more trust in officialdom does not bring about the solution, but rather exacerbates the problem.

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The Viral Warfare – Uncovering the Connection between Conspiracy Theories on COVID and the War in Ukraine

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