Feasibility of CO2 Pipeline Construction to Enable Gigaton-Scale Carbon Dioxide Removals: Evidence from historical precedent

doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-4701818/v1

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Feasibility of CO2 Pipeline Construction to Enable Gigaton-Scale Carbon Dioxide Removals: Evidence from historical precedent

https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4701818/v1

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We assess the feasibility of a rapid CO2 pipeline buildout using historical evidence from oil and gas pipelines. We answer four questions: 1) What length of pipeline network will be required to achieve the benchmarks of 1 GT or 100 Mt of CO₂ in 2050? 2) What have been the fastest national oil and gas pipeline buildouts achieved in a 25-year period ? 3) Are the pipeline requirements for gigaton-scale CO₂ removals feasible given these historical precedents, and 4) Under what political, economic, and social circumstances have rapid pipeline buildouts occurred? Modelling studies projecting 100 Mt of CO₂ transportation and sequestration capacity by 2050 suggest rates of pipeline construction that are precedented in 18 national 25 year build-outs during the twentieth and twenty-fist centuries. For 1 Gt, only two 25-year national pipeline build-outs (both in the USA) achieve the rate of pipeline construction that the modelling studies suggest would be required, only three 25-year periods of global pipeline construction meet the benchmark. Rapid construction of fossil fuel pipelines has benefited from strong economic and institutional drivers, which may not apply to CO₂ pipelines in the same way. Our findings are reason for caution about the likelihood of CO₂ pipeline buildouts keeping pace with CO₂ removal targets.

CO2 pipelines

Carbon dioxide removal

Carbon capture and storage

Fossil fuels

Politics of infrastructure

Economics of infrastructure

Large-scale carbon dioxide removal is likely to be an important part of international efforts to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. Several technologies for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere already exist at various stages of development. Of these, biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), and direct air capture (DAC) are among the most advanced. These technologies both have the advantage of producing a pure stream of CO₂, which can then be measured, pumped underground, and permanently sequestered (Smith et al., 2023). DAC has the advantage of relatively low land requirements, while BECCS provides electricity. However, both technologies require suitable underground storage sites pipelines to connect those sites with the sites of carbon capture, which might be located some distance from the nearest DAC or BECCS facilities (Larson et al., 2021; Wilcox et al., 2021; Zahasky and Krevor, 2020; Zhang et al., 2015). The large scale of the pipeline networks required, and the urgent timeline on which they would have to be built, raises questions of feasibility. Is it feasible (i.e., "doable given realistic assumptions" (Jewell and Cherp, 2023) to upscale these carbon capture technologies at a fast enough rate to sequester gigatons of carbon in time to meet climate objectives, such as in the Paris Agreement?

Carbon dioxide can be transported by truck, rail, ship, or pipeline. In practise, it is only the latter two of these which show promise for large-scale long-distance transportation of captured carbon (although trucking and rail may have a last-mile or first mile function in some cases). Most techno-economic analyses point to a major role for pipelines, although shipping could also take advantage of greater flexibility in source-sink matching, and may be particularly valuable in Europe (Al Baroudi et al., 2021; Pitt-Ridge et al., 2023).

The importance of CO₂ pipeline networks to this strategy of carbon sequestration implies that it is critical to determine the feasible rate at they might be built in the future. This will be shaped not only by technical and economic factors, but also by political, cultural, and societal constraints, including social opposition to CO₂ pipelines which is already emerging (Splitter, 2022). The history of oil and gas pipelines provides a living laboratory for the development of this kind of infrastructure in the real world (Grubler, 2012).

Discussions of carbon dioxide removal often talk about “gigaton scale” as a critical benchmark. Achieving gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals would put the global carbon removal industry within two orders of magnitude of humanity’s total global carbon emissions (Smith et al., 2023); and close to the total emissions from “hard-to-abate” sectors such as aviation and steel-making.

We use the history of oil and gas pipeline construction to answer four questions, centered around these two benchmarks:

How big will future CO₂ pipeline networks have to be to meet climate targets?
What are the fastest national build-outs of oil and gas pipelines that have been achieved in the historical record?
Is a pipeline build-out enabling the transportation and sequestration of CO₂ on the scale of gigatons feasible in light of historical precedents?
Under what social, economic, and political conditions have rapid pipeline build-outs been achieved, and to what extent might we expect these conditions to apply to the future construction of CO₂ pipeline networks?

These questions have relevance to two related but separate aspects of the climate change problem: Point-source carbon capture, from industrial or power generation facilities, such as coal power stations and steel mills (typically referred to using the acronym CCS); and large-scale carbon dioxide removals (CDR) using DAC and BEECS. These two sources of carbon to sequester will place different constraints on pipeline networks. Our research focuses on pipelines for CDR, but may also have relevance for the feasible build-out rate of CCS pipeline networks. In practise, both of these technologies will likely share some of the same pipeline networks.

Section 2 conducts a literature review, discussing the general state of CO₂ pipelines worldwide, and the existing literature forecasting pipeline requirements for various future carbon sequestration systems. Section 3 presents a methodology for answering the three questions listed above. Section summarizes our findings, answering the four questions listed above. Section 5 concludes with larger implications for carbon dioxide removal.

2.1 Historical and Present-Day CO₂ Pipelines

Carbon dioxide pipelines are not a new technology. Since the 1970s, CO₂ pipelines in the United States have transported CO₂ (mostly from natural underground reservoirs) to oil wells, where it is injected to help maintain wellhead pressure and thus improve oil recovery rates, in a process known as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) (Wallace et al., 2015). Other countries, including Canada, Australia, Norway, and China have begun their own CO₂ pipeline projects in recent decades (Fig. 1). Separately, several early carbon dioxide removal pilot projects have begun transporting CO₂ to injection sites—mostly in small quantities, by truck (Climeworks, 2021; Hill et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2021). Only one carbon dioxide removal project—the Arkalon Ethanol plant in North Dakota—uses a pipeline to transport carbon dioxide captured from the atmosphere. The majority of carbon dioxide currently transported comes from natural sources, and is injected at EOR sites rather than dedicated storage facilities (Fig. 2).

Carbon dioxide pipelines are broadly similar to oil and gas pipelines, albeit with a few specific engineering challenges. First: CO₂ can be transported in different phases (gas, liquid, supercritical) depending on economic considerations. What must be avoided, however, is phase changes in the line, due to changes in the flow (and thus pressure) of CO₂, or in the ambient temperature (Peletiri et al., 2018). Second: To be safely transported, CO₂ must be exceptionally pure. Any water contamination, in particular, can form carbonic acid, which is corrosive. Carbon dioxide is also a friction agent, which poses challenges for using motorized “pigs” to inspect the inside of pipelines (Noothout et al., 2014). And if a CO₂ pipeline ruptures, it can pose unique hazards, due to CO₂’s toxicity and tendency to settle into depressions and displace oxygen. A leak from a CO₂ pipeline in Mississipppi in 2020 forced the evacuation of 200 people and hospitalized 45 with life-threatening respiratory issues (Simon, 2023).

2.2 Estimating CO₂ Pipelines needed for Carbon Dioxide Removal

To assess the feasibility of building CO₂ pipeline networks adequate to carry all the carbon we might capture from the atmosphere in the future, it is necessary to determine the size of pipeline networks that would actually be needed to reach different levels of carbon removals. This is highly location-dependent. The number of carbon dioxide removal facilities, the number of injection points, and their distances from each other depend on the geographic, economic, and societal considerations.

The easiest way around this problem is to use existing detailed scenarios of future pipeline requirements for carbon dioxide removal, and compare these directly with historical precedents. This literature is relatively thin, but there are a few useful estimates. Larson et al (2021) propose a future scenario describing the construction of a CO₂ pipeline network from 2025 to 2050. Larson et al’s most CO₂ transportation-intensive scenario (which they term E + B-) uses 111,000 km of pipeline to transport 1.36 Gt of CO₂ annually by 2050. Building on this network, Pitt-Ridge et al (2023) developed their own scenario for carbon dioxide removal in the United States. They propose that the same network could be used to capture 700 MtCO₂ per year, most of which would come from BECCS. A European Commission Joint Research Centre (2024) conducts a similar scenario forecasting exercise for future European CO₂ pipelines, to carry carbon dioxide from both point-source CDR and CCS.

3.1 Pipelines required per Mt CO₂ sequestration capacity

As discussed above, there are a handful of studies considering pipeline requirements for various CDR scenarios. To estimate the length of pipeline network required for carbon removal scenarios, we took their time series of projected future pipeline construction, to compare directly with past evidence from pipeline construction in the oil and gas industries (see sections 3.2 and 3.3).

3.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

To develop a database of global pipeline construction by country, we used the Global Energy Monitor (GEM) database (Global Energy Monitor, 2023a, 2023b) as the starting point for a web-scraping process, which added additional information from GEM’s wiki about each individual pipeline they document. This was supplemented by manual web-based research to fill in important gaps regarding the lengths or construction years of particular pipelines for which the GEM database lacks the information. In some cases (all of which are noted in our supplementary data), estimation was required. Countries with a high proportion of poorly-documented pipelines were excluded from further analysis. Unfortunately, this forced us to leave important countries, including Germany and much of the Middle East, out of our analysis.

Next, we calculated the total length of oil and gas pipelines that was added in each country, during each 25-year period from 1904 (where the data starts) to the present day. So, for example, we calculated the total additional oil pipeline built by the USA from 1904–1929; from 1905–1930, 1906–1931, etc. We repeated this for every country, and for natural gas. We then identified the most rapid national 25-year build-outs from across this time series. We chose 25 years because it matches the time from present (2025) to the benchmark year of 2050 used in many studies on carbon dioxide removal, and on pipeline construction (Larson et al., 2021; Pitt-Ridge et al., 2023).

3.3 Determining feasible CO₂ transportation capacity using historical pipeline construction data

First, we identified the fastest historical oil or gas pipeline buildouts, and compared the time series data for these directly with the time series data provided by the CDR pipeline scenarios from the literature discussed above. This gives a simple picture of how plausible these scenarios are, in light of the most relevant historical evidence.

Second, we multiplied the total new pipeline constructed in 25 years, during each hstorical buildout, by the estimates of pipeline requirement per CDR capacity discussed above. This enabled us to produce a range of estimates for how much CO₂ sequestration capacity each past pipeline build-out would have provided, if CO₂ pipelines had been built instead of oil and gas pipelines. We then counted how many of these past build-outs would be compatible with a 100 Mt and 1 Gt capacity threshold, based on this logic.

3.4 Determining enablers and constraints of rapid pipeline construction

We identified six countries for deeper, qualitative study to identify key enablers and constraints of rapid pipeline construction. Four of these (the USA, China, Russia, and Canada) correspond to countries in which the top-five fastest historical pipeline buildouts have occurred. The other two (the United Kingdom and Nigeria) have been added for geographic diversity: To include countries which have had their own notable pipeline construction projects, but which take place in different social, economic, and political contexts than the first four countries: A wealthy European country with a relatively small territory and large offshore fossil fuel reserves; and a petroleum-exporting country in the Global South.

We read secondary historical texts on the history of each of the six countries selected, compiling key events into a timeline. Events in this timeline were categorized according to Steg et al’s (2022) typology of the dimensions of feasibility (technological, geophysical, economic, institutional, sociocultural, and ecological), and according to whether each factor was an enabler or constraint of rapid pipeline construction. Different events occurring in different countries were amalgamated into common patterns (so for example, growing American industrial use of natural gas and growing foreign demand for Soviet oil and gas after the 1970s oil crisis, were both categorized as “new demand” – an economic enabler). These were then used to develop a generalized list of the kinds of enablers and constraints affecting the rapid development of pipeline networks across different national contexts. By looking at these kinds of enablers and constraints in line with the quantitative data on pipeline construction for each country, we were also able to identify which of these factors were particularly important in enabling or constraining pipeline construction. Finally, we assessed these factors to determine their relevance for CO₂ pipelines carrying carbon dioxide from CDR operations. This qualitative analysis can be reviewed in detail in our supplementary data.

4.1 Pipeline network requirements for CO₂ removal

Larson et al (2021), Pitt-Ridge et al (2023), and Tumara et al (2024) all present scenarios for future CO₂ pipeline networks which would at least partly be devoted to transporting carbon dioxide captured directly from the atmosphere (Fig. 3). Of the three, only Larson et al (2021) propose a network capable of capturing 1 Gt of CO₂, although the other two suggest networks that could capture multiple hundreds of megatons. Larson et al (2021) and Tumara et al (2024) also suggest relatively rapid construction, with capacity reaching into the tens of megatons by 2030. Pitt-Ridge et al (2023) do not suggest anything about build-out rates, other than that it is possible to reach 700 Mt by 2050, with a network smaller than that presented in Larson et al’s (2021) scenario.

Taken together, these sources roughly agree on the length of pipeline network required for large-scale CO₂ sequestration. Achieving sequestration capacities in the hundreds of megatons requires pipeline network lengths in the tens of thousands of kilometers, while the only scenario enabling one gigaton (Larson et al., 2021) requires a pipeline network with a length in the hundreds of thousands of kilometers. Larson et al (2021) projects such a network being built in the USA over the course of 25 years, from the current status quo of just under 10,000 km of CO₂ pipelines. Tumara et al (2024) project a similar timeline, with their most ambitious scenario projecting 19000 km of pipeline built between 2025 and 2050. Pitt-Ridge et al (2023) provide just a single data point, using Larson et al’s (2021) 2030 network of 27500 km of pipelines to project sequestration capacity of 700 Mt from DAC and BECCS.

These scenarios are too regionally-specific to generalize a single rate or ratio of pipeline construction required per MtCO₂. However, we can use them for a rough benchmarking of how much pipeline might be required at a minimum for different levels of carbon removals. The smallest size of pipeline network enabling more than 100 Mt of CO₂ sequestration is Tumara et al’s (2024) 2040-D2 scenario, in which 113.7 Mt of CO₂ would be accomplished with 8700 km of pipelines. Therefore, we can use 8000 km as a rough benchmark for a pipeline network enabling 100 Mt of CO₂ sequestration (reduced to one significant figure to avoid suggesting higher precision than we can reasonably claim). This fits well with the status quo for CO₂ transportation in the USA, where currently 8500 km of pipelines transport 80 Mt of CO₂ annually. For 1 Gt, Larson et al’s (2021) projection of 1361 Mt capacity with 111,000 km of pipelines is the only benchmark available. Therefore, we can suggest 100,000 km of pipelines as a rough benchmark for Gt scale removals.

4.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

Of the countries for which we have obtained reliable data, there are 20 examples of historical pipeline build-outs of more than 7,000 km of oil and gas pipelines in a 25-year period (Table 1); These occurred in ten countries: the USA, Russia, China, Canada, India, Mexico, the UK, Argentina, and Australia—all of which are countries with large land areas and either large energy demand, a large energy supply for export, or both. Of these, just two periods of pipeline construction—both of which concern natural gas pipeline construction in the United States—meet the 70,000 km benchmark that would be required to support 1 Gt of removals in a single country. Using the benchmark of 8,000 km of pipeline to support 100 Mt of CO₂ sequestration capacity, we can identify 18 historical pipeline buildouts that reach this level, most of which occurred in large countries that are either major producers of fossil fuels (Russia, Canada, Australia); major consumers of fossil fuels (China, India), or both (USA). Internationally, there have been four historical periods of pipeline construction exceeding 100,000 km, occurring in the most recent 25 years for both oil and gas; during the late 20th century natural gas boom; and for oil pipelines during and after the Second World War. Three more 25-year construction periods exceed 8,000 km, implying that for most of the 20th century, oil and gas pipeline construction rates (taken separately) were fast enough to meet the rate of pipeline construction that might be required for hundreds of megatons of CO₂ sequestration capacity.

Table 1

Summary of all the historical pipeline build-outs in our dataset in which at least 4,000 km of pipeline were built (lower threshold for 100MT of removals) during a period of 25 years.
Rank	Country, fuel, and years	Total pipeline built in 25 years (km)
1	USA, Gas (1994–2019)	123 809	Potentially compatible with 1 Gt CO₂ sequestration capacity (Larson et al, 2021)
2	USA, Gas (1926–1951)	104 804
3	USA, Oil (1995–2020)	51 288	Potentially compatible with 100 Mt CO₂ sequestration capacity (Tumara et al, 2024)
4	Russia, Gas (1965–1990)	47 256
5	China, Gas (1998–2023)	39 688
6	Canada, Gas (1932–1957)	38 600
7	USA, Gas (1952–1977)	30 244
8	India, Gas (1998–2023)	25 331
9	Russia, Gas (1998–2023)	21 766
10	China, Oil (1996–2021)	19 863
11	Mexico, Gas (1997–2022)	17 048
12	Australia, Gas (1994–2019)	16 259
13	USA, Oil (1940–1965)	15 585
14	Russia, Oil (1964–1989)	15 470
15	Russia, Oil (1998–2023)	11 778
16	China, Gas (1961–1986)	10 217
17	Argentina, Gas (1963–1988)	10 156
18	UK, Gas (1961–1986)	8 856
19	China, Oil (1970–1995)	7 931
20	Australia, Gas (1967–1992)	7 907
22	Spain, Gas (1977–2002)	6679
23	Canada, Oil (1998–2023)	6667
24	Russia, Gas (1939–1964)	6138
25	Italy, Gas (1971–1996)	5902
26	Algeria, Gas (1997–2022)	5827
27	USA, Oil (1969–1994)	5546
28	Iran, Gas (1997–2022)	5475
29	Colombia, Gas (1972–1997)	5267
30	India, Oil (1985–2010)	5265
31	India, Gas (1972–1997)	4373
32	Norway, Gas (1982–2007)	4371

Table 2

Summary of all the global pipeline build-out periods in our dataset, arranged from the most pipeline built in 25 years to the least.
Rank	Country, fuel, and years	Total pipeline built in 25 years (km)
1	World, Gas (1995–2020)	295 006	Potentially compatible with 1 Gt CO₂ sequestration capacity (Larson et al, 2021)
2	World, Gas (1941–1966)	154 358
3	World, Oil (1995–2020)	106 132
4	World, Gas (1968–1993)	105 220
5	World, Oil (1964–1989)	49 997	Potentially compatible with 100 Mt CO₂ sequestration capacity (Tumara et al, 2024)
6	World, Gas (1905–1930)	49 351
7	World, Oil (1937–1962)	24 003
8	World, Oil (1904–1929)	618

4.3 Implications for the feasibility of CO₂ pipeline networks

Figure 4 compares the future CO₂ pipeline scenarios presented in Section 4.1 with the historical precedents discussed in section 4.2. It shows that the scale of global pipeline build-out required to meet the benchmarks set by Larson et al (2021), Pitt-Ridge et al (2023), and Tumara et al (2024) are well within historical precedents; not just for global pipeline construction, but for construction of pipelines within a few individual large countries, such as the USA, Russia, and China. However, these historical precedents are not very high above the rates of pipeline construction that would be required to reach these forecasts. This suggests that while it is probably feasible to build pipelines at the rate suggested by the three studies cited above; doing so would be an historic effort, requiring a substantial portion of the global pipeline construction capacity.

4.4 Enablers and Constraints for CO2 Pipelines

As discussed in section 3.3, we have selected six countries from our database which show evidence of rapid pipeline construction—four that show up prominently in the data discussed in section 4.2, and two (Nigeria and the United Kingdom), which also show evidence of rapid pipeline construction, in different kinds of geographic contexts. Each of these countries has its own periods of rapid pipeline construction:

United States, 1926–1951: An increase in natural gas supply, and a growing need to heat American cities, led to the rapid construction of several major long-distance gas lines, including the "inch" lines—two large interstate pipelines with unprecedented length and capacity for the time. This was followed by a sudden demand for new pipelines during the Second World War, and new demand and materials supply during the postwar years.
United States, 1994–2019: In the aftermath of gas shortages in the 1970s and consequent regulatory changes in the 1980s, the American natural gas industry rapidly built out new pipeline networks. This was accelerated by the fracking boom, which saw rapid construction of both oil and gas pipelines in the second half of this period.
Canada, 1932–1957: Following the Leduc oil discovery in Alberta, Canada went from being an energy importer at risk of shortages, to a net energy producer. With government support, the country built several transcontinental gas pipelines.
Russia, 1965–1990: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union aggressively expanded the country’s fossil fuel industry to ensure energy security following its experience in the Second World War, and to secure valuable energy exports to exchange for Western currency.
China, 1995–2020: Growth in Chinese heavy industry during the 2000s rapidly increased energy intensity, leading to shortages. The state responded by rapidly developing the country's oil and gas infrastructure, to transport both imported and domestic fuels.
United Kingdom, 1961–1986: The discovery of oil in the North Sea was a boon to the British government and economy, particularly due to the need for “Stirling oil” that it could pay for in pounds. Policy priorities were therefore to on-shore as much North Sea oil as possible, as quickly as possible, resulting in a rapid offshore pipeline buildout.
Nigeria, 1960–1985: The first discovery of oil in the Niger Delta was a major boom to the newly-independent country, resulting in large-scale pipeline construction during the first half of the 1960s, until this was curtailed by the start of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967.

The history of each of these countries is summarized in Figs. 5 and 6. We have identified important historical events which had both enabling and constraining impacts on the construction of pipelines in each country, which are depicted on the lower panel of each country’s chart, categorized according to Steg et al’s (2022) dimensions of feasibility.

In what remains of this section, we sort these enablers and constraints into the six dimensions of feasibility as discussed by Steg (2022).

4.4.1 Geophysical feasibility

The geophysical determinants of fossil fuel pipeline construction mostly have to do with the availability of fossil fuel resources, such as the Leduc find in Canada; the Western oilfields in China; or the Niger Delta (Akinola, 2018; Bott, 2004; Liu, 2013). These create impetus for the construction of new pipelines. The co-occurrence of natural gas with oil reserves has a more complex enabling effect, creating a perceived need to create markets (and infrastructure) to sell gas rather than wastefully flaring it (Blanchard, 2021).

Geophysical constraints on pipeline construction are much more limited, and mostly have to do limited availability of steel, which constrained pipeline construction during the Second World War (Blanchard, 2021).

4.4.2 Technological feasibility

As with geophysical enablers, technological factors such as the development of liquefied natural gas facilities or techniques to convert oil sands bitumen into synthetic crude, can open up new kinds of oil and gas supplies (Bott, 2004). The development of fracking in the United States not only increased the supply of oil and gas in the country; it also made regions which had been primarily consuming regions into producers, necessitating new kinds of interstate transfers (Blanchard, 2021). Advances in the technology of pipelines themselves can have a similar impact (Clark, 1963). Pipeline expansion can also follow on from failures of competing fossil fuel transportation technologies, as was the case when German submarines paralyzed American coastal shipping (Blanchard, 2021); or when Britain lost access to the Mediterranean for shipping (More, 2009).

A lack of facilitating technology can constrain the construction of pipeline networks, as was the case in the Soviet Union, which for many years had to import large-diameter pipe from its geopolitical rivals in the West (Perović, 2017). However, the fact that Western attempts to leverage this to block Soviet pipeline construction efforts had very little effect (Perović, 2017) suggests that this kind of technological constraint might ultimately be fairly surmountable.

4.4.3 Economic feasibility

Countries have historically had very large, and growing, demands for oil, while countries with oil resources had strong incentives to capitalize on this demand by building export infrastructure. This accelerated pipeline construction the most during major crises, such as the Second World War (Blanchard, 2021; Bott, 2004; Falola, 2008; Perović, 2017), the Suez crisis (More, 2009), the 1970s energy crises (Blanchard, 2021; Bott, 2004; Falola, 2008), or China’s energy shortage in the 2000s (Downs, 2010). New demand for fossil fuels, from a new technology (such as American town gas), or a growing industry (as in China in the 2000s can also create a sudden impetus for new pipelines (Blanchard, 2021; Liu, 2013; Yaodong and Gillespie, 2020).

The price of the commodity to be transported through any pipeline is a common determinant of its economic viability (Omonbude, 2009). The relationship between fossil fuel prices and pipeline construction is complicated, however. Pipelines, for one thing, are more insulated against declines in price than other parts of the fossil fuel value chain, since they can sign “ship or pay” or lease agreements with producers that pay the same amount regardless of the value or amount of commodity shipped (Roumeliotis, 2016). Conversely, insufficient pipeline capacity can force producers to sell at a discount, creating a strong impetus to build new infrastructure (Walls and Zheng, 2020). Our reading of the history suggests that high prices can have a strong political effect on increasing pipeline construction, especially when those high prices are felt by consumers (who are also voters). This was the case in the United States during the high price period of the 1970s.

A perennial economic constraint which is particularly well-documented in the history of American pipelines, is the challenge of matching supply with demand. The optimal design of a pipeline network is different for different players in the fossil fuel value chain. Pipeline owners want a tighter network, more precisely matched to average demand and therefore with less slack capacity. They also want to minimize competition for their large fixed investments. Fossil fuel consumers want consistent availability of fuel at low prices. Policymakers often have split loyalties. These issues are particularly acute for natural gas, which has high seasonal fluctuations in demand and cannot be easily stored in large quantities (Blanchard, 2021).

Solutions to this problem included treating pipelines as common carriers; vertical integration of pipelines with production and consumption businesses; storage infrastructure; arbitrage pipelines; pay-per-use business models; and legislation limiting new pipeline construction to avoid destrictuve competition. These solutions all have their own issues. Vertical integration, for example, can lead to monopolism and a resultant political incentive to clamp down on pipeline or fossil fuel companies who control the market. And arbitrage pipelines can be very difficult to price on a per-energy-per-distance basis (Blanchard, 2021; Bradley, 2018).

4.4.4 Sociocultural feasibility

Sociocultural enablers of pipelines are rare. In the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, a kind of socialist petromodernism led to the celebration of pipelines and the people who built them (Perović, 2017), but it is not clear whether this was a consequence or cause of the USSR’s pipeline ambitions during that period.

Sociocultural constraints, however, are very common. Environmental protests against pipelines are widely-documented in Canada, the United States, and in the Niger Delta, where at times they led to violent conflict (Bott, 2004; Bradley, 2018; Falola, 2008). Consumers of fossil fuels also sometimes have reasons to oppose pipelines, as was the case in Canada when Montrealers resisted the construction of pipelines from Western Canada, preferring to rely on cheaper imported oil (Bott, 2004). Industries—both competing industries such as American coal producers, and separate affected industries such as British North Sea fishers—have also raised objections (More, 2009).

Another sociocultural constraint comes from regional tensions. Pipelines often pass through multiple regions with different local cultures, economies, and politics, and sometimes with contentions relations with each other. Tensions between Eastern and Western Canada, or between the Northern and Southern United States, have been an impediment to pipeline construction (Blanchard, 2021; Bott, 2004). Producer regions often disagree with consumer regions over the shape of pipeline networks, or who should pay for them. In areas where fossil fuels are primarily exported, a different kind of controversy can emerge over the questions over how to distribute the resultant revenue, as was a particularly contentious issue in Nigeria (Falola, 2008).

Finally, in less politically and economically stable contexts, pipelines can fall victim to various kinds of conflict, sabotage, crime, and corruption. This is notable in Nigeria, whose pipeline network has faced civil war, sabotage, and theft. In the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, corruption and financial crimes around pipelines were so bad that many fossil fuel executives fled the country to avoid prosecution (Blanchard, 2021).

4.4.5 Institutional feasibility

Large pipeline projects have tended to be boosted by political, and geopolitical incentives. These can include the need for fuel for the military (Blanchard, 2021; Bott, 2004; Perović, 2017); concerns about energy security (Bott, 2004; Yaodong and Gillespie, 2020); or the need for oil and gas as a trading commodity—either to export for foreign currency or to offset imports (Akinola, 2018; More, 2009; Perović, 2017). Another factor is the political power of pipeline operators; the oil and gas industry more generally; or regions in which that industry was an important part of the local economy (Blanchard, 2021; Falola, 2008). Often, these political incentives translate into direct policy support, financial subsidies, or government coordination of pipeline projects, as has happened in Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and China (Bott, 2004; More, 2009; Perović, 2017; Yaodong and Gillespie, 2020).

Policy design is a major institutional constraint for pipelines. It is easy to create perverse incentives or dysfunctional regulations for such a complex, expensive, resource-intensive and trans-regional infrastructure (Blanchard, 2021; Bradley, 2018). The United States saw how easy it is to get this wrong, when in the 1970s, decades of under-construction (likely caused in part by policies designed to keep prices low for consumers) led to a gas supply crisis that saw schools closing for lack of heating (Blanchard, 2021). British policymakers appeared to be aware of these risks during the run-up to the North Sea oil boom, given the massive political and legislative resources they devoted to be able to rapidly establish a legal framework for North Sea oil..

Institutional factors at the level of private business can also be counterproductive. In the United States, during the energy crisis of the 1970s, Pipeline operators signed take-or-pay contracts, which required them to pay a penalty if they did not transport and market gas from a producer. The result was that when gas prices dropped, surplus capacity continued to flood the market, keeping prices artificially low (Blanchard, 2021; Bradley, 2018).

Finally, institutional factors at the level of international politics can also have an effect. This was the case with Russia, as NATO countries repeatedly tried to stymie their pipeline construction efforts using boycotts and embargoes (Perović, 2017).

4.4.6 Ecological Feasibility

Ecological factors aided the construction of pipelines in some cases, where they or other petroleum production and transport infrastructure were being built on land that was not seen as particularly ecologically valuable (Blanchard, 2021), or when the fuels they transported could displace other more polluting fuels (Blanchard, 2021; Chow, 2015; Liu, 2013). Pipelines can have negative environmental impacts, including pollution, leaks, and oil spills and blow-outs (Blanchard, 2021; Chow, 2015; Falola, 2008; More, 2009; Roxo, 2014), and are associated with environmental harms from upstream fossil fuel production and downstream consumption (Bott, 2004). However, these did not translate into significant impediments for the construction of the pipelines, unless they inspired environmental protest movements or environmental regulations (see sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 respectively.

4.4.7 Application to CO2 Pipelines

Table 3 discusses the applicability of the enablers and constraints discussed above specifically to CO₂ pipelines. Some of the findings are largely inapplicable. Geophysical feasibility of CO₂ pipelines, for example, pertains to availability of both pore space, and of steel and other metals; neither of which are currently major constraints on pipeline construction. The applicability of technological factors is similarly limited, since CO2 pipelines are already largely a solved technological problem (Wallace et al., 2015), and the ability to produce the necessary materials is now widespread. Technological choke-points, like those that occurred when oil shipment routes were disrupted and spurred pipeline investment, are also less relevant for CO2 pipelines, since there are few viable competing options for large-scale CO2 transportation.

Table 3: Summary of the relevance of different factors which influenced historical pipeline construction for CO₂ pipelines.

Dimension of feasibility		Examples	Relevance to CO₂ pipelines
Economic	Enabler	New demand; Supply shortages; New business models	High. CO2 market is critical. Niche applications (EOR) could prove important. And business models are still in flux.
Geophysical	Enabler	New resources; Need to use byproducts	Moderate. Analogue would be storage sites, which are ample. But development of new ones might accelerate pipeline construction new pipeline networks..
Institutional	Enabler	Supply concerns; state support; critical exports; political feedbacks	Moderate. The institutional factors that support oil and gas pipelines apply less to CO2. But policy support could still play a role, and there is scope for political feedbacks.
Sociocultural	Enabler	Ideological support	Moderate. Could get ideological support as low-carbon technology.
Technological	Enabler	Technological improvements; Chokepoints; Materials glut	Moderate. Chokepoints may play a role, if other forms of CO2 transport predominate. But this would just be a case of the system upscaling, rather than new build-out. Improvements in pipeline or capture technology could create a bonanza effect.
Ecological	Enabler	Pollution; unvalued landscapes	Moderate. CO2 pipelines don’t compete with a polluting industry, other than possibly some other CDR techniques. Unvalued landscapes could be easier to build through.
Economic	Constraint	Insufficient demand; Lack of investment; Supply-demand coordination	High. Demand issues discussed above, but supply-demand coordination is critical, and very challenging. CO2 has physical properties suggesting this could be a real problem. Note that BECCCS CO2 production might have some seasonality.
Geophysical	Constraint	Availability of resources	Low. Raw materials are abundantly available.
Institutional	Constraint	Policy or geopolitical complexity; Lack of political capital; Jurisdictional issues; Perverse policy incentives	High. Policy issues are equally complex, and there is a risk of perverse policy incentives just as there was with oil and gas pipelines. Less geopolitical risk, however.
Sociocultural	Constraint	Consumer, environmental, competitor, and affected industry opposition; Regional tensions	High. Opposition already exists. Regional conflicts also have a high likelihood if sector is very profitable. Existing pipelines and rights of way diminish this constraint in some places.
Technological	Constraint	Materials shortage	Low. Raw materials and technical know how are abundantly available.
Ecological	Constraint	Pollution; Spills, blowouts, and accidents; Fuel leaks	Low. These developments by themselves, though concerning, are unlikely to impede pipeline construction by themselves. They may, however, inspire public opposition (see above).

Economic issues are much more relevant. The lack of a sufficient market for CO2 is an impediment to the construction of more pipelines. As was the case with natural gas, CO2 pipeline networks might benefit from the establishment of strong niche applications for the product. Technologies like enhanced oil recovery have already led to a major CO₂ pipeline buildout in the United States, and might do so elsewhere as well. This, however, comes with political hurdles, as well as questions as to its real value in mitigating climate change if the ultimate effect is to produce more fossil fuels (Chailleux, 2020). Supply and demand coordination is another important problem, since CO2, like natural gas, is difficult to store. Supply shortages of CO₂ will be less likely to cause an economic crisis—and thus spur policy change—than supply shortages of energy commodities. The result could be a CO₂ pipeline system and CO₂ transportation market in which perennial overcapacity, under-capacity, or monopolism interferes with the smooth functioning of carbon markets.

Institutional factors are also important, for related reasons. Establishing rights-of-way (possibly requiring the use of eminent domain (National Petroleum Council, 2019)), coordinating diverse businesses and other actors, contending with local opposition, dealing with issues of pipeline access and natural monopoly, regulating for safety and environmental impact, all pose challenging policy questions, for which there is a real risk of getting the answers wrong. Perverse policy incentives could slow the development of the CO2 transport system, or accelerate it at the cost of safety, environmental responsibility, or democratic input.

At minimum, creating effective policies will require the expenditure of significant political capital, for a sector that probably has less political impetus than the oil and gas sector. The military does not use CO2; consumers do not depend on it to heat their homes; and, and absent a much broader global legitimation of carbon markets (possibly including border carbon adjustments), CO2 will be much less important in balance of trade issues than fossil fuels are. There might, however, be some scope for political feedbacks pushing policymakers to further enable rapid CO2 pipeline construction, through the growth of CO₂ capturing industries and their associated lobbying capabilities.

Sociocultural factors present similar risks of opposition to CO2 pipelines as exist for fossil fuel pipelines. Public opposition to CO₂ pipelines already exists (Splitter, 2022). Competitors (including competing CDR methods, such as biochar producers or tree-planters) might also lobby against CO2 pipelines, just as coal and railroad interests lobbied against fossil fuel pipelines. And other affected industries might also express concerns about how this infrastructure affects their interests. It is possible that these constraints could be offset by political support for CO2 pipelines as green infrastructure. Thus far, however, opposition has been more prominent.

Our findings suggest the following answers to our four research questions introduced in section 1:

1) How big will future CO₂ pipeline networks have to be to meet climate targets?

The three sources we use for estimates of future CO₂ pipeline networks (Larson et al., 2021; Pitt-Ridge et al., 2023; Tumara et al., 2024) suggest that CO₂ sequestration on the order of hundreds of megatons will require pipeline networks on the order of tens of thousands of kilometers. For gigaton-scale removals, hundreds of thousands of kilometers of pipeline will be required. These sources all project pipeline networks of this scale being built by 2050—a 25 year period from most of their starting years in 2025.

2) What are the fastest national build-outs of oil and gas pipelines that have been achieved in the historical record?

Historical pipeline build-outs over 25-year periods exceed the rate of CO₂ pipeline construction in the sources cited above, but not by very much. Historically, just two national pipeline construction buildouts have exceeded 100,000 km of pipeline buildout in 25 years; both of which were in the United States. A further 18 historical 25-year national pipeline buildouts exceed 8000 km—a rough benchmark that might be in line with 100 Mt of sequestration capacity. Internationally, four historical periods of oil and gas pipeline construction are compatible with 1 Gt of CO₂ sequestration capacity, and a total of 7 are compbatible with 100 Mt.

3) Is a pipeline build-out enabling the transportation and sequestration of CO₂ on the scale of gigatons feasible in light of historical precedents? Only a handful of national pipeline buildouts, all of which occurred in the United States, are in line with the pipeline network length likely required for gigaton-scale carbon removals. Other historical buildouts, including recent American oil pipeline construction, as well as recent Chinese gas pipeline construction and Russian gas pipeline construction between 1965 and 1990, could enable multiple hundreds of megatons. Global fossil fuel pipeline construction could enable multiple gigatons. We conclude that it is feasible for major countries to build CO₂ pipeline networks enabling gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removal, but that this would be a major undertaking requiring leadership by large countries, or a large number of smaller countries building pipelines in concert.

4) Under what social, economic, and political conditions have rapid pipeline build-outs been achieved, and to what extent might we expect these conditions to apply to the future construction of CO₂ pipeline networks? The most important constraints on rapid pipeline construction that apply to CO₂ pipelines are economic constraints (including resource constraints), institutional constraints (including policy challenges), and sociocultural constraints (including opposition). The most important enablers for oil and gas pipelines were economic and institutional, with oil demand and policy incentives to provide secure sources (or exports) of energy proving particularly decisive in overcoming the obstacles mentioned above. Unfortunately, many of these enablers are less relevant to CO₂ pipelines than they are for oil and gas pipelines. Institutional enablers are a particularly important gap, since there are fewer reasons for states to support CO₂ pipeline construction than there are reasons to support pipelines carrying energy commodities.

In supportive political, social, and economic contexts, pipeline construction does not appear to be a major impediment restricting feasible levels of carbon dioxide removal. Ensuring a supportive context, however, depends on overcoming large social, political, and economic hurdles. Establishing sufficient supply and demand for captured CO2 to justify pipeline construction might itself depend on sufficient pipeline capacity, creating a chicken and egg problema,nd, even after CO2 markets are successfully created, matching fluctuating supply and demand in a way that balances the interests and influence of different actors in the CO2 supply chain could be not just a technological and economic problem, but also a political one. Historically, these challenges have been overcome due to the societal importance of fossil fuels—particularly during major crises such as the Second World War.

A similar crisis may not spur the construction of CO₂ pipelines in the same way, since CO₂ is essentially a waste product rather than a critically-important energy and industrial commodity (Buck, 2020). One solution to this could be leveraging the material uses that CO₂ does have, for example for enhanced oil recovery. This, however, invites a “faustian bargain” (Hansson et al., 2022); counting on the fossil fuel industry to become a net-remover of CO₂ from the atmosphere rather than a net-contributor. The economic and political plausibility of this would be a good subject for future analogue research.

The history of fossil fuel pipelines suggests some approaches that might enhance the construction of CO2 pipelines. In many places, natural gas developed from a waste product which was coproduced with oil and flared by companies uninterested in selling it, to a critical energy commodity. This was in many cases the result of specific policies (especially flaring bans) that made natural gas pipeline construction the most economically attractive option for the oil industry. A similar CCS mandate, defining CO2 as a useful (or at least profitable) byproduct that must be sequestered rather than vented, might have a similar value. These measures could be made more politically feasible by the development of a large enough CO₂ transportation industry with its own lobbying arm.

Future work on CO2 pipelines would benefit from more precise and geographically specific estimates of pipeline requirements for CDR. Also, despite the close correspondence between CO₂ and oil and gas pipelines, CO₂ has a different set of physical and economic characteristics from oil and gas, which will mean that CO₂ pipelines will not develop in exactly the same way as oil and gas pipelines. We have tried to account for this, particularly in section 4.4. But it does impose a limitation on our findings.

In this article, we show that the largest pipeline buildouts of the past are aligned with future needs for carbon removal. Pipeline networks, however, are megaprojects, which involve technological complexity and large up-front costs, and are typically associated with institutional and societal conflict. They have overcome these key barriers in the past thanks to strong enabling conditions, including powerful political and economic imperatives to ensure a durable supply of energy commodities. To be built at the rate that is necessary, CO₂ pipelines would require a similarly strong set of enabling conditions in place over the next 25 years.

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You are reading this latest preprint version

Feasibility of CO2 Pipeline Construction to Enable Gigaton-Scale Carbon Dioxide Removals: Evidence from historical precedent

Status:

Version 1

Abstract

Figures

1 Introduction

2 Literature Review

2.1 Historical and Present-Day CO₂ Pipelines

2.2 Estimating CO₂ Pipelines needed for Carbon Dioxide Removal

3 Methodology

3.1 Pipelines required per Mt CO₂ sequestration capacity

3.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

3.3 Determining feasible CO₂ transportation capacity using historical pipeline construction data

3.4 Determining enablers and constraints of rapid pipeline construction

4 Findings

4.1 Pipeline network requirements for CO₂ removal

4.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

4.3 Implications for the feasibility of CO₂ pipeline networks

4.4 Enablers and Constraints for CO2 Pipelines

4.4.1 Geophysical feasibility

4.4.2 Technological feasibility

4.4.3 Economic feasibility

4.4.4 Sociocultural feasibility

4.4.5 Institutional feasibility

4.4.6 Ecological Feasibility

4.4.7 Application to CO2 Pipelines

5 Conclusion

Declarations

References

Status:

Version 1

Feasibility of CO2 Pipeline Construction to Enable Gigaton-Scale Carbon Dioxide Removals: Evidence from historical precedent

Status:

Version 1

Abstract

Figures

1 Introduction

2 Literature Review

2.1 Historical and Present-Day CO2 Pipelines

2.2 Estimating CO2 Pipelines needed for Carbon Dioxide Removal

3 Methodology

3.1 Pipelines required per Mt CO2 sequestration capacity

3.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

3.3 Determining feasible CO2 transportation capacity using historical pipeline construction data

3.4 Determining enablers and constraints of rapid pipeline construction

4 Findings

4.1 Pipeline network requirements for CO2 removal

4.2 Historical rates of oil and gas pipeline construction

4.3 Implications for the feasibility of CO2 pipeline networks

4.4 Enablers and Constraints for CO2 Pipelines

4.4.1 Geophysical feasibility

4.4.2 Technological feasibility

4.4.3 Economic feasibility

4.4.4 Sociocultural feasibility

4.4.5 Institutional feasibility

4.4.6 Ecological Feasibility

4.4.7 Application to CO2 Pipelines

5 Conclusion

Declarations

References

Status:

Version 1

2.1 Historical and Present-Day CO₂ Pipelines

2.2 Estimating CO₂ Pipelines needed for Carbon Dioxide Removal

3.1 Pipelines required per Mt CO₂ sequestration capacity

3.3 Determining feasible CO₂ transportation capacity using historical pipeline construction data

4.1 Pipeline network requirements for CO₂ removal

4.3 Implications for the feasibility of CO₂ pipeline networks