3.1 Analysis of the Oil-Well Blowout
3.1.1 Prior Events
As mentioned, the study area is the Baghjan oil field area under Oil India Limited (OIL), a public-sector company engaged in petroleum exploitation and production that operates the Baghjan oil field. OIL began its operation in Assam in 1959 and currently has 18 oil fields, and Baghjan is one of them (Dutta 2016). It is approximately 70 kilometers from the OIL Headquarters at Duliajan and is one of the main hydrocarbon-producing fields in Assam. OIL discovered the Baghjan field in 2003 after drilling its first exploratory at Well No. 1. Consequently, upon the successful commercial discovery of crude oil at Well No. 2, hydrocarbon exploitation was started in 2005 (Oil India Limited 2020). As the area was found to be highly prolific, an Early Production Setup (EPS) was constructed in 2008 to handle the crude produced. It was designed to handle 2700 kilolitres per day (S. Gogoi et al. 2022). Thirty-one wells were drilled, three of which were used for water disposal and 28 for oil, of which 05 wells, including Well No.5, were completed as gas wells (Item 1 2020). Before the event, only 22 wells were in production; five were temporarily shut in, and 01 was permanently abandoned. After the blowout, 21 wells are currently in production. The wells were given names based on the order in which they were discovered (Kaul and Chaudhri 2023). There was also a plan to drill Extended Reach Drilling (ERD) wells to target the prospective sand below the Dibru-Saikhowa National Park itself, which is about 1 km away from the main Baghjan field and among the others; well no.5 was included as a base for ERD (ERD Justification 2017).
3.1.2 Blowout Phase
Baghjan’s well No. 5 was spudded on 20 November 2006, and successful drilling was completed on 12 March 2007. However, production started in September 2015 and lasted till March 2020. During this time, well No. 5 produced a total of 191.83 million standard cubic meters (MMSCM) of Gas and 44,180 cubic meters (M3) of Condensate from the bottommost sand, i.e., Langpar sand at a depth of 3,871 m (Preliminary Report 2020). The Geology & Reservoir Department anticipated that further production would decrease reservoir pressure and recover less or no hydrocarbon. To avoid this, it was decided to start a workover operation to shut or plug this zone permanently and produce from another sand zone, i.e., Lakadong + Therria sand at 3,739 m (Bharadwaj et al. 2021a). The Ahmedabad-based firm M/s- John Energy Ltd was deployed in April 2020 to carry out the workover operation. A new reservoir was tapped for production at a depth of 3,739 m. Production at Baghjan well-5 had been temporarily halted as the infrastructure for the previous reservoir was being serviced (Objection of OIL 2020). The workover operation was carried out on April 25th, and the initial objectives were completed on May 18th.
After this, when the well was about to be redirected to the oil collection station following the perforation, pressure rose in the casing side due to leakage from the tubing side. So, it was decided to kill/subdue the well and complete the same tubing again (Bharadwaj et al. 2021b). While well-killing, pressure rose at the outer casing area, which could have come from the inner casing via a well-finish spool (WF spool) (Bharadwaj et al. 2021b). Sodium Format Solution was infused into cap well pressure, which killed the well, and after this, tubing was pulled out of the hole. In the interim, the WF spool was tested, and leakage was discovered; thus, it was decided to change the WF spool (Item 1 2020). However, before changing the WF spool, a secondary barrier, a 100m cement plug, was installed in the well. Accordingly, a plan was devised, and the cement plug job was completed on 26th May (Item 1 2020). It is pertinent to mention that during this work, a pressure control device known as a Blowout Preventer (BOP) was temporarily uninstalled (S. Gogoi et al. 2022).
The operation to change the WF spool began on May 27th, and the workover operation was under M/s John Energy Limited as part of the service contract. However, during the workover operation underway on 27th May, the Well suddenly became very active, thus resulting in a major blowout at around 10:30 a.m. (Preliminary Report 2020). However, it is important to note that despite the blowout's alarmingly high volume (80,000 standard cubic meters) and high pressure (more than 4,000 pounds per square inch), no immediate reports of human casualties or fire damage were made (Kaul and Chaudhri 2023). The locals and the inhabitants of the nearby area reported hearing the loud sound emanating from the oil field from 12 km and beyond (Down to Earth 2020).
The velocity of released gas and condensate from the blowout was very high as the plume moved upwards from the wellhead for about 60 to 70 m. During this 13-day phase, the impact was widespread as toxic gases (propane, methane, propylene, benzene, xylene, etc.) spread. It covered a 1.5 km to 2 km radius and traveled up to 9 km in the wind direction (Qureshi et al. 2020). On the other hand, the oil spill and condensate are estimated to have spread over an area of 3.15 sq. km., which also spread through the water to the wetland and was ultimately discharged into the Dangori River through the Dibru River (Item 1 2020). Within this radius of 2 km, every plant was affected as most of it was covered with oil and condensate, which eventually died off. On water, it directly affects the phytoplankton and zooplankton. Furthermore, this, taken as respiration and food, affects animal and human life. There was also a visible coating of oil film seen on every plant life, water bodies, agriculture field, and other manmade structures (Final Report 2021).
3.1.3 Cause of the Blowout
Finding the exact cause of an incident is difficult, as often the outcome is influenced by multiple errors. This is also the case where we consider the mistakes that contributed to the incident. All the causes mentioned below are directly taken from the official reports and are not personal analyses (Item 1 2020; Item 5 2023; Preliminary Report 2020; Progress Report Part I (Volume I) 2020; Progress Report Part II 2020).
The OIL and contractor’s planning and execution team's deficiency in understanding the gravity of a critical operation in the Cement Plug job, even though it was placed as a secondary safety barrier before the nipple down of BOP.
The cement plug was too far from the perforated zone and packer, exposing them to cement cutting and gas leakage.
The cement slurry began to set and lose water, lowering the well fluid's hydrostatic head and allowing gas bubbles to enter and expand.
The gas bubbles diluted a long column of brine solution and reduced its specific gravity, further lowering the hydrostatic head and making the well active.
The planning and execution authority mainly relied on the primary safety barrier of the hydrostatic head of the well fluid, and they did not consider the cement plug as an essential secondary barrier.
Before removing the BOP, the cement plug was not tagged and tested for integrity and safety, as was mandatory.
After removing the BOP, the well had no tested secondary safety barrier.
Contractors failed to follow the standard operating procedures for the blow-out preventer without testing secondary safety barriers.
The use of a retrievable bridge plug to isolate the gas zone, which could have been more convenient and time-saving, was not considered.
The written instruction to wait 48 hours for the cement to set was broken, as the BOP was removed after 15 hours without any authorization from OIL.
There were severe deficiencies in proper planning and supervising critical operations at the well site from the Contractor and deviations from the Standard Operating Procedure.
3.1.4 Fires Phase
Amid the twin crisis moment of COVID-19 and the Assam flood, one more grave incident, which will last for half a year, was on its path. It is worth noting that in the case of a blowout, fire is an expected event (Wang et al. 2019). After the 13-day phase, the blowout well caught fire around 01:14 PM on 9th June, engulfing a vast area. Before the fire incident, the cause was mainly noise and the releasing gases and condensate, which are high-pressure gases that are highly volatile and flammable. However, after the well caught fire, everything immediately came in contact with fire, and almost all burned to ashes within a range of one km radius (The Hindu 2020). Due to the spread of the fire, around 0.72 sq. km. area was affected. Many people were evacuated immediately, but the raging inferno destroyed most of the houses and their belongings, which were located near the blowout area (Qureshi et al. 2020). It also destroyed most of the nearby small tea gardens, of which only the ashes remained (Supriti David 2020). The fire engulfed most of the Maguri-Motapung grasslands towards the southwestern and western sides as they were already highly flammable due to oil condensate. On 10th June 2020, it was reported that two OIL Fire Service Personnel drowned in nearby ponds due to yesterday’s incident (Item 1 and 2 2020). The oil well blowout also generated loud noise and vibration, which measured up to 120 decibels (dB), equivalent to a jet engine, resulting in disturbance in the wildlife and human population in the vicinity (Item 1 2020).
There were many protests from the villagers and also on social media during the fire phase. The first one was from the communities due to the frequent tremors at the well site, which happened every 15 to 20 minutes after a few days of the blowout (Myithili Hazarika 2020). On July 7, irate residents of the surrounding areas besieged the Baghjan Early Production System (EPS) facility, preventing the installation from operating that day. This was primarily done to protest against not receiving the compensation. The Deputy Commissioner of Tinsukia declared that sufficient compensation would be given based on assessing the property loss in response to the community's persistent cries for payment (Kaul and Chaudhri 2023). A 45-year-old man committed suicide on July 19th after ingesting poison. The condensate from the well destroyed his entire property and plot of land. The claim that OIL's failure to compensate was the last straw. As a result of this incident, locals began barring company employees from entering and leaving the well site and other operation centers (Aditi Patil 2020). This ended when OIL promised to give one of the deceased daughters a job at OIL and agreed to pay an additional ₹10 lakh for each of the daughters' educations, on top of the ₹5 lakh already paid (Kaul and Chaudhri 2023). Having not been persuaded by the work's speed, the locals called for divine intervention on August 5. However, this was quickly resolved after OIL reassurance (Item 1 2020). Following this, there were occasional small-scale uprisings and inquiries from the community. However, no large-scale case was witnessed since OIL and the District Administration moved quickly to address concerns and provide compensation. Concurrently, protesters posted videos and pictures to social media that captured the situation in Baghjan. Numerous hashtags were trending, such as #BaghjanBurns, #baghjan, #oilexplosion, #baghjanoil, #baghjanfire, #Assamfire, #Assamflood2020, #baghjanoilwellexplosion, #BaghjanProtest, #SaveBaghjanSaveAssam and #Baghjanstillburning. Using its Twitter account and Facebook page, OIL attempted to respond to queries and offer information (Tuli and Danish 2021).
3.1.5 Post Blowout phase of extinguishing and controlling the well
In response to the Well No. 5 blowout on 27th May, ONGCL's Crisis Management Team and an Expert Team from ONGCL, Vadodara, approached the wellhead. While taking all preventive measures, the teams opened the casing valve and began continuously pumping water through the casing valve into the wellhead. In addition, 7-8 water monitors were installed to spray water continuously through the fire pump to the cool wellhead. Meanwhile, OIL contacted Global Expert and hired three well control operators from M/s Alert Disaster Control (Asia) Pvt Ltd., Singapore, who arrived at the site on 8 June (Objection of OIL 2020).
On 9 June, the blowout caught fire, and afterward, the operations were carried out under the direct supervision of the international well control expert from M/s ALERT Disaster Control (Asia) Pvt Ltd, Singapore. They also sought assistance from the Indian Air Force, the Army, the National Disaster Response Force, and other agencies (OIL Press Release 2020).
Water Jets: The first method was to spray water on the well to reduce the intensity of the fire and create a safe zone for experts to approach the well. The experts built a temporary water reservoir near the well by laying pipes from the Dangori River. However, this method was ineffective in controlling the fire or the gas leak (Item 1 2020).
Diverting gas: The experts installed a blowout preventer on 25th July and a casing head on 10th August on the well to divert the gas to two flare pits, where it was supposed to burn off. The reasoning was that there would be no fire if there were no fuel in the form of natural gas. This reduced the fire's pressure and intensity. However, the strategy did not produce the desired results (Item 1 2020).
Capping the well: The team attempted to cap the well by placing a heavy metal cap over its mouth and sealing it with heavy mud by injecting it into the well with mud pumps to counterbalance the gas pressure and kill the well. This attempt, however, failed on August 17th when a gas blast dislodged the cap. The experts had to remove and reposition the cap on the well. Several factors, including heavy rain, floods, local protests, and technical difficulties, caused the capping operation to be delayed (Item 1 2020).
Kill Fluid: The experts attempted to seal the well by injecting kill fluid or cement-laced chemical mud into it. On September 14th, the method was initiated by diverting the gas flow from the well to the two flare pits. It was called off on September 30th because another casing valve ruptured (Item 1 2020).
Snubbing the well: The experts resorted to a technology called snubbing. Snubbing is an oil well intervention technique used to put out a fire that involves inserting heavy metal pipes into the well to reduce pressure and seal the gas flow. This complex and risky operation requires special equipment and expertise. Thus, the Canadian M/s Snubbing Services was given the contract to snub the well. After several other methods, such as water jets, diversion pipes, mud pumps, and blowout preventers, failed to control the well, snubbing was used as a last resort. The snubbing unit arrived at the site on October 24th, and the snubbing equipment of 60 tons was flown in from Calgary, Canada, by an Antonov An-24, which came on November 4th. The snubbing operation began on November 9th and lasted six days. The snubbing operation successfully put off the fire on 15th November, but it took another 18 days to complete the killing operation, which ended on 3rd December 2020 (Item 1 2020).
3.2 Displacement and Relief Camps
The term "displacement" describes the temporary transfer of people or communities from their homes or original locations to other locations. Natural disasters, armed conflicts, environmental dangers, and construction projects are just a few causes. Temporary displacement and resettlement work to ensure the safety and well-being of affected populations (Bradley and Cohen 2010).
The statistics furnished by the OIL itself are that 3000 families were affected, and 9000 persons were displaced from their houses and accommodated in 12 relief camps. Notably, in the aftermath of the Gas Blowout at Well No. 5, around one thousand six hundred ten (1610) families were evacuated from the nearby affected areas (Item 5 and 6 2020). They were initially camped in four relief camps about 1.5 to 2 km from the well. Baghjan Dighulturrang M E School, St. Joseph School, Gateline LP School at Dighulturrang, and No.1 Baghjan Gaon L P School were the initial relief camp, which has been had been accommodated with provisions for health, sanitation, and drinking water facilities which were given in association with OIL (Objection of OIL 2020).
On 9th June, it took a turn when the fire broke out at the well. The fire was uncontrollable and was so large due to the oil spill that the people living around could not do anything except save themselves from being burnt. Villagers within a radius of 2 to 3 km from the explosion site took shelter in school buildings designated as relief camps beyond a distance of 3 km. The OIL has rehabilitated the local people within 5 km of the incident area into relief camps by providing all necessary facilities (Item 1 2020). A total of 10 relief camps were set up due to the incident on 9th June, and two more camps were added later due to the increasing number of victims. As informed by DC Tinsukia, there were 12 relief camps, each with 750 persons. It is worth noting that many families from Natun Rangagora Gaon take shelter in the relief camp due to the increasing tremors in their houses. On June 15, OIL set up a medical camp run by OIL and the Assam regiment officers (Objection of OIL 2020).
As of July 22nd, 07 camps continued with 5,758 occupants. Many families and individuals shifted to other places, including the homes of relatives and acquaintances. Rs. 11.17 crores were spent on the relief camps as of July 23rd. A tri-partite meeting was held on 18th September 2020. In the meeting, OIL agreed to pay 612 families an amount of Rs.50,000/- per family in compensation for those who left the camp for rental and house rent, food, and medical facilities compensation to the District Collector (Progress Report Part I (Volume I) 2020). The Deputy Commissioner (DC), Tinsukia, has apprised the Committee that all the affected families and individuals staying at the relief camps have been relocated to suitable rented accommodation. OIL has borne the cost of such relocation (Progress Report Part I (Volume I) 2020).
It is pertinent to mention that living in a relief camp with all the required necessities will never be a life of comfort. The time was much more challenging due to the ongoing pandemic, which stopped the whole globe from doing anything. The foremost problem of the relief camp is the overcrowded population of more than 9000 people living in 12 relief camps, most of which are schools converted into relief camps (Preliminary Report 2020). This can be seen in tightly packed rooms and the concern over the living and hygiene conditions in the overcrowded relief camps. For example, at the start of the Guijan Higher Secondary School relief camp and Guijan Middle English School, only five toilets were available for 2000 residents (Progress Report Part II 2020). These improved with time, but more was needed; such problems were always in the relief camps. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, when social distancing has to be followed, the camps are tightly packed, but no major outbreak of COVID-19 has been reported from the relief camps. Many residents of Baghjan and Natun Rangagora villages have refused to stay at the relief camps due to the fear of testing COVID-19 positive and the poor facilities in these camps (Objection of OIL 2020).
Except for the difficulties mentioned above, it is worth noting that the relief camp inhabitants did not get any significant problems in the case of necessities. All necessary support for stay, food, water, toilets, electricity, and medical and veterinary care has been provided at the relief camps with the backing from OIL, District Administration, and local organizations.
3.3 Compensation
India’s most prolonged oil well fire lasted for almost six months, and it caused damage or loss of human, material, economic, and environmental resources and caused a profound disruption of the normal functioning of society. At Baghjan, after the blowout, people lost many things like their homes, livelihood, agriculture, livestock, and many more. So, to recover and overcome this situation, the affected people require compensation, which Oil India Limited and the Government have provided.
At the beginning of the incident, 11 affected families were handed checks for a sum of ₹20 lakhs each as compensation from OIL, whose houses had been completely gutted by the fire (Item 1 2020).
Initially, on 5th June, a one-time compensation of ₹30,000 was released to 1,484 beneficiaries living in four relief camps after the gas blowout, and another one-time immediate compensation of ₹25,000 was provided to an additional 1,197 families in the relief camps after the fire. In addition, health insurance policies, including COVID-19, are also made available by OIL to the people living in the relief camp (First Interim Report 2020). OIL agreed to pay 612 families an amount of ₹50,000/- per family as compensation for those who left the camp for rental.
On June 15, 2020, OIL India Limited presented cheques for ₹30 Lakh each to the wives of the deceased firefighters, Late Tikheswar Gohain and Late Durlov Gogoi of Oil India Ltd, as part of the Company's social security scheme at their residences in Duliajan. Furthermore, it has been announced that on compassionate grounds, one of every two families’ eligible dependents will be offered employment with Oil India Ltd (Item 5 2023).
In the beginning, only 57 households were categorized as extremely affected. However, a re-survey conducted by the Deputy Commissioner and the head of Revenue in the District, under the NGT Committee, identified 104 families to be added to Category (i) along with the existing 57 families. The affected families of Baghjan village were categorized as follows (First Interim Report 2020).
1. Category (i) - 12 (11+1) + 161 (57 + 104) = 173 families
2. Category (ii) - 439 families
The OIL and the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal Committee (NGT) have determined various aspects of the compensation payment (First Interim Report 2020).
1. Impact on agriculture, fishery, and domestic animals in the area
2. Extend the loss and damage caused to human life
3. Extend of loss and damages caused to the household
4. Extend loss of livelihood
Later on, on 6th August 2020, an order was passed establishing three categories of interim compensation (First Interim Report 2020).
i. Category I - ₹25 lakhs
ii. Category II - ₹10 lakhs
iii. Category III - ₹2.5 lakhs
People received compensation from OIL based on their losses, which were categorized into three forms (First Interim Report 2020).
i. Category I - Completely damaged households and property
ii. Category II - Severely damaged households and property
iii. Category III - Partially damaged households and property
The committee accepted the recommendation to provide ₹25 lakhs to 173 identified families and ₹20 lakhs to 439 identified families. The sum of ₹25 lakhs has been given to the most affected families who stayed near the Baghjan-5 and experienced severe damages and losses. However, on 2nd December, vide its letter Ref No. RCE: 03-351 OIL accepted the above-mentioned recommendation with a reduced compensation amount, as shown in fig. 2, which is a copy of final compensation letter from the OIL. (Progress Report Part II 2020):
1. Category A: ₹15 lakhs for 161 families each
2. Category B: ₹10 lakhs for 439 families each
The total compensation paid by OIL amounted to ₹7.4445 crore, distributed among 2,681 families. The committee’s total expenditure until the fire was extinguished was ₹21.1600 crore. Further, OIL has deposited an amount of ₹36.9 Crore to the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Tinsukia, for compensation in various categories. As of date, ₹15.6575 Crore has been credited to the accounts of affected families in different categories. Additionally, multiple schemes have been announced by the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Assam for the affected people upon his visit to the site. These include establishing a Model Hospital at Baghjan, constructing a Veterinary Dispensary, and proposing Baghjan Rehabilitation through Handloom Weaving (Item 5 2023).
Table 1. Compensation satisfaction level of the survey households
Satisfaction Level
|
Option
|
Household
|
Percentage
|
Highly satisfied
|
A
|
3
|
11.11
|
Somewhat satisfied
|
B
|
10
|
37.04
|
Rather unsatisfied
|
C
|
4
|
14.81
|
Highly unsatisfied
|
D
|
2
|
7.41
|
No opinion
|
E
|
8
|
29.63
|
Total
|
|
27
|
100
|
It is important to note that many homes receive a sufficient sum as compensation since only the nearby houses had large losses, and most households far from the main vicinity region faced little loss, as seen in Table 1. Upon surveyed data from primary sources, the local inhabitant’s views regarding the use of compensation received by households fall into these categories:
Restoring livelihoods through income-generating activities.
Repairing or building new houses that were severely damaged.
Rehabilitating agricultural land and purchasing new agricultural land for better production.
Replacing essential items like books and stationery for children's education.
Acquiring new domestic animals to replace those lost during the fire.
3.4 Legal Violation
The Baghjan area is near a highly sensitive biodiversity hotspot, which thrives in diverse flora and fauna. A plethora of perennial rivers, an adjacent national park, and a protected wetland designated as an Important Bird and Biodiversity Area (IBA) in 1996 all contribute to the area's exceptional biological diversity and environmental significance (Bhatta et al. 2016). Oil mining, fire, and leakage have harmed the region's ecology and biodiversity. This violates the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (abbreviated CBD), an instrument India ratified in 1994. Although the Maguri-Motapung Wetland is not on India's Ramsar list, Article 4(1) of the Convention states that the conservation of wetlands should be followed whether they are on the List or not, thereby placing equal responsibility for protecting both wetlands that are on the Ramsar list and those that are not (Isfaq and Vardhan 2020).
The Ministry of Wildlife and Environment's Guidelines for Taking Non-Forestry Activities in Wildlife Habitats, under 3.5.1. activities within 10 km of the boundaries of National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries, i.e., the eco-sensitive zones (ESZ), will require the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) recommendations (Agrata Das and Arunav Bhattacharya 2020). However, via its Order dated 07.09.2017, the Supreme Court granted OIL conditional approval for the Baghjan oil field subject to a Biodiversity Impact Assessment study conducted by the Assam State Biodiversity Board (Progress Report Part I (Volume II) 2020). As of today, OIL has been unable to carry out the Biodiversity Impact Assessment Study either through the Assam State Biodiversity Board, as mandated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, or through any other agency, a fact that the Assam State Biodiversity Board has corroborated (Progress Report Part I (Volume II) 2020).
Part IV, Article 48A, states, "The State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country," imposing a direct responsibility on the State to protect the environment. The region's ecological importance has previously been emphasized. The State must meet its obligations under Article 48A but fails to implement necessary safety regulations in establishing oil mining operations, resulting in the blowout and subsequent damage to the region's biodiversity (Isfaq and Vardhan 2020).
Sections 25 and 26 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Rule 6 of the Hazardous Waste (Management & Handling) Rules, 1989, all require environmental clearances (EC) from Pollution Control Boards under the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 1994 (Agrata Das and Arunav Bhattacharya 2020). OIL only had the mandatory consent under the Water and Air Act, which the Pollution Control Board (PCB), Assam, approved for 2008-09, 2012-13, and 2018-19 (Progress Report Part I (Volume II) 2020). Following an investigation, the Assam Pollution Control Board directed OIL to close its existing operations because they operated without the necessary clearances (Isfaq and Vardhan 2020).
The concept of Environmental Impact Assessment, as defined in Article 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, has become an essential tool for ensuring that the environmental impact is minimal and does not have a significant impact on it. National legislative authorities have also emphasized the importance of it by drafting the EIA Notification of 1994, with Clause 9 of Schedule I of the same containing “Exploration for oil and gas and their production, transportation, and storage,” thereby explicitly mandating the requirement of EIA clearance for oil exploration purposes (Rahman and Boruah 2020). The fact that EIA norms were ignored before carrying out oil exploration in the region was a regulation that was a must owing to the eco-sensitive nature of the area (Progress Report Part I (Volume II) 2020). At this point, it is also pertinent to mention that, just a few months before the disaster in January 2020, the Environment Ministry waived the requirement for prior environmental clearances for oil and natural gas exploration on offshore and onshore sites, putting the environment at significant risk (Tuli and Danish 2021).
3.5 Impact on the Environment
The oil spill caused by the blowout of Baghjan's well no. 5 on May 27th and the subsequent fire on June 9th destroyed approximately 60-70 hectares of the surrounding area. The oil spilled onto the land and the nearby rivers and wetlands (Qureshi et al. 2020). The Biosphere reserve has approximately 40 species of mammals, 450 species of birds, 104 species of fish, 11 species of chelonians, 18 species of lizards, 23 species of snakes, 165 species of butterflies, and 680 plant species in the surrounding landscape of the Dibru-Saikhowa Biosphere Reserve (Item 5 and 6 2020). The fire and oil spill significantly impacted the environment, as explained below.
3.5.1 Impact on Air and Noise Pollution
Large amounts of oil and associated pollutants were discharged into the system and caused severe air pollution, endangering human and animal health. The burnt-out area is mapped as 56 to 70 ha, which includes crop fields, grasslands, and swamps. The area's air quality index (AQI) was 351, indicating "very poor" conditions, which revealed complaints of difficulty in breathing (Preliminary Report 2020). As per the Wildlife Institute of India Report, very high amounts of Nitrogen, Sulphur Dioxide, Carbon Monoxide, and Formaldehyde during the eventual blowout phase of 13 days, after which it subsided (Qureshi et al. 2020). According to The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) School of Advanced Studies report, the total greenhouse gas emissions from the Baghjan blowout were estimated to be 1.01 million tons of CO2 equivalent, equivalent to burning 5.5 lakh tons of coal (Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas Report 2023). Thus, it contributed to global warming by releasing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (R. ~P. Singh et al. 2020). The smoke of condensate and associated pollutants caused by the spreading of fire to the surrounding areas has threatened the lives of flora and fauna to a very high extent.
Sound up to 60 decibels is safe for humans and animals, but reports show a consistent increase in noise levels in and around the blowout site, exceeding the prescribed standard regardless of zone. Initial assessments by the PCB, Assam, dated 15.06.2020, show alarmingly high levels of ambient noise ranging from 82.2 dB to 92.03 dB at distances ranging from 800 to 200 meters from the blowout site. Ambient noise levels measured on 07.10.2020 ranged from a minimum of 94.3 dB to 98.2 dB at locations within a 100-meter radius of the source (Item 1 2020).
3.5.2 Impact on Water
The oil and gas leak contaminated the water of the surrounding area and the Maguri-Motapung Wetland, an important bird area and biodiversity hotspot. The oil also coated the vegetation and reduced the dissolved oxygen level in the water, affecting plant photosynthesis and animal respiration processes (Qureshi et al. 2020). The Dissolved Oxygen (DO) value for the Brahmaputra is reported to be 7.23 mg/l, and the maximum is 10.92 mg/l. However, the Wildlife Institute of India report states a reduced amount, with the site’s DO ranging from 0.94mg/l to 7.35mg/l, barely above Central PCB Class A limits (Qureshi et al. 2020). The Maguri-Motapung Wetland has been severely damaged and polluted, which has resulted in the death of large-scale aquatic animals, including the rare Gangetic River Dolphin. The Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) concentration in the site was significantly higher than in other parts of India, i.e., 0.21 to 691.31 μg Kg-1 (V. Singh et al. 2023). Because many of these pollutants will leach into the ground and contaminate groundwater, the impact is significant and will have lasting repercussions. While surveying, it was stated that the water tube well used by the villagers as a water source emanated foul smells. Wetlands are rich in biodiversity and provide essential ecosystem functions such as water purification, flood control, and carbon sequestration. However, it is expected that Maguri-Motapung Wetland will show less resilience than before (Qureshi et al. 2020).
3.5.3 Impact on Soil
The oil and gas leak also contaminated the soil of nearby agricultural fields, putting the general population at risk. PAH levels in soil range from 37 to 395.8 μg Kg-1, which is substantially more than acceptable (V. Singh et al. 2023). From the preliminary EIA conducted after the killing of the well, the Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPH) concentrations in the Maguri-Motapung Grassland area varied from 32 mg/kg to 736 mg/kg, which is high near the radius and decreased outward (Khandelwal et al. 2022). Benzene, Toluene, Ethylbenzene, and Xylene (BTEX) concentration, which accounts for 2.05 mg/kg to 14.02 mg/kg, higher than the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) standard, has also been noticed (Final Report 2021). Furthermore, the condensate and pollutants the smoke carries fall into the surrounding area, contaminating it significantly. The crop grown on contaminated soil may appear normal and healthy but may accumulate harmful chemicals.
3.5.4 Impact on flora and fauna
The Hon’ble National Green Tribunal Committee was established on 18th October 2010 to protect the environment and other natural resources, including enforcing legal rights and compensating for damages to persons and property (Gill 2014). NGT unanimously agrees that it is essential to establish a multidisciplinary team of specialists and community members. This team will report to the committee and will be responsible for developing a restoration plan for the Maguri-Motapung wetland and determining the extent of damages and the compensation needed. The multidisciplinary team was responsible for conducting all the official surveys during the six-month fire period, and the information was primarily extracted from these reports (Final Report 2021).
In the case of flora life in the surrounding area, it is already stated about the destruction of Maguri-Motapung Grassland, which is dominated by Arundo donox, Saccharum spontaneum, Saccharum ravaenae, Phragmites karka (Final Report 2021). The incident has imbalanced forests' healthy ecosystems and water and soil contamination, which will have long-term effects. Maguri-Motapung Wetland had a rich diversity, as 61 species of phytoplankton and 210 species of zooplankton were reported (Noroh et al. 2023; Sharma and Noroh 2020). The multidisciplinary team has noticed a decline in plankton as only 11 phytoplankton species and 12 zooplankton species were recorded (Preliminary Report 2020).
Regarding fauna in Maguri-Motapung Wetland, 35 dead species from 13 families were recorded, with nearly 22 species threatened. PAH concentration reported in fish ranges from 104.3 to 7829.6 μg Kg-1, with an average value of 1932.37 μg Kg-1, which samples appear to be 10 to 100 folds higher than in other parts of India (V. Singh et al. 2023). They also mentioned that the significant increase of the PAHs and low dissolved oxygen are the leading causes of death in different fish species. As per the team reports, these also seriously affected the breeding season of fish. The Wildlife Institute of India Report reveals that some prominent species, namely Ompok pabo, Nundus nundus, etc., are entirely wiped out from the Maguri-Motapung wetland (Qureshi et al. 2020). A significant decline was encountered in the rare Gangetic River Dolphin from Lohit and Dibru River, and not a single Dolphin was encountered in the Maguri-Motapung Wetland. Only four out of 26 mollusc species were reported from the Maguri-Motapung wetland (Qureshi et al. 2020).
A dead gibbon was born on September 29th in Purani Motapung Village, and the mother carried it for four days. She abandoned the body after some time, and it is assumed that during pregnancy, the female gibbon is compelled to feed on contaminated leaves and plant parts apart from direct exposure to xenobiotic pollutants. The mother gibbon also died a few days later as the gibbon took no food and rested on the tree top alone. After this, a survey was conducted, which found that the death rate of calves in the Purani Motapung area was 0.29/year, much higher than the state average at that time. This report suggests these are all linked to contaminated plants and xenobiotic pollutants (Preliminary Report 2020)
As the grassland was severely affected, most of the breeding endemic red data book grassland birds, namely Swamp Francolin, Marsh Babbler, Jerdon's Babbler, Black-breasted Parrotbill, and Swamp Prinia abandoned their nest without hatching or left their chicks to die (Nayak and Biswas 2023). It is worth noting that no migratory birds were observed in mid-October; otherwise, they visited every year. Besides the destroyed ecosystem, noise pollution added extra deterrence to the winter migratory birds.
3.5.5 Impact on the Ecosystem
The oil spill and fire affected the rich Dibru-Saikhowa biosphere reserve, which spans over 765 sq. km. and is the world's only riverine island wildlife reserve. This reserve includes the same-named National Park and the Maguri-Motapung wetland. It is recognized as an Important Bird Area (IBA) and an Endemic Bird Area (EBA) of Assam by Birdlife International (Final Report 2021). During an expert field survey of the multidisciplinary team, it was discovered that bird density and diversity within a one km radius had decreased significantly. The Maguri-Motapung wetland is a naturally occurring wetland, and it hosts many rare and endangered species, several rare butterflies, and fish and is a habitat for migratory birds. It is one of the critical remaining refuges for several endangered and rare species, such as the Ganges River dolphin, white-winged wood duck, the Bengal florican, black-breasted parrotbill, hoolock gibbon, clouded leopard, Chinese pangolin, pig-tailed macaque and many more (Final Report 2021). The oil well fire spread to a large area, reducing visibility and destroying over 60 hectares of grassland and forest land. It also raised the temperature of the landscape, which in turn influenced animal behavior and migration. Due to the oil spill and smoke, there is also contamination with toxic chemicals and oil film coating on the vegetation, the wetland, the riverfront, and many species of flora and fauna in the impacted area. The affected ecosystems could take at least a decade to recover 70-80% of their original form (Final Report 2021)
3.6 Normalized Difference Vegetation Index Comparison Map of The Study Area
The NDVI, or Normalized Difference Vegetation Index, is a commonly employed metric that measures the health and density of vegetation. The NDVI map has been utilized in this context to visually represent the vegetation of the blowout area in both the before and after scenarios. This will illustrate the fire's visible magnitude and the oil dispersion as it damages the vegetation, causing a temporary absence of plant life and a long-lasting effect for numerous years. Fig. 3a image is the before-blowout situation, which shows the vegetation before the blowout and oil spillage. Fig. 3b is during the peak duration, depicting the aftermath of the blowout on the morning of the 9th of June before the fire, clearly illustrating the influence of the spilled oil and jet combustion discharged from the wellhead on the surrounding vegetation. The incident had a detrimental impact on the health of plants in the vicinity, resulting in their demise. The oil spill had a detrimental effect on terrestrial vegetation because of the deposition of condensate, which hindered their photosynthetic capacity. Soil contamination also led to the accumulation of toxic compounds in the plants. Fig. 3c and 3d depict images taken during the blowout's fourth and sixth months, demonstrating recovery from the peak duration, although the main blowout area remains devoid of vegetation.
Table 2. Attribute table of NDVI Comparison maps
Sl. No.
|
NDVI Value
|
Percentage
|
Before Blowout
|
Peak Duration
|
During 4th Month
|
During 6th Month
|
1
|
˗1 to 0.1
|
1.31
|
27.21
|
20.49
|
10.58
|
2
|
0.1 to 0.4
|
7.95
|
21.73
|
10.75
|
12.89
|
3
|
0.4 to 0.6
|
36.20
|
23.25
|
27.23
|
28.21
|
4
|
0.6 to 1
|
54.53
|
27.81
|
41.53
|
48.32
|
As stated above, NDVI ranges between -1.0 and 1.0, where the negative values range from -1.0 to 0.1 and indicate the presence of non-vegetated features. Values between 0.1 and 0.4 suggest a barren surface or senescing vegetation, whereas values above 0.4 to 0.6 and 0.6 to 1.0 indicate the presence of healthy vegetation. As seen in Fig. 3 and Table 2, the increase in pixel frequency for lower NDVI values (0.1 to 0.4) and the decrease in high-value pixels (0.4 to 0.6 and 0.6 to 1.0) indicate negative effects on vegetation resulting from the blowout. The flooding of the Maguri-Motapung wetland due to the monsoon precipitation led to an increase in negative results for NDVI. The vegetation within a one km radius was annihilated and is noticeable mainly in the southwest grassland. Fig. 4 presents a comparison of NDVI data through a line graph, illustrating the percentage share of the four categories. From the graph it is evident that there was a massive impact on the vegetation in the surrounding area.
Validation is essential for evaluating the accuracy of the output in representing real-world conditions (Schumann et al. 2009). As mentioned earlier, due to a lack of validation, the NDVI map generated and used in this study was validated against TCI maps derived from Copernicus satellite data, which shows real-world conditions and images. The TCI maps were obtained from the same period and covered the same area as the NDVI map, and they were produced using the same method, resulting in identical maps. The validation process of Fig. 5 consisted of comparing the NDVI map with the TCI map to verify its reliability and accuracy. The TCI maps show similarity and a consistent pattern with the NDVI result if compared.
3.7 Restoration of the Environment
The continuous oil spills and fires have defaced the environment on a large scale. The government has given instructions for environmental restoration, and OIL has made efforts by engaging its resources and hiring services from organizations of national reputation to minimize future environmental impacts while recuperating from environmental damage. Oil India Ltd. manually picks up a thin film of floating condensate oil. Sorbents were used to keep condensate oil from spreading (Final Report 2021). In addition to the District Administration, the following organizations are involved in the endeavor mentioned above, viz. M/s ERM India Pvt Limited., The Energy Research Institute (TERI), Assam Agricultural University, CSIR- North East Institute of Science and Technology, and Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Guwahati. The above organizations perform the following environmental restoration tasks (Item 1 2020).
Environmental Scanning
Spillage, Cleaning, and Bio-remediation
Picking up spilled oil manually and by a turbo pump
Assessment of Contamination of Surface Water, Ground Water, and Soil
Assessment of Impact on Biodiversity
Damage Assessment by Experts
Assessment of Vibration
Additional Efforts for the preservation of the Dibru-Saikhowa National Park
Different agencies are involved in carrying out various assessments and studies.
M/s ERM India Private Limited.: For Environmental Impact Assessment study
The Energy Research Institute (TERI): For Air and Noise quality monitoring
Assam Agricultural University: For assessment of impact on crops & tea garden etc.
CSIR- North East Institute of Science and Technology: For Geophysical studies
IIT Guwahati: For Thermal mapping and sound frequency measurement.
As per the findings of these reports, an appropriate restoration plan will be created with a long-term framework, and almost a lot has been done on this plan (Final Report 2021). The government and OIL claim to have a detailed plan for environmental restoration in their official documents. However, they do not act on their word and continue to violate ecological norms. As evidenced, bureaucratic lethargy, combined with corporate negligence and the government's blind eye to profit, has deteriorated the critical environment. According to Wildlife Institute India's reports, the environment was already fragile, and the impact of oil spills and fires has exacerbated the situation (Qureshi et al. 2020). As mentioned above, it is up to the organization to figure out how the restoration plan will bear fruit, but it will be hard to get the old situation back soon.