Anxiety is the most prevalent mental health concern in Australia, with approximately 3.2 million Australians experiencing an anxiety related condition between 2020 and 2021 alone (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022). Not all anxiety is maladaptive, often serving the adaptive purpose of prompting individuals to avoid potential environmental threats (Gutiérrez-García & Contreras, 2013). However, when the experience of anxiety is out of proportion to the current situation, this can cause significant emotional and cognitive disturbances, limiting the quality of life for the affected individual (Gutiérrez-García & Contreras, 2013). Due to the significant individual variability in the experience of anxiety, research has focused on identifying the mechanisms underpinning the experience of anxiety, with the goal of limiting the impairment associated with this prevalent mental health concern.
A well-established predictor of anxiety-related dysfunction is trait anxiety, which refers to the general tendency of an individual to experience elevations in anxiety in response to a stressful event (Endler & Kocovski, 2001). Trait anxiety has been identified as a factor contributing to the aetiology of anxiety-related disorders (Knowles & Olatunji, 2020), making research into the construct itself, and the contributing mechanisms, an important element in extending our understanding of anxiety.
Until recently, trait anxiety has commonly been considered a unitary dimension that is frequently assessed using questionnaires such as the trait version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1983), which requires individuals to report on the frequency with which they experience specific anxiety symptoms ‘in general’. Theoretically, however, a number of different types of anxious disposition could underlie variation in trait anxiety scores. Research by Rudaizky and colleagues (2012, 2014) has revealed that two dimensions of anxious disposition each account for unique variance in trait anxiety scores (Rudaizky et al., 2012). One dimension, referred to as anxiety reactivity, reflects individual differences in the magnitude of state anxiety responses elicited by a stressor. For example, in response to an impending examination, most people would experience some elevation in state anxiety. However, individuals who experience greater reactivity tend to exhibit more intense state anxiety reactions. The other dimension, referred to as anxiety perseveration, reflects individual differences in the persistence of a state anxiety elevation once elicited (Rudaizky et al., 2012). For example, following an examination, most people would experience anxiety reducing emotions such as relief. However, individuals who experience greater perseveration tend to remain elevated, even after leaving the examination room.
Over the last decade, the suggestion has been made within the literature that different mechanisms may independently drive variation in anxiety reactivity and in anxiety perseveration (Gole et al., 2012). However, to the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first to systematically assess the cognitive mechanisms underlying these two dimensions of anxiety vulnerability. Distinguishing these mechanisms could have important applications for the broader literature concerning the basis of anxiety vulnerability, through the extension of current conceptual models of trait anxiety that seek to explain individual differences in this phenomenon (see Knowles & Olatunji, 2020). Cognitive theorists have suggested that individual differences in anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration reflect the differing impact of alternative types of information which people process (Rudaizky et al., 2014). Building on this foundation, the present study’s hypotheses, concerning processes underpinning anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, were derived from the broader emotion literature.
Distinguishing the cognitive mechanisms that differentially contribute to variation in anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, respectively, has important theoretical implications for advancing the understanding of individual differences in trait anxiety. Cognitive models of anxiety, while recognising that focusing on negative content elevates trait anxiety, do not differentiate between the processing styles that may differentially give rise to elevated anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration (Rudaizky et al., 2012). By exploring the influence of these styles, it becomes possible for us to better understand how varied information and/or content can influence individuals’ responses to stressful events, in both the short and longer term. This opens the possibility of examining how manipulating the information people process, prior to a stressful event, impacts the level of anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration they experience both throughout and after the event (Rudaizky et al., 2012). Developing a methodology that could reduce the magnitude of these dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety, could potentially help individuals cope better with stressful situations as they arise, be it an interview or exam (Rudaizky et al., 2012).
Relevant to understanding individual differences in anxiety reactivity is literature focusing on emotional regulation (Davis et al., 2011). Research by Kross and colleagues (2005, 2014) posits that thinking about a situation in a manner that involves focusing on situational details, leads to heightened emotional arousal. There is evidence to support this. For example, a study by Bornstein and colleagues (2020) identified that when participants tended to process situational details concerning a stressful event (e.g., writing how and in what order the event happened), they experienced greater elevation of negative emotions than did those who tended to process implicational details. Though Kross and colleagues did not distinguish the impact of processing situational and implicational information and anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, their findings suggest that elevated anxiety reactivity, reflecting more intense state anxiety response to a stressor, could be driven by the processing of situational information concerning the stressor. Therefore, the second hypothesis under test in the current study is that processing situational information about a stressful event leads to greater anxiety reactivity (but not to greater perseveration) in response to this event.
Relevant to understanding anxiety perseveration is literature focusing on repetitive thoughts, such as depressive rumination (a process akin to anxiety perseveration). Within this literature base, there is evidence to suggest that preferential processing of information, which is decontextualised and abstract in nature, is one of the crucial processes which differentiates dysfunctional from functional repetitive thoughts (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). More specifically, Watkins’ (2008) Processing Mode Theory posits that utilising an implicational processing mode inhibits adaptive emotional processing of negative/stressful events (White & Wild, 2016). By disrupting the formation of a cohesive and specific narrative concerning a situation or event, negative interpretations are strengthened, giving rise to repetitive negative, or intrusive thoughts (White & Wild, 2016). Thus, Watkins and colleague propose that processing implication information, that focuses on the reasons for, and the consequences of an event, increases repetitive negative thinking and so elevates negative affect (Watkins et al., 2008).
There is evidence to support Watkin’s theory, with increased processing of implicational information processing mode being found to elevate negative affect (Kambara et al., 2019). Most relevant to the present research, one study identified that individuals who were presented with statements that contained abstract thoughts about the reasons for, and the consequences of a past event experienced longer duration of negative mood and arousal following a stressful event (Ehring et al., 2009). Another study by Altan-Atalay and colleagues (2022) exposed participants to a stressful situation and employed a manipulation that required participants to either process implication information (by answering questions such as “why is this happening to me?”), or non-implicational information (by answering questions such as “how can I solve the problem at hand?”). They found that participants who were induced to process implicational information experienced higher levels of subsequent state rumination (Altan-Atalay et al., 2022). It is important to note that while these studies provide support for Watkin’s theory, the methodology does not distinguish between the impact that processing implicational information has on anxiety reactivity and on anxiety perseveration. Therefore, the current literature base is unable to determine whether the processing of implicational information contributes to elevated anxiety perseveration specifically. However, given Watkins’ theory and this preliminary empirical support, it is plausible to suggest that elevated anxiety perseveration, reflecting greater persistence of the anxious response once elicited, could be increased by the processing of implicational information. The first hypothesis tested in the current study is therefore that processing information which is implicational in nature leads to greater anxiety perseveration (but not anxiety reactivity) in the wake of a stressful event.
Distinguishing the cognitive mechanisms that differentially contribute to variation in anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, respectively, has important theoretical implications for advancing the understanding of individual differences in trait anxiety. Cognitive models of anxiety, while recognising that focusing on negative content elevates trait anxiety, do not differentiate between the processing styles that may differentially give rise to elevated anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration (Rudaizky et al., 2012). By exploring the influence of these styles, it becomes possible for us to better understand how varied information and/or content can influence individuals’ responses to stressful events, in both the short and longer term. This opens the possibility of examining how manipulating the information people process, prior to a stressful event, impacts the level of anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration they experience both throughout and after the event (Rudaizky et al., 2012). Developing a methodology that could reduce the magnitude of these dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety, could potentially help individuals cope better with stressful situations as they arise, be it an interview or exam (Rudaizky et al., 2012).
The current study sought to test these two hypotheses concerning the contribution of information processing to the expression of anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration by examining whether participants who process either situational or implication information about an upcoming stressor respectively exhibit heighted anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration in response to this event. Participants were told that would be exposed to a lab-based stressor, which took the form of a simulated interview. At several junctures across the experimental session, both as they approached this stressor and also after they had completed it, participants’ state anxiety was assessed using a visual analogue scale. This made it possible to compute separate measures of their anxiety reactivity (i.e., reflecting state anxiety elevation elicited by the approaching interview) and anxiety perseveration (i.e., reflecting persistence of anxiety following the interview). To examine the impact of processing either situational or implicational information on each dimension of anxiety response, every participant was required to process either one or the other type of information concerning the stressor. This information was presented in the form of video clips, in which supposed former participants shared either situational information about the interview or implicational information about the interview.
While information type was the main experimental manipulation, consideration was given to the valence of the information, given the wealth of research that implicates negative information in the experience of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 2016) and rumination (Watkins & Roberts, 2020). This gave rise to an exploratory manipulation whereby each information type category was broken into two separate conditions: positive and negative. Given the well-established link between negatively valenced information and elevated anxiety-linked responses, it is plausible to suggest that only the processing of negative situational and implicational information would give rise to anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, respectively. To ensure that any effects observed could be attributed to the processing of negative situational or implicational information (and not to the processing of situational or implicational information more generally) this between-subjects manipulation led to participants being presented either with exclusively negative or exclusive positive (implicational or situational) information about the upcoming interview.
With the original hypotheses, and exploratory manipulation in mind, the present study predicts that participants who are required to process negative information concerning the upcoming Interview Challenge that is situational in nature, as compared to those who are required to process negative information that is implicational in nature or that is positive, will experience greater anxiety reactivity (but not perseveration) during the period when they are introduced to the Interview Challenge. Additionally, it is predicted that participants who are required to process negative information concerning the upcoming Interview Challenge that is implicational in nature, as compared to those who are required to process negative information that is situational in nature or that is positive, will experience greater anxiety perseveration (but not reactivity) in the period following participation in the Interview Challenge.