Several recent studies of India’s long-term energy outlook - such as those by NREL (Rose et al., 2020) and TERI (Spencer et al., 2020) - are underpinned by techno-economic models. Similarly, the modelling tool used to carry out the techno-economic analysis in this study is OSeMOSYS (Howells et al., 2011), a widely used open-source energy planning tool. OSeMOSYS uses linear optimisation to identify the least cost ‘optimal’ system over a given time horizon under user-specified constraints.
A financial model has been prepared alongside the technoeconomic model, capable of taking the technoeconomic model’s projections of the energy system as inputs, and determining whether the interconnector would be investible beyond being techno-economically desirable. The financial model is implemented as both a spreadsheet and a Python module.
Model setup
The techno-economic model was developed in two phases. In phase 1, the model included a representation both GCC and Indian power systems. It consisted of six countries on the GCC side, with Saudi Arabia divided into four regions and the remaining five countries each represented separately. The Indian power system was divided into five regional grids. Further, an interconnector between Oman on the GCC side and the Western grid of India is also represented.
The model was then updated based on the feedback from phase 1 to include bi-directional trade, the option of multiple solar PV sites in the GCC, and battery storage deployment in India.
The financial model has been designed to extend the findings of the technoeconomic model, drawing on a common group of scenarios, and extending the findings with further financially-relevant parameters and assumptions.
Scenario Parameterisation
The development of the technoeconomic and financial models has been closely linked - the ranges of key parameters for both models was decided between the modelling teams prior to the scenarios being run. In this Phase 2 of the GUI feasibility study, scenario parameterisation has focused closely on the costs of the interconnector, which Phase 1 showed to be determining factors in the interconnector’s desirability. These parameters include capital costs, operating costs, the social discount rate, and the project cost of capital.
We obtain figures for capital expenditure (CAPEX) by other similar HVDC interconnector projects. Based on these projects, we are able to significantly reduce the parameter search space. Table 1 shows key CAPEX parameters for comparator projects. We choose a CAPEX parameter range of $0.45mn/MW to $2.0mn/MW, which captures the range of comparable overland and underwater interconnector projects.
Table 1: Interconnector capital cost comparison
Interconnector
|
Size [MW]
|
Distance
|
Over/under
|
Cost
[US$mn]
|
Unit Cost [US$mn/MW]
|
Sources*
|
ES-FR
|
2000
|
70
|
overland
|
837
|
0.42
|
1
|
Labrador Island Link
|
900
|
1100
|
overland
|
2145
|
2.38
|
2
|
CASA-1000
|
1300
|
1227
|
overland
|
977
|
0.75
|
3
|
GCCIA
|
1200
|
1104
|
overland
|
1537
|
1.28
|
3
|
PowerLinks
|
3000
|
1200
|
overland
|
341
|
0.11
|
4
|
Plains & Eastern
|
4000
|
1160
|
overland
|
2500
|
0.63
|
5
|
IL/Cyprus/GR
|
2000
|
1500
|
underwater
|
900
|
0.45
|
6
|
Viking Link DK-GB
|
1400
|
765
|
underwater
|
2390
|
1.71
|
7
|
English Channel FR-GB
|
2000
|
40
|
underwater
|
412
|
0.21
|
8
|
Maritime Link (CA)
|
500
|
180
|
underwater
|
962
|
1.92
|
9
|
Trans Bay Cable Project
|
400
|
85
|
underwater
|
440
|
1.10
|
10
|
Cross Sound Cable
|
330
|
39
|
underwater
|
120
|
0.36
|
11
|
East-West (IE-GB)
|
500
|
260
|
underwater
|
720
|
1.44
|
3
|
NorNed
|
700
|
580
|
underwater
|
720
|
1.03
|
3
|
Hudson Transmission Project
|
660
|
12
|
underwater
|
850
|
1.29
|
12
|
|
|
|
|
MIN
|
0.11
|
|
|
|
|
|
MAX
|
2.38
|
|
|
|
|
|
MEAN
|
1.01
|
|
*sources: 1: https://web.archive.org/web/20111005233257/http://social.csptoday.com/qa/spain-invest-heavily-transmisson-grid-upgrades-over-next-five-years; 2: https://www.transmissionhub.com/articles/transprojects/labrador-island-link; 3: https://sari-energy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Session-3-Case-Studies-on-Financing-Models.pdf; 4: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/671171468017990099/estimating-employment-effects-of-powerlinks-transmission-limited-project-in-india-and-bhutan; 5: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/electricity/hvdctransmission/pdf/transmission.pdf ; 6: https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2B015M; 7: http://viking-link.com/; 8: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-voltage_direct_current; 9: https://www.linxon.com/project/maritime-link-emera-500-mw-hvdc-connection-project-canada/; 10: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans_Bay_Cable; 11: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_Sound_Cable; 12: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/electricity/hvdctransmission/pdf/transmission.pdf
Operational expenditures (OPEX) were assumed to be negligible in Phase 1. In Phase 2 we return to this assumption and obtain OPEX rates for comparable submarine HVDC projects in the North Sea (Flament et al. 2014). Cables have a higher OPEX rate than converter station equipment, so we choose an OPEX range that represents a blend of these rates. This blend sufficiently covers the parameter space so that more detail can be added in downstream analysis.
While the ultimate discount rate used for the project will be a function of the capital structure of the project, a range is chosen to be represented in the technoeconomic modelling of the project. The financial model can then be tuned to different scenario runs for consistency between the two models. With further research we have been able to narrow the range of discount rates as compared to Phase 1.
The World Bank (Meier, P. 2020) has issued guidance on the use of discount rates in the analysis of electricity projects. Taking a welfare approach, they adopt social discount rates in the range of 5% to 10%. This range is used as the social discount rate in the technoeconomic model.
The project discount rate will be determined by the cost of capital of those who fund the project. In the financing of the GCCIA Interconnector, for example, costs were split according to which parties most benefited from the interconnector, and a commensurate cost of capital (7.55%) was used for the project. For this project, costs of capital are expected to also fall in this range. The range of 5% to 10% is likewise used for the project cost of capital.
With the input parameter spaces established, the scenarios can be sampled from their range. The range for each variable is shown in Table 2. Using these input data ranges, twenty-five ‘samples’ were created to combine different values for each parameter through a process of Latin Hypercube sampling.
Table 2. Cost input data ranges to create twenty-five 'samples'
Variable
|
CapitalCost
|
DiscountRate
|
Interconnector CAPEX
|
450 $/kW
|
2000 $/kW
|
Interconnector OPEX
(% of CAPEX)
|
1.2%
|
2.1%
|
Social discount rate
|
5%
|
10%
|
Project cost of capital
|
5%
|
10%
|
In addition to the twenty-five samples, three potential sites for a solar PV farm in the GCC were also identified. The sites were selected based on their longitude and solar PV generation potential. The selected locations, and their coordinates, are East (17.4599 N, 54.8877 E), Centre (22.2344 N, 42.8657 E), and West (29.0957 N, 35.5765 E). The first site is located in Oman while the remaining two are in Saudi Arabia.
The time difference between the GCC and India, especially relating to coincident solar power generation in the former and peak demand hours in the latter, is a key factor in considering the GUI. In order to analyse the importance of this time difference, three potential sites for a solar PV farm are selected and included in the techno-economic model. Each site is considered independently of the other – only one site is active in each scenario. The three sites are each analysed across the 25 samples described in the previous section to provide a set of 75 scenario runs.
Counterfactual Analysis
A key criterion in the design of the financing of an interconnector project is understanding which of the interconnected parties has the most to gain from the interconnection. The benefitting party is more likely to finance the interconnector and therefore the capital structure and costs of capital is dependent on who the interconnector beneficiary is.
Determining the interconnector beneficiary is not trivial. Interconnected countries experience a range of benefits including reduced system marginal costs, reduced system capital costs, access to markets, and stability of electricity supply (SARI/EI/IRADE Team 2019). These benefits may be asymmetrically distributed and difficult to quantify. They also depend on the choice of counterfactual scenario. A counterfactual scenario with a hard decarbonisation constraint, for example, will have a different distribution of marginal and capital costs than a business-as-usual baseline.
To develop some initial insight into the distribution of benefits of the proposed interconnector, we compare a counterfactual business-as-usual case that has been constrained to not build the interconnector to an unconstrained central scenario. Figure 2 shows that the addition of the interconnector has a large impact on the mean marginal cost of electricity in interconnected countries, weighted by hourly electricity demand. The interconnector reduces mean electricity costs in GCC countries. These savings may or may not be forwarded to rate payers depending on the design of the electricity market.
Figure 3 shows that the presence of the interconnector decreases total system costs in GCC countries, while total system costs in India are largely unchanged. This is consistent with the findings of the technoeconomic model that show that most interconnector trade volume occurs in the direction of electricity export from India to the GCC.
Despite the finding of reduced marginal and system costs in GCC countries, it remains unclear which country or collection of countries will have the most incentive to pay for the interconnector. Interconnectors are often built to give national champion industries access to export markets, such as the Ireland-UK interconnector built by the Ireland grid operator to give zero-marginal-cost Irish wind power access to the UK power market (SARI/EI/IRADE Team 2019). Considering that this project is of national interest to the Government of India under the One Sun, One World, One Grid concept, geopolitical interests may prove the determinant of which party builds the interconnector.
In the financial model, we proceed with the assumption that the interconnector will be championed by the Government of India, built by Indian companies, and financed by development and investment banks operating in India.
Business Model Selection
The business models of the proposed interconnector describe how it will make revenue to cover its costs and service its debt. Four business models have been identified which can provide cost recovery for the proposed interconnector.
- Generator Supply Dedicated Line - For a unidirectional line from a generating station to a demand node, costs are recovered directly from the sale of electricity. Typical of, e.g., remote hydro power resources.
- Regulated grid tariff - A regulated tariff for transmission capacity, levied by the regulator. A typical arrangement for, e.g., domestic transmission lines. Tariffs may be levied on generators or consumers.
- Transmission rights model - Retailers buy forward transmission rights which have fixed prices. Typical for well-coupled markets, e.g., France-UK.
- Congestion charge model - Interconnector levies a variable ‘congestion’ charge. Most common between markets where variable arbitrage opportunities occur, e.g., between wind-rich Ireland and the UK.
Because two-way trading is desired for the CCG-GUI project, consistent with the One-sun-one-world-one-grid concept, a generator-supply business model is not appropriate for the financial model. The least-costs decision-making of the technoeconomic model takes full advantage of time-of-use marginal costs, so the financial model must also reflect the significant and variable arbitrage opportunities expected to exist between the GCC and Indian power markets. As such the design of the financial model proceeds assuming a variable time-of-use tariff consistent with a congestion charge model. This tariff will be determined by the technoeconomic model and will be based upon the difference between the marginal costs of electricity in India and the GCC.
Interconnector Capital Structure
Models for financing large electricity infrastructure projects include private finance, utility finance, and public-private partnership. These financing arrangements feature different typical capital structures for the legal entity that owns the interconnector. The capital structure of the entity will be used to determine the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) which will be used to interpolate the technoeconomic results. The capital structure also plays a crucial role in the cashflow of the interconnector project, determining interest payments and financing fees.
For a project of this size, a public-private partnership is typical, where governments, regulated companies, private lenders, and multilateral financial institutions jointly finance the infrastructure. This implies a capital structure that combines private and public (government) equity, commercial debt, concessionary loans, and public grants. Concessionary loans would typically be provided by a multilateral development bank.
We prepare a baseline capital structure which can be adjusted according to different assumptions. This capital structure is comparable to other large interconnector projects, such as the PowerLinks interconnector that carries electricity from Bhutan to New Delhi, India (PowerLinks Tranmission Ltd 2009). summarises the GUI baseline capital structure and compares it to the PowerLinks capital structure.
Table 3: GUI baseline capital structure and comparison project
|
GUI Baseline
|
|
PowerLinks Transmission Ltd
|
|
Grant
|
[Unspecified]
|
2.5%
|
[None]
|
0%
|
Equity
|
[Unspecified]
|
22.5%
|
Tata Power Company Ltd
|
12.9%
|
|
|
Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd
|
12.4%
|
|
Sum
|
25%
|
Sum
|
24.3%
|
Debt
|
Development Bank 1
|
16.5%
|
International Finance Corporation (World Bank)
|
22.5%
|
Development Bank 2
|
19.5%
|
Asia Development Bank
|
19.9%
|
Commercial Bank
|
22.5%
|
Infrastructure Development Finance Limited
|
17.1%
|
Government Debt
|
16.5%
|
State Bank of India
|
15.2%
|
|
Sum
|
75%
|
Sum
|
74.7%
|
Sum
|
|
100%
|
|
100%
|
Cost of Capital
With a capital structure in place, we can begin to develop assumptions for the GUI’s cost of capital. We obtain literature values to provide preliminary assumptions for the cost of equity and the cost of debt of the project.
The World Bank occasionally publishes a schedule of lending rates and fees that can be used to estimate the debt margin and fees levied for World Bank lending (The World Bank 2021). For India, World Bank variable spread lending is available at 0.82% for a 15-year tenor. Keeping with the analogous comparison to the PowerLinks interconnector, we also obtain a similar debt margin for the Asia Development Bank (2021).
For commercial and government debt, the rates are more difficult to obtain. We use a rate of 7% for government lending, slightly more than the risk-free rate for India (countryeconomy.com 2021). For commercial lending, our baseline rate is 20%.
We develop a cost of equity using the capital asset pricing model. In this case we include only the risk-free rate and the equity market risk premium. We assume the risk-free rate to be equal to the yield of a Government of India sovereign bond: 6.15% (ibid.). We use an equity risk premium of 7%, following the recent guidance of RBSA Advisors (2020).
Variable spread lending applies debt margins on top of a baseline interest rate, typically the London Interbank Overnight Rate (LIBOR). We use a baseline LIBOR of 0.2% (bankrate.com 2021).
Cashflow Analysis
With a cost of capital and capital structure decided, the full cashflow of the proposed GUI can be projected. A key difference between the logic of the technoeconomic model and the financial model is that in the technoeconomic model, construction costs are assumed to be overnight in a given year. In the financial model, we recognise that for a construction project of this size, project costs begin several years before the nominal commissioning year. The financial model spreads construction costs over the five years preceding each capacity addition using a fixed spending profile.
Construction costs are met first by grant and equity drawdowns. Once equity and grant allocations are depleted, debt is drawn down to pay construction costs. Each capacity addition is considered a new project phase, so equity can be drawn down for distant future phases, while debt is being drawn down for near future phases where equity funding has been depleted, all while debt for previous construction phases is being serviced.
Debt drawdowns occurring prior to debt servicing will incur interest payments during the construction period. A commitment fee is also levied on debt which has been committed but not drawn down prior to the commencement of payments (The World Bank 2021). An upfront fee is charged based on total debt requirement when construction begins (Ibid.). These fees and interest payments all increase the total costs and the size of the loans required.
Operating expenses are determined as a portion of the total installed capital asset value. The capital asset value is equal to the unit construction costs multiplied by the installed capacity. In this way, operating expenses scale with the amount of installed capacity and do not extend beyond the equipment's economic lifespan. Following the North Sea Grid annexes, operating expenses are estimated to be in the range of 1.2% to 2% of capital asset value (Flament et al. 2015).
Operating revenue is determined by the technoeconomic model. We assume that the interconnector’s variable tariff captures the full price arbitrage between the GCC interconnection node and the Western India grid node. Trade volumes are determined by the technoeconomic model. Revenue is taxed with a fixed corporate tax rate which we set at 15% as a baseline. For a project this large, the corporate rate would be subject to negotiation directly with the government.
Debt is serviced with fixed annual payments. We adopt a baseline loan tenor of 15 years, fitting the 25-year economic lifespan of the infrastructure. The financial model time horizon therefore extends to 2075, 25 years beyond the end of the technoeconomic model, wherein 2049 is the last available year for an overnight capacity addition. Each overnight capacity addition is retired after its 25-year economic life with no terminal value.
A dividend is paid to the interconnector’s shareholders from the cashflow available to equity. The net present value of the project is calculated using the remaining net cashflow discounted at the calculated weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Other key financial metrics for the project include the equity internal rate of return (Equity IRR) and project internal rate of return (Project IRR). The Project IRR is the IRR for the ‘unlevered’ project. The Equity IRR represents the IRR for the full ‘levered’ project. The Project IRR is used to evaluate returns to the project; the Equity IRR is used to evaluate returns to the project investor. We use the ‘modified’ IRR (MIRR) method, which is always calculable and makes more sound assumptions concerning reinvestment opportunities. The MIRR is also more suitable for multiphase projects with complex cashflows.
Risk Analysis
The sources of uncertainty and risk to a project of this nature can be classified under financial, commercial, and economic risk. Financial risks include interest rate risk, currency risk, and commodity risks. Commercial risks include offtake risk, non-performance risk, construction risk, environmental risk, and security risks. Economic risks include those related to the macroeconomy and drivers of demand.
These risks can be mapped to parameters in the financial model. While this mapping is imperfect, it allows model results to be stress-tested for robustness. Table 4 summarises project risks and their analogous parameters in the financial model which can impaired and stress-tested.
Table 4: Project risks and sensitivity testing in the financial model
Risk
|
Description
|
Financial Model Parameter
|
Financial Risks
|
|
|
Interest Rate
|
Risk that variable rate loans will suffer rate increases
|
Stress test by increasing LIBOR
|
Current
|
Risk that currency valuation/devaluations will increase the project costs or decrease revenues in real terms
|
Potentially transferred as currency hedging. Stress test by increasing opex for option cover.
|
Commodity
|
Risk that covarying or substitute commodity prices will change averse to project economics
|
Included in technoeconomic scenario ensemble
|
Commercial Risks
|
Offtake
|
Unanticipated reduced demand for interconnection services due to offtake failure
|
Stress test by reducing revenue
|
Non-performance
|
The interconnector may suffer unanticipated downtimes or failures
|
Stress test by reducing revenue
|
Construction
|
Construction can suffer delays or cost overruns
|
Stress test by increasing construction costs beyond 100%
|
Environmental
|
Operating and financial impairment due to acute and chronic environmental risks
|
Potentially transferred as additional insurance, imposing additional opex
|
Security
|
Operating and financial impairment due to acute and chronic security risks
|
Potentially transferred as additional insurance imposing additional opex
|
Economic Risks
|
|
|
Macroeconomic
|
Unanticipated reduced demand for interconnection services due to macroeconomic downturn
|
Stress test by reducing revenue
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|