Removing carbon, restoring trust: public perceptions of industry and community roles in U.S. carbon dioxide removal policy

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-4438083/v1

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Removing carbon, restoring trust: public perceptions of industry and community roles in U.S. carbon dioxide removal policy

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4438083/v1

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In a nationally representative survey (N = 1,488), I examine public perceptions of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) governance, justice, moral hazard, and the role of the fossil fuel industry in transitioning towards net-negative emissions. Qualitative coding reveals cost and misplaced financial responsibility as the most common concern, followed by doubts about CDR’s effectiveness and distrust towards industry profit motives. The most frequently cited benefit was direct job creation, followed by improved air quality, and long-term climate change benefits. I find that public support for CDR policies is significantly influenced by partisan and sectoral endorsements, with environmental NGOs bolstering support overall but sometimes reducing support among Republicans. The public shows no evidence of identifying the risk of moral hazard among policymakers supportive of CDR. Strong preferences emerge for policies that hold polluting industries accountable for their CO₂ emissions, public over private ownership, and significant community engagement in CDR projects, reflecting a demand for transparent and equitable CDR governance.

Environmental Policy

carbon dioxide removal

community engagement

public ownership

moral hazard

climate policy

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is now necessary under ambitious climate action trajectories—both to balance emissions sources and sinks to achieve net-zero and, thereafter, to usher a regime of “net-negative” global emissions (IPCC, 2022; Bednar et al., 2021). Countries have thus begun to make commitments to CDR deployment – either explicit, as through policies like European Climate Law, or implicit, as in nationally determined contributions (Deprez et al., 2024; Lund et al., 2023; Jacobs et al., 2023; Bellamy, 2022; Schenuit & Geden, 2023). The U.S. has made CDR an important tenet of its climate policy (Harvey et al., 2023; Jacobs et al., 2023). In addition to Executive branch actions, the Legislature has been active in supporting domestic CDR research, development, and increasingly deployment. The passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) marked the largest government investments in CDR in the world to date (Scott-Buechler et al., 2024).

1.1. Knowledge of CDR and policy support

Despite growing government commitment to developing and deploying CDR, public awareness remains low. Preliminary evidence suggests that public opinions on CDR are still forming, primarily shaped by limited exposure and understanding, leading to what can be characterized as “shallow” opinions. Cox et al. (2020) found that only 9.6% of national survey participants self-reported knowing “a great deal” or “a fair amount” about CDR. Wolske et al. (2019), meanwhile, found that 47.6% of national survey respondents reported having never heard of CDR and 29.6% being “a little” familiar with it. Low awareness has also been found when examining specific CDR pathways. For example, Scott-Buechler et al. (2024) found that 72.44% had never heard of direct air capture (DAC). Similarly, Spence et al. (2021) found that 62% of U.S. respondents had never heard of enhanced rock weathering.

Moreover, existing research examines public attitudes towards CDR but often focuses on scenarios where individuals receive detailed, in-depth information (Wolske et al., 2019). However, members of the public are more likely to first encounter CDR through fleeting exposures via media snippets, such as headlines, tweets, or brief news segments. Such initial engagements can shape foundational attitudes and set the stage for future acceptance or resistance to CDR technologies. As CDR grows in salience among members of the public, the messenger may be as important as the message, but this aspect of CDR communication remains underexplored (Bellamy & Raimi, 2023; Scott-Buechler et al., 2024).

Indeed, the success of CDR as a climate strategy will depend not only on the research and development of innovative and efficient pathways, but also the conditions under which it is produced and reproduced (Buck, 2016; Carton, 2019; Hall & Davis, 2021). Research shows the importance of developing robust governance for CDR, with particular attention to justice dimensions (Forster et al., 2020; Morrow et al., 2020; Sovacool et al., 2023). Public engagement in CDR policy and deployment is necessary for just outcomes (Nawaz et al., 2024; Sovacool, 2023). In addition to advancing justice principles, community engagement may lead to more efficient and equitable project development. Failure to attain public acceptance at larger scales (i.e., at state or national levels) can produce negative publicity and adverse policy outcomes, and a lack of acceptance within project-adjacent communities can lead to slower and more costly deployment (Moffat et al., 2016). For example, Susskind et al. (2022) examine renewable energy projects across multiple U.S. states and find that, where conflict occurred, 34% of projects experienced significant delays and 49% were canceled. They identify seven sources of opposition, including “public perceptions of unfair participation processes.” Similarly, Sovacool and Ratan (2012) identify participatory project siting as one of nine factors key to determining acceptance and eventual success of solar and wind energy projects. However, relatively little research exists exploring what role the public sees for these principles in CDR.

1.2. Moral hazards of CDR

Research on CDR’s moral hazard effects—whereby the availability of CDR might lead to diminished efforts in reducing greenhouse gas emissions—has yielded mixed results. As Grant et al. (2021) identify, CDR has long featured in integrated assessment models to counter-balance continued emissions while minimizing costs in low-carbon scenarios. Carton (2019) refers to the phenomenon as a “spatiotemporal fix” that “promises to defer the devaluation of fixed capital” such as fossil fuel infrastructure into the future and across geographies. Further, Carton et al. (2020) trace the history of CDR in political discourses and find high-emitting countries like the U.S., Canada, and Russia pushed for the Kyoto Protocol to include “carbon sinks,” a precursor, in order to delay decarbonization in their commitments. Empirical evidence for mitigation deterrence among policymakers is lacking; among members of the public, empirical studies arrive at seemingly conflicting conclusions. Austin & Converse (2021), for example, conducted eight experiments with members of the public and found “no compelling evidence” that learning about climate engineering techniques decreased participants’ commitment to mitigation. Campbell-Arvai et al. (2017), however, found that learning about CDR as a whole, and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air capture (DAC) dampened survey-takers’ perceived threat of climate change. They found this risk compensation to be most pronounced among conservatives. While effects on individual beliefs about climate change may inform public perceptions of the efficacy and rigor of climate policy, whether the public perceives a mitigation deterrence effect of CDR policies on the societal transition to net-zero is an important and underexplored question. Certainly, if a moral hazard exists in climate policy decision-making in national and international fora, but uninformed publics do not perceive it, CDR could be more easily used as a tool for greenwashing.

1.3. Role of the fossil fuel industry in CDR

Indeed, as Bellamy (2022) identifies, an important and overlooked aspect of broader “moral hazards” concerns is the relationship between CDR and fossil fuel industry—in particular, how discussions of CDR enable or stall managed decline. The industry has made no secret of its interest in CDR. Vicki Hollub, CEO of Occidental Petroleum, publicly announced in 2023 that DAC “is going to be the technology that helps to preserve our industry over time…[t]his gives our industry a license to continue to operate for the 60, 70, 80 years that I think it’s going to be very much needed” (Dihn, 2023). A subsidiary of Occidental, 1PointFive, was recently awarded one of two grants to build a million-ton DAC facility under the Department of Energy’s DAC Hubs program (OCED, n.d). This has raised concerns among climate and environmental justice advocates, who view actions like these as attempts to greenwash its public image (Data for Progress et al., 2023)—a tactic the industry has a long history of employing to stall decarbonization efforts (Herzog-Hawelka & Gupta, 2023; Si et al., 2023). An investigation by Corporate Accountability, an industry watchdog, found that 93% of the carbon offsets Chevron claimed between 2020 and 2022 were of such low environmental integrity that they could only be classified “junk” (Jackson & Tofighi-Niaki, 2023). On the other hand, advocates of including the fossil fuel industry in CDR point to its expertise, especially where underground storage and transportation of CO₂ are concerned (Kelemen et al., 2019). No research to date has examined what the public thinks of this debate, however, and what role it might envision for the fossil fuel industry in sectors of climate action like CDR.

While knowledge and acceptance of CDR has been evaluated by other studies, I take a critical political economy approach to explore the conditions under which the public believes CDR should be produced. I fill four critical gaps in the literature on public perceptions, specifically: (1) the role of CDR messenger on sentiments toward CDR, (2) public preferences for CDR project parameters, (3) perceived moral hazard effects of CDR, and (4) potential roles for the fossil fuel industry. I combine a survey experiment with questions on conditions for CDR policy in the U.S., which I support with qualitative coding of open-ended survey responses on perceived risks and benefits of CDR.

Data were collected via a nationally representative survey fielded in February 2023 (N = 1,488). Sampling was conducted using probability-based methods via the PureSpectrum Marketplace Platform, a national web panel provider employing online ads, text messages, and in-app prompts to recruit respondents. Individuals enlisted received a link redirecting them to the Qualtrics survey. Nationally representative targeting and sampling were used across sex, race, ethnicity, education, political party, and region. Sample demographics are reported in Table 1.

My initial sample included 2,996 participants. To ensure the reliability and validity of the data, I implemented stringent screening procedures. Participants were excluded if they did not complete the survey, or failed an attention check. Given the complexity and low salience of CDR, I additionally included a simple comprehension check following a brief description to ensure participants in the final sample could accurately comprehend CDR as “strategies that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere like planting new forests and building machines that suck carbon out of the air.” This resulted in a refined cohort of 1,488 respondents.

Table 1

Summary statistics of survey population across sex, race (in which respondents were permitted to self-identify Hispanic in addition to a separate ethnicity question), level of educational attainment, and political party preference.
		Sample share (%)
Sex	Male	53.06
Sex	Female	46.94
Race	White	71.89
	Black	11.97
	Asian	5.38
	Hispanic	5.78
	American Indian/Alaska Native	2.49
	Other	2.49
Education	No high school diploma	3.03
	High school diploma	28.64
	Some college, no degree	27.30
	Associate's degree	12.78
	Bachelor's degree	18.76
	Advanced degree	9.48
Political Party Preference	Democrat	33.09
	Lean more toward Democrat	10.22
	Republican	29.12
	Lean more toward Republican	10.22
	Neither	17.35

To address the partisan sensitivity identified by Carman et al. (2022), I used both “climate change” and “extreme weather” in the questionnaire, attempting to cater to the diverse political spectrum of the sample. After asking about concern about climate change and extreme weather, the survey instrument provided respondents with an adapted explanation of anthropogenic CO₂’s contribution to global warming, inspired by Bergquist et al. (2022). This was followed by a brief description of CDR. Participants were then shown the sentence “A group of ____ lawmakers have proposed a law that would invest in technologies that remove large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere,” where the blank was randomly assigned one of three categories: “Democratic,” “Republican,” or “Bipartisan.” Participants were then asked if they would support or oppose the law. Participants’ preferences were gauged using a four-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose,” including a “don't know” option to capture uncertainty or ambivalence. If participants marked “don’t know,” they were nudged to select an option on the Likert-scale, though were again provided with the “don’t know” option. This choice of scaling, supported by Revilla et al. (2014), allowed me to measure the intensity of public sentiment towards various aspects of CDR.

Participants were then randomly assigned to a message about a group that had endorsed the law: a fossil fuel company, an environmental NGO, or a local leader in their community. They were asked if this endorsement increased or decreased their support for the law, which was again on a four-point Likert scale. Following the experimental treatments, survey-takers were asked if, were the law to pass, what they thought the effect would be on the long-term use of fossil fuels, use of renewable energy, and the amount of carbon pollution released in the U.S. Participants were provided a five-point Likert scale for this question, ranging from “greatly increase” to “greatly decrease” with a midpoint “no effect” for those who perhaps did not consider there to be a relationship between CDR and these other activities. As with other questions, “don’t know” was also offered as an option. These questions were aimed at assessing perceptions of societal moral hazard effects.

Participants were then asked a series of questions about the potential for CDR projects in their own communities. They were first asked what effect they thought CDR projects in their communities would have on the state economy, and then asked to choose the level of engagement they considered to be most appropriate for CDR projects in their community: no requirements, community consultation, community consultation and investment, community voting stakes in projects, or community ownership of projects.

Questions then turned to the role of the public and private sectors in CDR more broadly, beginning with a question about whether CDR should be publicly or privately owned. Participants were then asked what role the government should play in funding CDR, and who should ultimately own CDR projects funded fully or partially by the government (government itself, fossil fuel companies, local communities, or CDR companies). For those who believed the government should play some role in funding CDR, a follow-up question on the source of the funding was asked: raising taxes, diverting funds from other climate priorities, or taxing polluting industries.

The final closed-question section centered on the role of the fossil fuel industry in CDR. A thorough literature review was conducted to identify potential messages about the fossil fuel industry’s potential role in CDR, which were later vetted by experts to ensure content validity and representativeness. For each message, participants used a four-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly approve” to “strongly disapprove.” The four messages were as follows: 1) Bring experience: “Fossil fuel companies have experience putting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and some of this experience can be applied to take carbon dioxide back out of the atmosphere. They are a necessary partner in CDR.” 2) Untrustworthy: “Fossil fuel companies knowingly continued to pollute after their own scientists linked carbon dioxide emissions to climate change. They cannot be trusted to clean up the mess they made.” 3) Provided energy: “Fossil fuel companies have provided the energy that everyone uses, even if they contributed to climate change in the process. They should be allowed to contribute to CDR even as they continue to emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.” 4) Nationalize: “Fossil fuel companies knowingly continued to pollute after their own scientists linked carbon dioxide emissions to climate change but they also have experience that can be applied to take carbon dioxide back out of the atmosphere. They should be publicly owned so that the people can decide how or if they contribute to CDR.”

Given the ordinal nature of the Likert-scale outcome variables, I developed a proportional odds logistic regression model using concern about climate change (Goldberg et al., 2021), political party, age, education, household income, gender, location type (metropolitan, micropolitan, small town, or rural) and race as covariates. I also linked zipcodes to locations of power plants (EIA, 2023) and included fossil fuel capacity (taking into account both the number and size of plants) to represent just transition needs. Finally, when testing the effect of partisan messenger, I included interaction effects with respondents’ party affiliation. The model’s proportional odds assumptions were tested using a Brant test. For questions without Likert scale responses, including on options for government funding and ownership and community engagement mechanisms, I used a logistic regression model with the same covariates. Assumptions for the logistic regression were tested using Wald Test and variance influence factors (VIF).

Finally, I asked respondents two open-ended questions: 1) Now that you’ve learned a bit about carbon dioxide removal (CDR), before this survey ends, in a few words, what are your biggest concerns about it? 2) Now that you’ve learned a bit about carbon dioxide removal (CDR), before this survey ends, in a few words, what are the biggest opportunities you see in it?

These questions aimed at eliciting in participants’ own words their perceptions – both negative and positive – of CDR, and to provide additional context for perceptions shared through more traditional multiple-choice question formats. Open-ended survey questions allow participants the opportunity to provide more spontaneous, diverse responses (Reja et al., 2003); they can also be useful for understanding first-order thinking about a subject, and tend to elicit concerns about policies’ distributional effects, fairness, and trust in implementing actors (Ferrario & Stantcheva, 2022). Open-ended responses were qualitatively coded inductively, whereby codes were determined from the data.

3.1. Role of messenger on policy support & preferences

I began by examining the impact of partisan and sector messengers on support for a law investing in CDR (Table 2).

When the law was proposed by a group of only Republican lawmakers, as opposed to bipartisan lawmakers, overall support decreased significantly (OR = 0.42, 95% CI: 0.28–0.63). However, there was no significant effect when Democrat-only lawmakers were the messengers.

Table 2

Ordered logistic regression results for questions, a) “Do you support or oppose [a law to invest in CDR]?” (strongly oppose to strongly support, represented by signs) and b) “Does this endorsement increase or decrease your support for this law?” (strongly decrease to strongly increase, represented by arrows). Results reported in odds ratio (95% confidence interval) format. Significance of p ≤ 0.001 indicated with ‘***’, of p = 0.05 with ‘**’, and of p = 0.1 with ‘*’. If no base is specified, the covariate is numerical.
	a) Partisan Messenger	b) Sector Messenger
Intercepts	– – \| – : 0.10 (0.05–0.20)* – \| + : 0.36 (0.19–0.66) + \| + + : 6.24 (3.31–11.77)***	↓↓ \| ↓ : 0.07 (0.04–0.12)* ↓ \| 0 : 0.22 (0.12–0.40)* 0 \| ↑ : 1.66 (0.93–2.97)* ↑ \| ↑↑: 9.66 (5.34–17.45)***
Party (base: Democrat)	Republican: 0.37 (0.24–0.56)*** Independent: 0.96 (0.55–1.69)	Republican: 0.93 (0.64–1.35) Independent: 0.68 (0.41–1.10)
Partisan messenger (base: Bipartisan)	Democrat: 1.26 (0.84–1.88) Republican: 0.42 (0.28–0.63)***	Democrat: 0.94 (0.74–1.19) Republican: 0.98 (0.77–1.24)
Republican x Partisan messenger	Republican: 4.66 (2.65–8.22)*** Democrat: 0.67 (0.38–1.17)	x
Independent x Partisan messenger	Republican: 0.87 (0.40–1.88) Democrat: 0.53 (0.24–1.16)	x
Sector messenger (base: Community leader)	x	Env. NGO: 1.52 (1.06–2.17) Fossil fuel co.: 0.66 (0.46–0.94)
Republican x Sector messenger	x	Env. NGO: 0.61 (0.36–1.01)* Fossil fuel co.: 1.42 (0.84–2.39)
Independent x Sector messenger	x	Env. NGO: 1.28 (0.63–2.61) Fossil fuel co.: 0.96 (0.49–1.90)
Climate change concern	2.05 (1.81–2.33)***	1.59 (1.43–1.78)***
Sex (base: Female)	Male: 1.14 (0.91–1.42)	Male: 1.26 (1.03–1.54)**
Race/Ethnicity (base: White, non-Hispanic)	Black: 0.73 (0.51–1.05)* Hispanic: 0.81 (0.50–1.33) Asian: 0.77 (0.48–1.24)	Black: 1.10 (0.79–1.52) Hispanic: 1.14 (0.74–1.77) Asian: 1.35 (0.87–2.08)
Income	1.00 (0.92–1.09)	0.99 (0.91–1.06)
Age	1.00 (1.00–1.01)	1.00 (0.99–1.00)
Education (base: No college)	College: 0.94 (0.74–1.20) Post-college: 1.40 (0.94–2.09)	College: 0.77 (0.61–0.96)** Post-college: 1.07 (0.74–1.53)
Location Type (base: Metropolitan)	Micropolitan: 0.97 (0.68–1.40) Small town: 1.19 (0.70–2.05) Rural: 1.42 (0.76–2.68)	Micropolitan: 0.60 (0.43–0.84)** Small town: 0.89 (0.53–1.50) Rural: 1.13 (0.69–1.84)
Fossil fuel generation in zip	1.00 (1.00–1.00)	1.00 (1.00–1.00)

Republicans exhibited a strong in-party effect, wherein their odds of supporting the law was 4.66 times higher (95% CI: 2.65–8.22) when Republican lawmakers were the messengers compared to when the message came from a bipartisan group of lawmakers. In contrast, Democrats and Independents did not display any significant in-party effects.

In another question, participants were asked whether an endorsement from a specific sector messenger would increase or decrease their support for the proposed law (Table 2). Compared to an endorsement from a community leader, an endorsement from an environmental advocacy nonprofit significantly increased the odds of support (OR: 1.52, 95% CI: 1.06–2.17), while an endorsement from a prominent fossil fuel company significantly decreased the odds of support (OR: 0.66, 95% CI: 0.46–0.94). When examining the impact of sector messengers among Republicans, an endorsement from an environmental advocacy nonprofit lowered support relative to an endorsement from a community leader, with the effect approaching significance (OR: 0.61, 95% CI: 0.36–1.01). There was no statistically significant effect observed for an endorsement from a prominent fossil fuel company among Republicans. Across both experimental treatments, higher levels of concern about climate change consistently served as a strong indicator of increased support for the proposed law.

3.2. Perceived moral hazard of CDR policy

I turn to public perceptions of how carbon dioxide removal (CDR) legislation might impact the use of renewable energy technologies. The results indicate a statistically significant belief that CDR legislation would primarily increase the use of renewables, evidenced by the high odds ratio (OR = 4.12, 95% CI: 2.27–7.50, p < 0.001) for moving from “somewhat increase” to “greatly increase.” This suggests strong public optimism that CDR policies would boost renewable energy usage significantly.

Respondents with the fossil fuel endorsement treatment in the messenger experiments believed that the passage of national CDR legislation would result in decreased renewable energy use across the country, as compared with respondents in the local leader endorsement treatment group (OR: 0.71, 95% CI: 0.49–1.03, p = 0.071). Similarly, as compared with Democrats, Republicans believed that major CDR legislation would lead to decreased renewable energy use nationally (OR: 0.69, 95% CI: 0.46–1.0, p = 0.059). However, Republicans who received the fossil fuel endorsement treatment believed that renewables use would increase (OR: 1.64, 95% CI: 0.96–2.81, p = 0.070), as compared with Republicans in other treatment groups. Respondents with college degrees were more likely to believe that renewables use would increase compared with those with less than a college degree (OR: 1.28, 95% CI: 1.01–1.61, p = 0.038). Conversely, the likelihood of respondents believing that CDR legislation would decrease renewables use was notably low (OR = 0.07, 95% CI: 0.04–0.13, p < 0.001 for a transition from “greatly decrease” to “somewhat decrease”), reinforcing the notion that the general public perceives CDR initiatives as complementary to or enhancing renewable energy efforts rather than competing with them. The transitions across other categories further support this, with movement from “no effect” to “somewhat increase” being moderately probable (OR = 0.60, 95% CI: 0.33–1.09, p = 0.096), though not reaching statistical significance.

Demographic factors such as political affiliation, sector message source, and other socio-economic variables displayed mixed effects, with most showing no significant impact on perceptions regarding CDR’s influence on renewable energy usage. Notably, concern for climate change was a significant predictor of a positive outlook on the synergy between CDR legislation and renewable energy use (OR = 1.30, 95% CI: 1.16–1.46, p < 0.001), aligning with expectations that those more worried about climate issues are also more supportive of comprehensive environmental actions.

While not all intercepts were significant, analysis of public perceptions concerning the impact of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) legislation on both national carbon pollution and fossil fuel use reveals expectations that CDR initiatives will lead to a decrease in both carbon emissions and fossil fuel consumption. This finding is highlighted by the significant odds ratios indicating that respondents are far more likely to believe that CDR legislation will result in a “great decrease” rather than just a “somewhat decrease” in fossil fuel use (OR = 6.76, 95% CI: 3.68–12.41, p < 0.001) and similarly strong beliefs regarding the reduction of carbon pollution. In contrast, the likelihood of a perceived increase in carbon pollution or fossil fuel use due to CDR legislation is minimal, with odds ratios significantly favoring a decrease (OR = 0.16, 95% CI: 0.09–0.29, p < 0.001 for an increase in fossil fuel use).

Political affiliations subtly influence these perceptions; Republicans are less likely than Democrats to believe that CDR legislation will decrease fossil fuel use (OR = 0.76, 95% CI: 0.59–0.97, p = 0.026), indicating a partisan divide in beliefs about the environmental impact of such policies. However, these political differences are not accompanied by significant interactions between party affiliation and messages from different sectors (environmental NGOs or fossil fuel companies), suggesting that the fundamental beliefs about CDR impacts are robust across different communication sources. Moreover, demographic factors such as age, gender, race, and education show minimal influence on these perceptions, with age being the only demographic factor showing a slight but statistically significant trend towards greater concern over time about fossil fuel use (OR = 1.01, 95% CI: 1.01–1.02, p < 0.001). This might reflect a growing awareness and concern among older populations about sustainability issues as they evolve.

Overall, these findings indicate a strong public consensus on the positive environmental impact of CDR legislation, marked by a broad expectation that such policies will significantly decrease both carbon pollution and fossil fuel consumption. This consensus suggests a potential avenue for policy makers to frame CDR initiatives within the context of broader environmental and energy sustainability strategies, potentially enhancing public and political support for such measures. The limited explanatory power of the models (Nagelkerke R² values of 0.073 and 0.063), however, underscores the complexity of public opinions on CDR impacts, suggesting that other unexplored factors may also play crucial roles in shaping these perceptions.

3.3. Perceptions of project parameters

I then assessed preferences for prospective local projects. When asked about the level of input their community should have in local CDR project decision making, a large majority of respondents (89%) indicated that developers should at least consult with their community, while only 11% believed there should not be any requirements for community involvement (Fig. 1). While more respondents believed that communities should be consulted and/or invested in by project developers, 40% of all respondents believed that communities should either have voting stakes in projects or even own them outright (Fig. 1). This suggests a strong public preference for community involvement in CDR decision making, and points to needs for community co- and full ownership. When considering the potential economic impact of CDR projects, more than half of respondents (59%) believed that CDR implementation would improve (either greatly or slightly) economic conditions in their state, while only 16% thought it would lead to worsening conditions (Fig. 2). However, a sizable proportion (12%) indicated they were unsure about the economic implications (Fig. 2).

When asked if they thought CDR should be publicly or privately owned and operated, 40% of respondents opted for public ownership, 19% for private ownership, and 40% indicated they hadn’t heard enough to say. This suggests that while the public has yet to form stable beliefs about CDR, public ownership may resonate more immediately. Using the covariates listed in Table 2 (except the messenger treatments, as projects were not framed as the result of the policy; these covariates were tested in the model and found not to be significant), the logistic regression model (Intercept Odds Ratio: 5.43, 95% CI: 1.91–15.45, p = 0.001) indicated that, of those who stated a preference, Republicans were significantly less likely than Democrats to support public ownership (OR: 0.20, 95% CI: 0.08–0.50, p < 0.001), as were men compared with women (OR: 0.61, 95% CI: 0.45–0.84, p = 0.003), and Hispanic (OR: 0.44, 95% CI: 0.24–0.81, p = 0.010) and Black respondents (OR: 0.60, 95% CI: 0.37–0.97, p = 0.040) compared with white respondents. Finally, those with college-level education (OR: 0.63, CI 95%: 0.45–0.90, p = 0.011) or greater (OR: 0.38, 95% CI: 0.22–0.64, p < 0.001) were less likely than those without a college degree. I also tested the interaction between concern about climate change and partisan identification in this model, finding no significant effect for Independents but a positive effect for Republicans (OR: 1.42, 95% CI: 0.95–2.10, p = 0.083).

Examining public opinion on the extent to which the government should pay for carbon dioxide removal, ordinal logistic regression revealed significant predictors influencing public preferences. Notably, the odds of preferring “None” of the costs compared to “Some” were significantly lower, with an odds ratio (OR) of 0.13 (95% CI: 0.08–0.21, p < 0.001), indicating a strong inclination against the government not contributing to these costs. Conversely, the transition from preferring “Some” payment to “All” payment by the government was more favorable, with an OR of 1.83 (95% CI: 1.13–2.97, p = 0.014), suggesting a moderate preference for complete government funding. Political affiliation did not significantly affect these preferences, with Independents showing an OR of 0.88 (95% CI: 0.67–1.15, p = 0.338) and Republicans an OR of 0.99 (95% CI: 0.79–1.25, p = 0.952), both compared to Democrats. Similarly, views were not significantly influenced by gender or several other demographic factors such as income and most racial categories, except for Black or African American respondents who were more likely to favor greater government involvement with an OR of 1.65 (95% CI: 1.22–2.24, p = 0.001). Belief in climate change emerged as a strong predictor of support for government funding, with an OR of 1.56 (95% CI: 1.41–1.73, p < 0.001), underscoring that increased concern or acknowledgment of climate issues correlates with support for governmental financial involvement. Age was inversely related to the preference for government payment, with a minimal yet statistically significant decrease in preference with increasing age (OR = 0.99, 95% CI: 0.99–1.00, p = 0.001).

Respondents who believed the government should play a role in funding CDR were then asked how these funds should be raised. Table 3 presents multinomial regression results that delineate public opinion on government strategies for funding carbon dioxide removal, specifically contrasting preferences for taxing industries versus the public. The intercepts for both industry and public models show substantial odds, suggesting a strong baseline preference against not funding these initiatives at all.

Republicans, compared to Democrats, show significantly decreased support for both industry (OR: 0.27, 95% CI: 0.10–0.68, p = 0.01) and public taxation strategies (OR: 0.07, 95% CI: 0.02–0.24, p < 0.001). Independents also tend towards lower support, though not significantly in all cases. Concern for climate change increased the likelihood of favoring industry taxation (OR: 1.90, 95% CI: 1.24–2.91, p = 0.01) but does not significantly impact public taxation preferences. Interactions between party affiliation and climate change concern revealed no significant interaction effect on industry taxation preference among Republicans, but a suggestive trend towards increasing support for public taxation strategies with growing climate change concern (OR: 1.94, 95% CI: 0.98–3.83, p = 0.06). This indicates that even among Republicans, those more concerned about climate change are somewhat more open to supporting government intervention through public taxation.

Table 3

Multinomial regression results for the question “Which of the following comes closest to how you think the government should pay for carbon dioxide removal?” a) “tax polluting industries according to how much carbon dioxide they are currently emitting,” “tax polluting industries a certain percentage of the total amount of carbon dioxide they have ever emitted,” “tax polluting industries according to the total amount of carbon dioxide they have ever emitted” b) “tax the public,” “tax only the wealthiest members of the public.” Base option is not to fund at all. Results reported in odds ratio (95% confidence interval) format. Significance of p ≤ 0.001 indicated with ‘***’, of p = 0.05 with ‘**’, and of p = 0.1 with ‘*’. If no base is specified, the covariate is numerical.
	a) Industry	b) Public
Intercepts	13.23 (4.20–41.70)***	13.56 (3.59–51.28)***
Party (base: Democrat)	Republican: 0.27 (0.10–0.68)** Independent: 0.60 (0.19–1.94)	Republican: 0.07 (0.02–0.24)*** Independent: 0.31 (0.08–1.21)*
Climate change concern	1.90 (1.24–2.91)**	1.24 (0.78–1.98)
Party x Climate change concern	Republican: 1.23 (0.69–2.20) Independent: 0.92 (0.45–1.89)	Republican: 1.94 (0.98–3.83)* Independent: 1.32 (0.60–2.90)
Sex (base: Female)	Male: 1.134 (0.59–2.21)	Male: 1.07 (0.51–2.25)
Race/Ethnicity (base: White, non-Hispanic)	Black: 0.81 (0.26–2.53) Hispanic: 0.48 (0.12–1.85) Asian: 0.76 (0.16–3.62)	Black: 0.58 (0.16–2.06) Hispanic: 0.78 (0.18–3.36) Asian: 0.65 (0.12–3.65)
Income	1.03 (0.80–1.32)	0.94 (0.71–1.25)
Age	1.00 (0.98–1.02)	0.99 (0.97–1.01)
Education (base: No college)	College: 2.37 (0.92–6.05)* Post-college: 0.37 (0.14–0.97)**	College: 2.24 (0.81–6.18) Post-college: 0.37 (0.11–1.22)
Location Type (base: Metropolitan)	Micropolitan: 0.52 (0.21–1.31) Small town: 1.05 (0.22–4.91) Rural: 0.70 (0.19–2.58)	Micropolitan: 0.47 (0.16–1.39) Small town: 1.66 (0.31–9.00) Rural: 0.14 (0.01–1.51)
Fossil fuel generation in zip	1.00 (1.00–1.00)*	1.00 (1.00–1.00)

Demographic factors such as race, sex, and location type show no substantial influence on the preference patterns, suggesting that opinions on this issue cut across these lines more evenly than might be expected. Education emerges as a notable predictor, with individuals having a college education showing a potential inclination towards industry-based funding solutions, though these results were not consistently significant across the models. Finally, the negligible influence of local fossil fuel generation on preferences (OR: 1.00, p around 0.05 for both models) suggests that local economic dependence on fossil fuels does not sway public opinion on funding strategies for carbon dioxide removal. This points to a broader consensus that may be driven more by overarching political and environmental concerns rather than local economic conditions.

Among respondents who favored government funding for CDR, opinions on the ownership of these projects varied, reflecting diverse perspectives on the most effective management and control strategies. A significant proportion, one-third of respondents (33%), believed that CDR projects should remain under the ownership of CDR companies, suggesting a trust in the expertise and operational capabilities of private enterprises in managing these initiatives. Similarly, another 33% advocated for ownership by host communities, indicating a strong preference for local control and the potential benefits of local stewardship, such as increased accountability and direct community benefits. Both themes emerged in qualitative research reported in Scott-Buechler et al. (2024) on direct air capture.

A smaller segment, 18%, felt that the government should own these projects. This group likely views governmental ownership as means to ensure that the projects adhere to public welfare goals and are managed in the public interest, rather than for private profit. Finally, the smallest portion of respondents (16%) believed that fossil fuel companies should own the CDR projects, possibly reflecting a perspective that those who contribute most significantly to carbon emissions should have a direct role in remediation efforts. The role of the fossil fuel industry in CDR is discussed in the following section.

3.4. Perceptions of the appropriate role for the fossil fuel industry in CDR

Using the same ordinal logistic regression parameters, I explored public responses to narratives surrounding the fossil fuel industry’s role in CDR (Fig. 3). The models testing the proposition for fossil fuel companies’ participation in CDR given their historic role in providing energy (“should be allowed to contribute to CDR even as they continue to emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere”) and the proposition to nationalize the fossil fuel industry (“should be publicly owned so that the people can decide how or if they contribute to CDR”) were significant for all intercepts (Strongly disapprove|Somewhat disapprove, Somewhat disapprove|Somewhat approve, Somewhat approve|Strongly approve). The first, shorthanded to “provided energy,” saw significantly higher support among Republicans than Democrats (OR: 1.65, 95% CI: 1.27–2.15, p < 0.001), aligning with research demonstrating that Republicans favor the industry (Coley & Hess, 2012; Howes & Nowlin, 2022). Men were more likely than women (OR: 1.53, 95% CI: 1.23–1.91, p < 0.001) and asian respondents more likely than white respondents (OR: 1.61, 95% CI: 1.02–2.55, p = 0.043) to support the notion that fossil fuel companies had provided energy for everyone and should be able to contribute to CDR.

The nationalization option garnered considerable support, with an increased likelihood of strong approval from somewhat approve (OR = 4.20, CI: 2.31–7.63). Concern about climate change was significantly and positively correlated with support for putting fossil fuel companies under public control (OR = 1.54, 95% CI: 1.36–1.75, p < 0.001). One of the primary proposals for this is to nationalize the industry (Green & Robeyns, 2022; Gunderson & Fyock, 2022), though this could also be effected in other ways (i.e. state-level control). Support decreased as income increased (OR: 0.91, 95% CI: 0.83–0.99, p = 0.022, suggesting private sector preferences among wealthier people.

While not significant between moderate views (Somewhat disapprove | Somewhat approve), the message positioning fossil fuel companies’ experience as useful for CDR (“are a necessary partner in CDR.”) showed significant transitions in attitude at the extremes of the approval spectrum. Strong opposition to moderate disapproval showed a substantial decrease in likelihood (OR = 0.21, CI: 0.11–0.39), whereas the transition from moderate approval to strong approval showed a marked increase (OR = 8.86, CI: 4.81–16.34), indicating polarized views on the utility of industry experience in CDR. The increase in support was particularly noticeable among Republicans (OR = 1.44, CI: 1.09–1.89) and with rising concern about climate change (OR = 1.18, CI: 1.05–1.34). The untrustworthiness narrative (“cannot be trusted to clean up the mess they made”) also showed significant results at the extremes, with significant likelihoods of selecting “strongly disapprove” over “somewhat disapprove” (OR = 0.25, CI: 0.14–0.45) and “somewhat approve” to “strongly approve” (OR = 8.12, CI: 4.53–14.56). This highlights polarized opinions on the trustworthiness of the industry, leaning towards distrust. In keeping with Republican support for fossil fuels, the perspective that the industry was untrustworthy saw a decrease in Republican support (OR = 0.73, CI: 0.56–0.95). As concern about climate change increased, the perception that the industry was not to be trusted also increased (OR = 1.94, CI: 1.72–2.20).

3.5. Perceived risks & benefits of CDR

The open-ended section at the end of the survey allowed respondents to discuss perceived benefits and risks or drawbacks of CDR. Among the top concerns, the most frequently cited was the cost and misplaced financial responsibility (especially that the public would have to foot the bill for an industrial waste problem), highlighted by 244 respondents. This concern underscores the apprehension about who bears the financial burden of CDR initiatives and the efficiency of funding allocation. Closely related to this was the fear of tax increases, mentioned by 78 respondents, reflecting anxiety over potential economic implications for the public. Another significant worry, cited by 144 participants, was the effectiveness of CDR itself, with doubts about its capability to adequately address the scale of carbon emissions. Additionally, 93 individuals expressed distrust towards the profit motives of industries involved in CDR, suspecting that commercial interests might override environmental priorities. Concerns about the direct effects of CDR on the atmosphere were also noted by 78 respondents, indicating apprehension regarding unintended environmental consequences.

The foremost benefit perceived for CDR was direct job creation, which was mentioned by 250 respondents, suggesting that CDR is seen as a catalyst for economic growth and employment opportunities. Close behind, cleaner air was highlighted by 242 respondents, which suggests – as other research has shown – that the public has difficulty differentiating gasses that cause climate change from those that cause more visible forms of pollution, such as sulfur oxides or particulate matter (Scott-Buechler et al., 2024). Indeed, many participants tied “cleaner air” to health benefits anticipated from reduced atmospheric CO₂ levels. Furthermore, broader environmental and climate benefits were acknowledged, with 208 and 128 mentions respectively. Lastly, concern for future generations, noted by 93 respondents, revealed a desire among some participants to see future benefits that they themselves may not experience.

The results of the nationally representative survey provide important insights on public preferences for how carbon dioxide removal (CDR) should be deployed in the United States. I find strong support for policies that hold polluting industries accountable for their emissions, both historic and ongoing, through mechanisms like the carbon takeback obligation (CTBO) and other polluter pays principle (PPP) based policies. This is evidenced by the significant public support for taxing industries to fund CDR according to their current or cumulative emissions. Moreover, survey results reveal an overwhelming public demand for community engagement in CDR decision-making processes. Nearly 90% of respondents believe that CDR developers should, at a minimum, consult with host communities, while 40% go further, advocating for communities to have voting stakes in or outright ownership of CDR projects. This underscores the need for robust community engagement requirements in early-stage CDR programs, such as the Department of Energy’s DAC Hubs initiative, which aims to establish regional direct air capture facilities. Public sector responses to the program’s Notice of Intent emphasized the critical importance of incorporating procedural and restorative justice principles in the siting and development of these Hubs. These findings lend strong support to these calls for community-centered approaches to CDR deployment.

My findings also underscore the importance of ensuring that CDR deployment delivers tangible benefits to host communities. While survey results highlight the public’s strong preference for community engagement in CDR decision-making processes, it is crucial to recognize that meaningful community input must be accompanied by material outputs that improve residents' quality of life. As Fig. 1 illustrates, a significant portion of respondents believe that communities should have voting stakes in or outright ownership of CDR projects. This suggests that the public values not only procedural justice but also the equitable distribution of benefits arising from CDR deployment. Policymakers and project developers should therefore prioritize mechanisms that channel resources back into host communities, such as revenue-sharing agreements, local infrastructure investments, and community benefit funds. These material benefits could support critical public goods like parks, schools, and sewers, as well as help diversify local economies and create long-term prosperity. By tying community input to concrete outcomes, CDR projects can foster stronger bonds with residents and build durable public support for carbon removal efforts.

Interestingly, survey results also indicate that public ownership of CDR infrastructure may resonate more immediately with the American public compared to private ownership. 40% of respondents favored public ownership, while only 19% preferred private ownership. This aligns with critical political economy scholarship on CDR, which has cautioned that an overemphasis on private sector leadership could exacerbate existing inequities and potentially lock in continued fossil fuel use (Malm & Carton, 2021; Asayama, 2021; Parson & Buck, 2020). Public ownership, on the other hand, could help democratize the scale-up of CDR technologies and ensure that they contribute to a just transition away from fossil fuels (Scott-Buechler et al., 2024). Policy makers should take note of this public preference and consider how public ownership models could be incorporated into CDR deployment strategies.

Future research should further explore the specific policy instruments and benefit-sharing models that can most effectively deliver material gains to communities hosting CDR facilities. This could include comparative case studies of successful community-industry partnerships in analogous sectors, such as renewable energy or sustainable forestry. By centering both procedural and distributive justice in CDR deployment strategies, policymakers can ensure that carbon removal not only contributes to climate mitigation but also advances equitable and inclusive development at the local level.

As CDR continues to grow in prominence as part of the national climate strategy, it is essential that policymakers take into account public preferences on justice and equity in CDR deployment. My research provides a strong foundation for understanding these preferences, but future studies should delve deeper, especially into the specific conditions under which CDR projects can deliver equitable outcomes for workers and communities. Additionally, more research is needed to examine how public engagement with CDR policy preferences translates into political behavior and activism. CDR’s complex political landscape is further highlighted by tension between visions for the sector by the environmental community and the fossil fuel industry. Environmentalists worry that CDR could create a moral hazard by enabling the partial decarbonization of fossil fuels, thereby prolonging their use and delaying the transition to clean energy. The fossil fuel community, however, faces the risk that CDR might enable more renewables (as was perceived to be the case by survey participants) in the long run and implicitly admit the need for decarbonization—a concern reflected in the strong skepticism among Republicans found in the survey. This unique dynamic positions CDR as facing potential opposition from both ends of the political spectrum, unlike more conventional policy issues such as immigration or spending.

Another notable finding from the survey is the lack of significant effects in most of the moral hazard models, which suggests that the public may not be immediately recognizing the potential unintended consequences of CDR deployment. Effects of CDR legislation on both carbon pollution and fossil fuel consumption were insignificant, perhaps indicating an absence of widespread concern about or recognition of potential moral hazard effects. This raises important questions about public accountability. If policymakers are more attuned to the potential for CDR to create perverse incentives or delay necessary emissions reductions, but the public remains largely unaware of these risks, there may be a disconnect between policy decisions and public preferences. This could allow CDR deployment to proceed without adequate safeguards or oversight, as policymakers face less pressure from constituents to address moral hazard concerns. Research is necessary to understand what moral hazard effects – if any – CDR has on policymakers like legislators. It may be that public education is necessary to raise awareness about the potential unintended consequences of CDR to enable public scrutiny and accountability. If this is the case, research should explore effective communication strategies for engaging the public on moral hazard concerns and other complex dimensions of CDR policy.

This work reveals a public that, while still unsure of what CDR is (Cox et al., 2020; Wolske et al., 2019), has preferences for how CDR should be deployed in the U.S., with an emphasis on industry accountability, community engagement, and public ownership. This may be especially true of an industry like CDR, which could be conceptualized as an industrial waste problem (Buck et al., 2020). These preferences may also be responding to the novelty of CDR and, as qualitative research has shown, to a recognition that climate change is a global problem with local solutions (and thus burdens). Future research is necessary to assess public and community ownership structures and policy structuring mechanisms for effective industry accountability. Where much of the CDR scholarship has focused expressly on private sector-led and public sector-funded, I show there is need for more research on public sector-led and private-sector funded pathways for CDR that center equity and justice at multiple scales.

Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Stanford University Institutional Review Board.

All participants were adults (at least 18 years old) and signed waivers of informed consent prior to participating in the study.

Data availability

Replication code is available through the Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FHYQ6E). Data available upon request.

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The authors declare no competing interests.

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Removing carbon, restoring trust: public perceptions of industry and community roles in U.S. carbon dioxide removal policy

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Abstract

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1. Introduction

1.1. Knowledge of CDR and policy support

1.2. Moral hazards of CDR

1.3. Role of the fossil fuel industry in CDR

2. Methods

3. Results

3.1. Role of messenger on policy support & preferences

3.2. Perceived moral hazard of CDR policy

3.3. Perceptions of project parameters

3.4. Perceptions of the appropriate role for the fossil fuel industry in CDR

3.5. Perceived risks & benefits of CDR

4. Conclusion and Policy Implications

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Data availability

References

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