Within the machinery of democratic governance, referendums occupy a unique and consequential role, serving to directly engage the voices of the people in critical matters of state. The 2023 Voice to Parliament Referendum aimed to enable a change to the Australian Constitution to recognise the First Peoples of Australia by establishing a body called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice. If passed into law, the ‘Voice’ would legislate a structure that would enable Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to provide advice to the government and parliament on issues that were likely to impact on the lives of Australian indigenous people and communities.
The impetus for the referendum began in 2017 when representatives of First Nations people met and produced the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which called for a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Australian Constitution. At the time, the ruling conservative Liberal/ National Party coalition rejected the call outright. However, following the election of the Australian Labor Party in 2022 the new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that Australians would have their say in a referendum to include an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice to Parliament.
In Australia, for a constitutional change to be passed, the referendum vote needs to be approved by a ‘double majority’ comprising a national majority of electors from all states and territories, together with a majority of electors in a majority of the states (i.e. at least four of the six states). Historically, attempts to amend the constitution in Australia have resulted in many more rejections than approvals. Since 1901 of the 44 constitutional referendums presented to the Australian voting public, only 7 had reached the required threshold, with the remaining being defeated. Following the October 14, 2023, vote, the Voice to Parliament referendum did not meet the required test and hence was not passed. Of the 17,671,784 enrolled voters, approximately 90 per cent cast a vote with 39.9 per cent casting a yes vote and 60.1 per cent casting a no vote (Biddle, Gray, McAllister, & Qvortrup, 2023)[1].
The outcome of the referendum was in contrast to social surveys that have found that Australian generally support improving the well-being of the country’s indigenous population (Levy & McAllister, 2022; Markham & Sanders, 2020) and this contrast became more stark when social commentary began to unpack the possible reasons for the overwhelming no-vote and the uneven support for the yes-vote. Associated with these debates, commentators began to analyse the results looking at why some areas tended towards a no vote, while others tended towards a yes vote. Spatially, commentators were quick to point out the distinct patterns that appeared to have emerged. Within the capital cities, these included distinct clusters of yes votes within inner and near inner-city locations with no votes dominating outer suburban locations.
Associated with the rudimentary spatial analysis, questions began to be asked that focused on the socio-demographic make-up of the electorate and how different ‘types’ of voters impacted on the outcome. The various questions and explanations were wide-ranging but can be distilled into 6 testable hypotheses.
During the campaign leading up to the referendum, a common theme in the media related to the argument that for many Australian voters, the referendum and what it stood for was not front-of-mind due to everyday issues. This can be labelled the ‘concern with everyday issues rather than the referendum’ hypothesis where it was argued that the ‘voice to Parliament can’t compete with cost-of-living crisis in voters’ minds (Chowdhury, 2023). Prosecuting this argument, commentators suggested that in cases where voters are more concerned about everyday issues such as the cost of living, they may be less concerned with bigger-picture issues and vote to maintain the status-quo (i.e vote no). Furthermore, as suggested by Biddle et al. (2023, p. 60) people were
less inclined to support a change to the constitution that would result in benefits to one group over another, and that people were angry with the government for focusing on what is seen as a niche issue when more pressing issues are being ignored.
Such a hypothesis is aligned with a range of empirical research which has reported that anxiety may stimulate preferences for protective policies (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015) and drive voters to consider their choices more carefully (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007) or that voters move toward the status quo under times of threat (Bisbee & Honig, 2022).
The second hypothesis that emerged relates to views that ‘multicultural support offers hope for a Yes outcome’ (Gunstone, 2023). This might be referred to as the multi-cultural empathy hypothesis and suggests that multi-cultural communities may have empathy for indigenous issues and the message behind the voice to Parliament and hence are more likely to vote yes. Alluding to the potential empathy impact on the referendum outcome Jakubowicz (2023) noted the support received for the Black Lives Matter movement by members of various ethnic groups arguing that
These events may have heightened the awareness in immigrant communities of the prevalence of racism in Australia. They may also have enhanced empathy for Indigenous people’s struggles, and potentially, support for the Voice (para 24).
Such a view is supported in the academic literature where it has been suggested that viewing an issue through the perspective of ethnic minorities or other disadvantaged groups can reduce the impact of prejudice towards these groups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and by extension increase support for policy issues impacting these groups.
A third hypothesis established following the referendum related to a perceived lack of information or knowledge, best expressed by the phrase used by the no-campaign ‘If you don’t know, vote no’. The ‘if you don’t know, vote no’ hypothesis related to the confusion around the intent of the referendum and was summed up by statements such as the ‘voice referendum was too 'complicated' for 'less educated' Australians to understand’ (Collins, 2023). Regarding this argument, it may well be the case, as Crisp (1983) suggests ‘from all that we know about voting behaviour in Australia, it is clear that some of the voters will cast a vote in ignorance of what it is all for—and what seems true for elections seems to apply to constitutional referenda’ (Bennett, 1985, p. 27). Within the political science literature, there is a range of empirical material that has investigated the links between education and political engagement and motivations. A number of researchers have found that the broader education curriculum and school experience can influence political attitudes and awareness and help create politically informed and engaged voters (Boden & Nedeva, 2010; Hillygus, 2005; Mishra, Klein, & Müller, 2023; Schofer, Ramirez, & Meyer, 2021), or provide important social capital and social networks which aid and encourage greater engagement and participation (Evans, Rees, Taylor, & Fox, 2021; Mishra et al., 2023; Putnam, 2000).
The fourth hypothesis relates to headlines such as ‘Voice Referendum: Old-fashioned racism driving 'No' campaign’ (Duffield, 2023). Some posit that the referendum has tapped into ‘a deep well of historical racism’ which has outweighed other considerations (Anderson, Paradies, Langton, Lovett, & Calma, 2023). Indeed, racism was an important issue in the 1967 Referendum where Australians voted to remove references in the Constitution that discriminated against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. In the aftermath of the 1967 referendum, it was suggested that there was a strong inverse relationship between the percentage of electors agreeing with the proposals and the ratio of Aboriginal to European populations (Mitchell, 1968). As such it was thought that the no vote was influenced by a proximity or contact hypothesis (Bennett, 1985; Ray, 1983) whereby voters living in communities with higher numbers of indigenous people were more likely to vote no.
A fifth possible hypothesis relates to the link between conservative views and political voting behaviour. The ‘conservatism and fear of change’ hypothesis is reflected in the reported links between the no campaign and conservative politics where the media reported ‘Indigenous voice: no campaign’s deep links to conservative Christian politics revealed’ (Butler, 2023). The conservatism and status-quo nexus has been well established in the voting patterns of Australians. During the 1967 referendum, it was argued that the no vote was driven in part by conservatism with rural electoral sub-divisions that were thought to be more conservative, voting against change (Bennett, 1985). Similarly, with reference to climate change policy Colvin and Jotzo (2021) analysed the 2019 Australian Federal election and found that conservative voters were more likely to vote to maintain the status quo on climate change policy rather than vote for change. Within the broader political science literature, researchers have investigated the links between conservatism and voting for the status-quo. For example, researchers including Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2017), Federico and Malka (2018) and Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, and Shrout (2007) have found that typically, people with a strong desire to diminish insecurity and minimize uncertainty tend to be drawn to the political right (i.e. conservatives), which prioritizes stability and hierarchy and increases the likelihood of voting for the status quo. With reference to these links Thorisdottir et al. (2007, p. 179)
[T]here is a special resonance or match between motives to reduce uncertainty and threat, and the two core aspects of right-wing ideology, resistance to change and acceptance of inequality.
The final hypothesis relates to political party alignment. Throughout the referendum campaign, clear political party lines were evident with the conservative coalition largely supporting the no vote, while the ruling Labor party, together with independent and green party members of parliament leaning towards the yes-vote. Opinion surveys leading up to the referendum supported this hypothesis, with voters for the major parties (labor and the collation) falling in line with the stated party views. Reviewing a number of opinion polls (Markham & Sanders, 2020, p. 17) note that
in 2018 and 2019, levels of support for a Voice among committed Coalition voters fell below 50%, likely due to the unsupportive positions of Coalition Prime Ministers.
Interestingly, they also note
this move among Coalition voters could well have been in the opposite direction had their leadership chosen a supportive position on a Voice, at which point a national majority vote in a referendum would have been very likely.
The suggestion of party partisanship in voting outcomes in the referendum should not come as a surprise given the existing literature on the impact of party policy position on the opinions of citizens. Deriving from early work by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Donald (1960) who referred to political elites / parties as ‘an opinion-forming agency of great importance’ (p. 128), arguments have focused on understanding the ways in which citizens use prompts about the position of their preferred party as an information shortcut to reach an informed opinion (Lupia, 2006, 2018; Sniderman & Stiglitz, 2012) or citizens simply follow the ‘party-line’ of their choosing to remain consistent with their identify and stay loyal to the partisan group (Huddy, Bankert, & Davies, 2018). Although there appears to be significant debate regarding the strength and veracity of such linkages (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), there is a significant body of research literature which supports, to a greater or lesser extent, such opinion forming linkages (Barber & Pope, 2019; Chong & Mullinix, 2019; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Peterson, 2019; Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010).
While these diverse arguments have represented the mainstream discussion of the referendum outcome, we have only just begun to see an emerging academic literature addressing the referendum outcome. A recent report by Biddle et al. (2023) undertook an analysis using survey data and reported findings that go some way to adding empirical rigour to the public debate. Interestingly, in the context of the arguments set out above, the authors undertook an analysis of outcomes at the electoral district level and found that districts with higher proportions of indigenous population, higher proportion of people born overseas, and districts held by the coalition or green / independent candidates were more likely to return a no-vote. Conversely, districts with higher levels of individuals with a bachelor’s degree or with incomes equal to or lower than the median were more likely to record a yes vote. A broad interpretation of these findings suggests that some of the arguments that have emerged in the media and in social commentary do have some relevance to understanding the voice referendum outcomes.
This current paper adds to a burgeoning empirical literature by presenting an ecological-based analysis of the referendum outcome, focusing on the association between voting outcomes at small spatial levels across the major capital cities and a range of socio-economic and demographic variables that capture the essence of the arguments put forward within the public discourse.
[1] Of the 15,895,231 voters who cast a vote, 155,545 recorded an informal vote, represent less than 1 per cent of all votes.