The results of analysis will now be presented in three subsections. The first section solidifies the assertion that the interpretation of advertising rules that rendered the MIS unacceptable to regulators was indeed an institution. (Because, before demonstrating how institutional work occurred in the case under review, it is important to confirm the premise that an institution that needed to be challenged, actually existed). The second and third sections are each devoted to the institutional work carried out by a) a single actor and b) multiple actors from beyond the health sector. Some quotes from the data are included in the narrative in quotation marks, italicised and attributed to their source. The institutional work observed in the case included:
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compliance with the dominant actors’ demands,
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communicating and explaining new ideas to decision-makers,
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problematising the status quo,
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(re)defining concepts and ideas in ways that make new technological interventions acceptable and
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enlisting the help of allies even from beyond the health sector who possess coercive judicial power.
5.1 Was the inhibiting interpretation of advertising laws institutionalised?
To facilitate providers’ uptake of the intervention proposed by MIS, explicit and public endorsement or approval from the state was important. The approval was important to the extent that it signalled to practitioners that it wouldn’t be illegal to participate in MIS’ intervention. This endorsement was however withheld, and this withholding of approval or endorsement became a barrier to uptake. The reasons provided for the withholding of endorsement or approval suggested that an inhibiting interpretation of advertising laws, was the underlying basis for this barrier.
“In terms of Sect. 135 of the Health Professions Act your proposed MIS directory (as seen and considered by the Authority, is advertising ) is prohibited. It’s a NO.” [20151130_Email from the HPAZ]
“the committee carefully considered all the documents at hand and resolved to advise that your proposal is not in line with the Health Professions Act…in particular, Sect. 135. Furthermore, your proposal is not in line with the operations of a health institution based on the interpretation of the definition of a health institution as outlined in the provisions of Sect. 2(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the Health Professions Act” [20160301_PCZ_Decision_letter]
it was also argued that,
“it would not be within public interest to give positive response to the issue of the MIS as there are no satisfactory mechanisms to protect the public” [20160331_HPAZ_Decision_letter]
Although regulators objected to the MIS for several reasons apart from its supposed contravening of advertising laws, our results will focus mainly on the interpretation of advertising laws as the institutionalised barrier that impeded the acceptance of MIS. This is because that interpretation was what exhibited the status of being institutionalised. It was also the point of greatest contention during litigation.
This interpretation of advertising laws met several diagnostic criteria for institutions:
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It resisted change for three years (2015 to 2018) despite several attempts to explain an alternative interpretation to the regulators.
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It was consistently communicated in official correspondence as taken-for-granted fact despite it being later invalidated by two courts of law,
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it was supported by at least one of three pillars that underpin institutions, i.e. the regulative pillar (a legal framework and regulators with the mandate to punish noncompliant actors)
5.2 Institutional work by a lone actor
The three types of actions considered here involved:
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Compliance with the demands of powerful actors (i.e. regulators). It was hoped that by complying with regulators’ demands for: more information, wide stakeholder consultation and practical demonstrations, their objections to the MIS would be abated.
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The production of texts that communicated to regulators and practitioners about how the proposal to operate the MIS did not constitute illegal advertising of medicines or health services. It was envisaged that if they understood that what MIS proposed to do was not illegal, they would endorse it. Furthermore, in communication, it was emphasised how allowing the MIS to operate was the constitutionally appropriate thing to do, given that the rights to information and to healthcare, were provided for in Zimbabwe’s Constitution.
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The production of texts that problematised and questioned the appropriateness of the status quo for patient health.
The decisions to pursue these three actions were shaped by the professional logic and the state technical logic, which prioritise patient interests and recognise regulatory institutions as the legitimate gatekeepers of the healthcare institutional field in Zimbabwe, whose approval ought to be secured before the deployment of a healthcare intervention. The decision to frame what the MIS intended to do as legal and constitutional was influenced by the state judicial logic which views matters from the perspective of legality and constitutionalism.
- Compliance with the demands of powerful actors (i.e. regulators)
From the time the MIS concept was introduced to regulatory bodies for endorsement, several requests for more information and stakeholder consultation were made by the regulators before they ultimately communicated the decision that the MIS could not be legally operationalised. For example:
“We refer to your letter dated 5 October 2015 and the associated documents which were considered by the Practice Control Committee. The Committee resolved that you come to the Council offices to give oral submissions on the proposed concept and do a dummy run of the concept for the Committee to clearly understand your proposal” [20151016_PCZ_request_for_Presentation]
“MIS is requested to organise and fund a stakeholders’ demonstration workshop where you would make a presentation to the stakeholders in the medical industry. During the presentation, stakeholders will ask questions, give fair input and get a better understanding of your proposed project” [20151021_HPAZ Request_for_Stakeholders_Meeting]
Each request was complied with, including the request to host a stakeholders’ meeting. Although the stakeholders’ meeting lacked coercive power to make binding enforceable decisions, it was a legitimate decision-making forum according to the professional logic. It was therefore hoped that any endorsements coming from the stakeholders would persuade the regulators to shift their position.
On its own, compliance with these requests was ineffective in changing regulators’ perception around what counted as illegal advertising, and ultimately, perceptions around the legality of the MIS. This finding highlights the challenges encountered by actors seeking to disrupt institutions in the sector within which they are embedded. Actors within an institutional field (in this case, professionals within the health sector) may find it challenging to disrupt institutions within their field because as they try to do that, they are limited by that field’s dominant arrangements or beliefs that shape even their own cognitions and decisions (Maguire, 2007). These actors try to institute change while acting within the limiting confines of the logics that influence both them and the actors they wish to change. In this instance, the professions logic belief held by advocates of MIS, that healthcare regulators were important actors whose demands needed to be acquiesced to in order to convince them to embrace an intervention, was actually a hinderance for a year (see case timeline).
2. Production of texts that communicated and explained to regulators and practitioners how the MIS’ intended operations did not constitute illegal advertising of medicines
The first indicator that advertising rules were being interpreted in an inhibiting way was a global email communication sent to all healthcare providers in Zimbabwe by the HPAZ warning them that getting involved with the MIS “would be advertising, which is prohibited by the Health Professions Act” [20150728_HPAZ_Warning_to_Providers].
Thereafter, in written correspondence to regulators and in face-to-face presentations to their decision-making committees, I emphasised the legality of the MIS and how it would operate without contravening advertising laws. E.g.
“Section 135 of the Health Professions Act [Chapter 27:19], prohibits health practitioners from advertising outside the regulations of their respective professions. Subsection 135(1) of the same, defines advertising as publishing any statement or claim in a newspaper, magazine, notice, handbill, pamphlet, card or circular, and broadcasting any statement by electronic or other means except in such manner as may be specified in any regulations or rules made under this Act which define ethical practice or discipline in the health profession concerned. By these two definitions, what the MIS and all the providers who subscribe to it intend to do is therefore not advertising. The MIS will not publish any claims in print form or broadcast messages to the general public by any means. What the MIS will do is respond to individual queries or questions presented to it by patients. That is after all, the mandate of health professionals; to answer questions presented to them by patients to the best of their abilities” [20150802_MIS Letter to Health Professions Authority].
Again, on its own, similar to compliance, communication did not result in regulators endorsing the MIS. Even the framing of MIS as constitutional and legal, (the same argument presented months later by court judges), was not sufficient to change regulators’ position. it is reasoned that the arguments I presented were not effective because as observed by Maguire [33], I lacked the coercive power to compel dominant actors (i.e. the regulators) to abandon their institutionalised interpretation of advertising laws.
3. Production of texts that problematised and questioned the appropriateness of the status quo
What led regulators to conclude that what MIS proposed to do would be illegal had its basis in the principle of regulating direct-to-consumer advertising of medicines in the public interest [34] (state technical logic).
“Healthcare professionals are bound by the convention that they should refrain from advertising since patients (and their families) experiencing health concerns are particularly vulnerable to persuasive emotive advertising and publicity” [20170322_HPAZ_Heads_Of_Argument].
(N.B. Heads of Argument is a document submitted to a court of law, that summarises the key points and arguments of the case).
In response to sentiments such as the one expressed above, which emphasised advertising restrictions, I produced texts that highlighted advertising restrictions’ negative impacts on access to information. In those texts, the advertising regulations were problematised as compromising swift access to medicines and patient adherence to prescribed treatment. This assertion was couched in the professional logic, characterised by consideration for patient care. In communication with the regulators, the advertising legal framework was problematised as being inconsistent with the values of upholding patient interests.
“The tragedy of [advertising restrictions] is that, patients in an economy where no pharmacy has every registered medicine in stock all the time, patients have to move door- to-door in search of the medicines they require, compromising adherence to treatment and ultimately their health.” – Author [20150802_Letter_to_HPAZ]
Yet again, on their own, these texts did not succeed in getting regulators to alter their position on the MIS.
Attention is now turned to the institutional work carried out by multiple actors.
5.3 Institutional work enabled by allies within and beyond the health sector
The four types of actions described here were the ones that depended on the collaborative actions of multiple actors rather than the isolated efforts of one. They involved:
- construction of a new shared understanding of medical advertising
- litigation
- defining/redefining concepts and ideas
- the emergence of other actors who embraced the newly-legitimised practice of providing patients with medicine availability information
- Allies helped with the construction of a new shared understanding of medical advertising
Before the courts were approached, my legal counsel, a human rights lawyer working pro bono, wrote to the regulators, explaining how the medical advertising laws “must be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of Zimbabwe” [20160622_MIS_Lawyers_first_letter_to_PCZ], i.e. in a way that promotes citizens’ constitutional rights to information and healthcare and freedom of expression.
2. Litigation
After unsuccessful attempts to secure the desired state approval from healthcare regulators, legal proceedings were initiated. Litigation was meant to secure a different (hoped to be more favourable) interpretation of advertising rules from a state authority that unlike me, possessed the coercive power to invalidate the healthcare regulators’ interpretation of advertising laws i.e. the judiciary. The texts my legal counsel submitted to the High Court, problematised the regulators’ interpretation of the advertising rules as not only incorrect, but unconstitutional as it had the effect of potentially depriving citizens access to information and healthcare, both of which were constitutionally guaranteed rights. The same texts requested a declaration that the proposed intervention didn’t ‘contravene section 135 of the Health Professions Act, read together with the Constitution’ . In other words, an invalidation of the institutionalised interpretation of advertising laws was sought. Litigation was enabled by the state judicial logic, which is preoccupied with the supremacy of constitutionalism, and which considers courts as legitimate forums, lawyers as legitimate experts and judges as legitimate decision-makers on matters, including matters concerning healthcare practice and digital technologies.
A High Court ruling held that the regulators’ interpretation of advertising rules that had led them to consider MIS’ proposal illegal, was erroneous. The regulators appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had erred in its interpretation of the medical advertising laws. Yet again, it was decided by the Supreme Court that MIS’ proposal to digitally avail medicine availability information was not in contravention of advertising regulations:
“the proposed database…doesn’t contravene Section 135 of the Health Professions Act”
[20181109_Supreme_Court_Order] (VERD_01).
(N.B. Section 135 of the Health Professions Act was the clause that prohibited direct-to-consumer medical advertising).
3. Defining concepts and ideas
In delivering a court verdict that invalidated the regulators’ inhibiting interpretation of advertising rules, the High Court defined/redefined four ideas and concepts:
- the constitutional duty of state agencies (e.g. courts and regulators),
- the correct method of interpreting legislation (including advertising legislation),
- what ‘advertising’ means and
- what ‘a health institution’ means
Defining these four allowed the Court to justify the invalidation of the regulators’ institutionalised interpretation of advertising laws that had inhibited them from approving MIS and its intended operations. Below, I elaborate on these four.
First, a definition of the constitutionally-enshrined duty of state agencies (including regulatory bodies and courts) was provided, before concluding that regulators had neglected that duty.
“The courts and agencies of the government have a duty to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are protected. They must facilitate rapid and equitable development and in particular take measures to promote private initiative and self-reliance. The regulators failed to discharge their constitutional duty to consider the rights and freedoms of the applicant [Author] and those of the public, while they were considering the MIS proposal…It is a fact that they [regulators] seemed to be ignorant of such a duty.. I have no desire to emasculate the Constitution... the duty owed by the courts to the public, to assist in bringing about rapid development in the promotion of private initiative and self-reliance, enjoin me to grant the court order sought.” [20171213_High_Court_Judgement]
In this way the court defined itself as a government entity that could remedy the regulators’ neglect of constitutional duty.
Second, the High court defined how legislation (including advertising legislation) ought to be interpreted:
“An interpretation of legislation where it occurs in the interests of the public, must yield to upholding the rights enshrined in the Declaration of Rights. If the interpretation made by a tribunal discounts the guaranteed rights of an individual or the populous, then the determination will be deemed unconstitutional…Thus, because the regulators determined the MIS proposal based purely on their interpretation of the various statues without having examined the Declaration of Rights or at least referring to it, they clearly erred.” [20171213_High_Court_Judgement].
By defining what was the right method of interpreting legislation (the method that used a constitutionalist or rights-based lens), the High court succeeded in justifying the invalidation of the regulators’ interpretation of advertising laws that was in its view, unconstitutional.
Third, the High Court defined what advertising meant in its view. Thereafter it concluded that what the MIS intended to do did not count as advertising:
“the [regulator], objected to MIS on the basis that the proposed intervention was unlawful because it amounted to advertising, which is prohibited by Section 135 of the Act. To my mind, what applicant [Author] has in mind is making a publication of information by electronic means and that is most certainly NOT advertising in the sense of pitting one institution or profession against the other.” [20171213_High_Court_Judgement]
Fourth, the High Court judge defined the MIS as a health institution, contrary to the regulators who had ruled otherwise. While the regulators argued that they used the definition of a health institution provided in the Health Professions Act, the Court used the common dictionary definition of a health institution:
“MIS qualifies to be described as an institution because it is ‘an organisation with a special purpose’. (Merriam Webster) dictionary)…instead of recognising that its raison de etré is that of registering health institutions and to promote the enhancement of health services for the benefit of the public, the regulator made its decision based on a restrictive interpretation of what the law deems to be a health institution” [20171213_High_Court_Judgement].
This [re]-defining of MIS as a health institution rendered its operations (providing information) eligible to be identified as a legitimate health service, rather than acts of illegal advertising.
Both the actions of a single actor and the collaborative actions of multiple actors (including those beyond the health sector) were instrumental in challenging the interpretation of advertising laws in Zimbabwe that were effectively a barrier to a potentially useful digital health intervention. It would appear that in terms of observable effect, litigation proved to be more effective in undermining the institution in question than other discursive institutional work actions that preceded it. However, it was a record of those preceding actions convinced the High Court that other remedies had been pursued prior to approaching the Court. It was vital to prove that other actions had been tried, because when operating within the state judiciary logic, exhaustion of non-judicial remedies is required, before actors pursue administrative justice through Zimbabwean courts [35].
“The HPAZ has insinuated that the applicant ought to have taken the matter up on appeal to the [HPAZ]…instead of approaching this Court. ….My view is that this is without merit. Appealing to the regulator is of no use to the applicant since the [HPAZ] has already stated its position.” [20171213_High_Court_Judgement].
4. The emergence of other actors who embraced the newly-legitimised practice of providing patients with medicine availability information
Part of successfully disrupting institutions may include the adoption by other actors, of newly-emerging trends after they have been demonstrated as viable by other actors [16] some extent, this too was observed in the case considered in this paper. By 2020, several interventions enabling access to medicines availability information had come into use in Zimbabwe [36, 37, 38] including a pilot run of the MIS concept. Further empirical work is required to test whether this invalidation of the institution translates into sustained change in shared meaning and norms regarding medical advertising in general and digital medicine information platforms in particular, or whether it is an uncomfortable order imposed on actors by the judiciary.