Interventions to build trust in scientists need to acknowledge that uncritical faith not only is counter to science itself but also could breed harmful consequences. When distrust stems in part from underrepresentation, however, it raises the question of whether expanding representation can play a role in building trust. This is important given relative exclusion from the practice of science and lower trust in scientists might preclude groups from the potential benefits of science (27). In line with our earlier argument about social similarity/difference, we sought to test whether individuals prefer to follow (i.e., trust) the advice of scientists with whom they share characteristics (28).
We implemented a survey experiment with a nationally representative sample (N = 1,120). Participants chose one of two scientists (e.g., A or B) from whom they would follow advice for taking a vaccine or which of two doctors (e.g., A or B) they would prefer to have as their primary care physician (see supporting information). We merged analyses for scientists and doctors as the overall results were similar for each. Henceforth we refer to “scientists” for efficiency. Each scientist was described along seven dimensions: experience (low or high), gender (male or female), race (white, Black, Hispanic, or Asian American), education (public institution or Ivy League), religiosity (e.g., speaks to religious organizations or to civic organizations), rural or urban upbringing, and class background (lower, middle, or upper). We included education and class background to capture socioeconomic profiles. Experience provides a benchmark to assess the impact of demographic characteristics.
A respondent would receive a table that described Scientist A’s and Scientist B’s characteristics. The information for Scientist A might describe them as high experience, male, white, Ivy League educated, religious, rural, and middle class. Scientist B might be portrayed as low experience, male, Black, Ivy League educated, non-religious, urban, and middle class. The precise attributes for each scientist were probabilistically determined and could be the same (or not) for A and B (in the example, A and B are both male, but A is white and B is Black). We then computed whether each demographic attribute was a “match” or “not a match” for the respondent. For instance, if the respondent were a Black religious male, then we would code Scientist A as being a gender and religiosity match but not a race match; Scientist B would be a gender and race match but not a religiosity match. The one exception was experience, which was not a variable that was matched; rather, it was simply an indicator (0/1) of whether the Scientist was experienced. Our interest is in whether the likelihood of choosing Scientist A or Scientist B increases in the presence of a given demographic match.Figure 4. Impact of Match on Trust. OLS coefficients and 95% intervals for a regression of choosing Scientist B (over Scientist A) on whether the respondent’s given demographic attribute matched Scientist B (“Match B”) or Scientist A (“Match A”) (or, in the case of experience, was experienced). (A) Regression with all respondents. (B) Regression with “Overrepresented groups” that includes respondents from the demographic group noted in the figure who are overrepresented among scientists (e.g., the Gender Match A (Male) indicates whether Scientist A was a Male for Male respondents). (C) Regression with “Underrepresented groups” that includes respondents from the demographic group noted in the figure who are underrepresented among scientists (e.g., the Gender Match A (Female) indicates whether Scientist A was a Female for Female respondents). All data come from a conjoint experiment (with a total of 12,220 observations). Details are in the supporting information.
Several findings stand out. First, experience dwarfs any single demographic, with respondents strongly preferring the more experienced option, increasing the probability of a given choice by nearly 25 percentage points. Second, the results reveal that a demographic match (e.g., a female scientist for a female respondent or a scientist who grew up in a rural setting for a rural respondent) affects the probability of selecting the scientist. This holds for gender (roughly a 4.5 percentage point change), race (roughly a 9.5 percentage point change), religiosity (roughly a 7.5 percentage point change), and urban/rural (roughly a 3 percentage point change). Education and class do not exhibit meaningful effects. Demographic effects are small relative to experience, but they build upon one another; on average, each additional match increased the likelihood of a choice by about 4 percentage points, meaning that if all six attributes match, it boosts the likelihood of that choice by roughly 24 percentage points, equaling the experience effect (see supporting information). Third, if the two choices are both matches on a given attribute (e.g., race), the impact of a match on that attribute (e.g., race) cancels out, which is sensible.
Figure 4B shows the influence of matches for those who are overrepresented in science on the given attribute. For instance, for gender, it displays the impact of the option (A or B) being male for male respondents. For race, the figure reports the impact of a racial match for white respondents (and for the other attributes, respectively, college educated, non-religious, urban, and middle or upper class). Figure 4C shows the effects for those underrepresented among scientists, such as when the option (A or B) is Black for Black respondents, and so on, as noted in the figure. The figures make clear that female, Black, Hispanic or Latino, rural, and lower-class respondents displayed significantly stronger preferences for a scientist who matched their acute respective demographic than their better-represented counterparts who, in fact, are largely indifferent to the relevant demographics (also see 29). That said, those from overrepresented groups relatively prioritize religiosity and education. Specifically, non-religious respondents strongly prefer a non-religious choice to a greater extent than religious individuals prefer a choice that signals religiosity. Also, educated individuals show a match effect, whereas less educated individuals do not. Experience has nearly identical effects for respondents from under- and overrepresented groups. Overall, those underrepresented in science in terms of gender, race, rurality, and class prefer scientists who share their backgrounds (more than their overrepresented counterparts).
Expanding representation also can increase general trust in scientists. In the experiment, respondents reported their general trust in scientists on a scale from 0 to 100 prior to choosing between the scientists, an exercise they did ten times (i.e., they received ten profiles and made ten choices, and the results in Fig. 4 include each of those choices). They were then asked about their general trust after the scenarios. We find that as the number of precise matches received across the ten choices increased, so did general trust in scientists—this is particularly the case for female, Black, and religious respondents. For example, as female respondents receive more female scientist choices over the course of the experiment, their overall trust increases. The same is true for Black respondents (for matches regarding race) and religious respondents (for matches regarding religiosity) (see supporting information). Notably, this occurs for trust in scientists but not for trust in pharmaceutical companies (which serves as a placebo).